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Abstract 
 
The objective of this study was to describe the process of internationalization of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to explore the reason for the 
differences in the pace of internationalization of firms. This is due to the fact that 
increasing evidence shows that in spite of small size and inexperience in 
international transactions, high value-adding manufacturing firms are capable of 
outrunning their larger, more resourceful counterparts in foreign markets. The 
problem studied were more specifically: Which factors influence the pace for SMEs 
to increase their resource commitment to a foreign market and which factors 
influence the pace for entering new country markets? 
 
The international strategy an SME chooses is assumed to depend upon the firms’ 
key employees’ experience and network, the characteristics of the industry, how 
global it is and the characteristics of the product(s).  
 
The problem was investigated using a case study design, more specifically by 
carrying out in-depth interviews of founders or other key employees in twelve case 
firms. The case companies were selected from a pool of respondents to a survey that 
was carried out in the Autumn 2001. The population of that survey was defined to be 
SMEs in Norway, founded after 1990 (registered in the Kompass database), an SME 
being defined as firms with less than one hundred employees. Based on preliminary 
findings of the firms’ export share and market selection the twelve case firms were 
categorized into four different groups: gradual international (GI), born global on the 
export dimension (BGE), born global on the market dimension (BGM) and true born 
global (TBG). This study thus gives a more nuanced view on the socalled born 
global. It is found that it might be useful see the born global as a more heterogenous 
group than has been done previously. In addition, the study departs from other 
studies in focusing on the market selection dimension in studying the increased 
international commitment as opposed to the entry mode dimension which most 
previous studies have focused on. 
 
It was concluded that the SMEs which may be recommended to venture abroad at an 
early stage are the ones with; 
- a unique product/or production process 
- founders or other key employees with extensive experience and network from 
previous employment in similar industries, in particular will the ones with strong 
relations to key persons in large, successful organizations have a large advantage, or 
the ones with good and well-established relations to certain actors in the industry 
supporting them with knowledge and insight to areas they themselves are lacking 
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(f.i. research institutions) will be at an advantage compared to those not having such 
relationships (e.g. they have to start at start-up with establishing such relationships). 
 
- products adapted for a global market – may need to venture abroad and an earlier 
stage in the firm’s development, compared to firms with products for which there 
exists a sufficient home market. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The purpose of this study is to describe the process of internationalization of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to explore the reasons for the differences 
in the pace of internationalization of firms, why are some firms born global? 
Furthermore, the study of several cases are intended to allow for better 
understanding or improved ability to theorize about the concept of 
internationalization of SMEs. Empirical evidence, from many countries, supports the 
notion that firms often internationalize by benefiting from what they learn by 
experience, i.e. their market knowledge increases gradually and uncertainty and risk 
is reduced over time for each new country. However, in 1988 Johanson & Mattson 
pointed out that some firms follow other internationalization patterns. They argued 
that the degree of internationalization of markets (e.g. the frequency, intensity and 
integration of relationships across borders in the particular industry market) has an 
impact on the internationalization process of the individual firm. In highly 
internationalized markets, firms may leapfrog some of the stages in the learning 
process. More recently, many authors (e.g. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Knight & 
Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais, 2000), have found empirical 
evidence of yet another type. Some exporters are born global. These are firms that 
aim at international markets or even the global market from their inception. They do 
not seem to follow any kind of staged learning process leading to 
internationalization, i.e. their behaviour is beyond leapfrogging.  
 
Knight & Cavusgil (1996) argue that the slowness of the process described in 
traditional internationalization literature may be an indication of management’s 
aversion to risk-taking and their inability to acquire relevant knowledge and 
information. The fact that the process seems to be speeded-up now, may partly be 
explained by the notion that management in rapidly globalizing firms are less risk-
averse and/or have better access to relevant information. The environment has 
changed a lot since the “traditional internationalization theories” were developed, 
e.g. the increased level of globalization in many industries may constitute an 
explanation for the observed increase in the pace of internationalization of firms. 
This increased globalization, which is believed to lead people to perceive the world 
as being smaller, may also induce managers to perceive the risk of entering foreign 
markets as being lower. One driver of globalization is believed to be the 
development of advanced communication technology, i.e. an industry described as 
having a high degree of globalization will by definition be characterized by having 
information transferred more easily and faster than in less global industries. This 
increased access to information may decrease the psychic distance between 
countries, which has previously been seen as a major obstacle for the international 
expansion of firms (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
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Despite the importance of SMEs to international marketing, little is known about 
how they prosper under globalization or about globalization’s moderating role on 
entrepreneurship and marketing strategy. According to Knight (2000), most SMEs 
are disadvantaged in an increasingly global environment because they lack the 
resources of large multinationals. Waters (1995) states that one manifestation of a 
globalizing world is just the emergence we now see of entrepreneurial start-ups that 
have an international outlook from inception.  
 
The faster pace may also at least partly be explained by the fact that professionals 
with cross-national experience and inter-cultural competence are available in much 
larger numbers than just ten years ago and also founders of new companies have 
much more elaborate international experience, skills and networks than previously 
(Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais, 2000). Oviatt & McDougall (1994) also state that 
recent technological innovation and the presence of increasing numbers of 
employees with international business experience have established new foundations 
for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Traditionally, these were developed from 
large, “mature” domestic firms, but the increased use of low-cost communication 
technology and transportation means that the ability to discover and take advantage 
of business opportunities in multiple countries is not the prerogative of large, mature 
corporations anymore. Crick & Jones (2000), for instance, found that several firms 
were set up by managers who have experience operating in international markets 
from previous employment. They have experience in dealing with the complexities 
of international operations and have acquired an appreciation of the risks and 
resource implications. Finally, but not less important, they have developed a 
network of customers and contacts that they can use and rely upon when setting up 
their own firms. Whatever the reasons are, there is increasing evidence that shows 
that in spite of small size and inexperience in international transactions, high value-
adding manufacturing firms are capable of outrunning their larger, more resourceful 
counterparts in foreign markets.  
 
The focus on SMEs and the influence on their development stemming from 
increased globalization is an area in need of further study (Knight, 2000). In 
addition, this study will have an explicit focus not only on the increased 
commitment to markets as is the more common indicator of a firm’s degree of 
internationalization (see f.i. Pedersen & Petersen, 1998), but also on market 
selection or more specifically on the degree of market spreading. The theoretical 
contributions in the area of foreign entry mode, have been more advanced than other 
topics of the firm’s internationalization (Andersen, 1997). The level of analysis 
studied here are the individual, the reasoning behind this will be further elaborated 
in chapter four. The traditional level of analysis when studying the process of 
internationalization, is the firm (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 1990; Cavusgil, 
1980; Johanson & Mattson, 1988; Madhok, 1997; Andersen, 1997, among others).   
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1.2 Internationalization 
1.2.1 The Born Global Phenomenon  
According to Bradley (1995), there are basically two dimensions which represent the 
key strategic decisions in connection with a firm’s internationalization, (1) 
international market selection, and (2) choice of entry mode. With regard to the 
market selection dimension, the so called born globals (BGs) often start activities in 
many markets simultaneously and do not always prefer starting in those markets that 
are closest. The product is developed for a global-/international market (Madsen, 
Rasmussen & Servais, 2000). Bell (1995) explains this in the following way, 
“psychic distance has become much less relevant as global communication and 
transportation infrastructures improve and as markets become increasingly 
homogeneous” (p.62).  According to Pedersen & Petersen (1998) the pace by which 
firms commit resources may differ substantially, but the tendency is for firms to 
increase their resource commitment to a foreign market over a period of time, 
starting to serve foreign markets with agents and later internalizing the activity by 
changing to wholly owned subsidiaries. It is assumed that the internationalization 
process of firms is currently proceeding faster on both dimensions (Hedlund & 
Kverneland, 1985) than traditional theory predicts. Thus, the research questions 
addressed in this thesis are: which factors influence the pace for SMEs to increase 
their resource commitment to a foreign market and which factors influence the pace 
for entering new country markets?   
 
The term international usually refers to either an attitude of the firm towards foreign 
activities or the actual carrying out of activities abroad (Kindleberger, 1962 in 
Johanson, 1994). The attitudes are the basis for decisions to undertake international 
ventures, and the experiences from international activities influence these attitudes. 
Tayeb (1992) argues that companies engage in international business when the 
possibility of achieving the company’s objectives is either diminishing at home 
and/or there are great opportunities abroad.   
  
The first born global study was conducted by Rennie (1993) who identified a “new 
breed” of Australian firms which were “born global”. According to this study born 
globals tended to be small (e.g. average sales $16 million) and relatively young (e.g. 
average age of 14 years), they had begun exporting on average, two years after their 
establishment and generated three quarters of their total sales from exports. The 
companies were found in all industries, but they all applied new technologies to 
developing unique products or a new way of doing business and, according to 
Junkkari (2000), as a result were strikingly competitive against established large 
players. 
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1.3 Methodological approach 
Taking the explorative nature of the study, the complexity of the outcome variable 
and the need for processural data into consideration, a comparative case study 
approach was chosen to study the pace of internationalization of twelve case firms. 
 
The analysis is based on a combination of primary and secondary data sources. The 
collection of primary data consists primarily of semi-structured interviews. The 
secondary data sources consists of external information sources such as newspaper 
articles and the Brønnøysund register, as well as internal documents such as 
newsletters, annual reports, customer lists and a number of other important 
documents. 
 
The approach in this thesis is both to compare the different cases to see if any 
patterns replicate themselves across the cases, and to look at each case’s history to 
get a picture of the dynamics in the internationalization processes. A quite detailed 
roadmap is proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) who defines eight stages in the process of 
theorybuilding from case study research; 
 
Roadmap of a case study
Getting started
Selecting cases
Crafting instruments
Entering the field
Analyzing the data
Shaping hypotheses
Enfolding literature
Reaching closure
 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989:532) 
Figure 1: Roadmap of the study 
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First it is about getting started, i.e. the research question(s) have to be defined. 
Second, the cases to be studied have to be selected. The cases are chosen based on 
theoretical selection not random. Third it is about crafting the instruments or 
choosing methods of data collection and fourth it is suggested that the researcher 
enters the field, that is, the collection of data is starting either through interviewing 
and/or participant observation. The next step is analyzing the data using within-case 
analysis and cross-case pattern search and based on this the shaping of hypotheses or 
propositions is done as the sixth step before enfolding literature. That is, compare 
the data with conflicting and/or similar literaure, and finally the eight and last stage 
is to reach closure, in other words, to sum up the main findings and the different 
implications of these and the limitations of the study. With regard to the analysis in 
this study, it was divided into four main stages: (1) establishing the case firms’ 
milestones (chronology), (2) coding and writing up the data according to phases and 
themes, (3) comparing the cases, and (4) applying theory.   
1.4 Outline of thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: first an overview of the chosen perspectives on 
firms’ internationalization processes is given in chapter two, before the conceptual 
framework is presented in chapter three. In chapter four the research design is 
described and operationalizations of the main concepts are made. The way the cases 
have been chosen are also elaborated on in chapter four and how the actual data 
collection has been carried out before the chapter is concluded with a discussion of 
validity and reliability issues. The twelve cases are described in some detail in 
chapter five, with focus on the different dimensions believed to have an impact on 
the pace of internationalization. In chapter six the cases are further analyzed and 
results compared with relevant theory in the field and propositions following from 
these findings are then presented. Finally the main results of the case study are 
summarized and implications are made in chapter seven. The final chapter also ends 
with some suggestions for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Internationalization can be described as the process of adapting exchange transaction 
modality to international markets (Calof & Beamish, 1995). Root (1987) defined 
entry mode as an institutional arrangement for organizing and conducting 
international business transactions, such as contractual transfer, joint ventures and 
wholly-owned operations. The existing literature does not seem to have reached to 
an agreement on which conceptual framework and constructs should be used to 
explain a firm’s foreign market entry. Some of the most frequently used frameworks 
on internationalization will be reviewed next and it will be elaborated on why one 
theory has been chosen over the other.   
  
Traditionally international business researchers focused on large multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) (Gabrielson et al, 2006) and following from this, much of the 
focus has been on how and when to carry out foreign direct investments (FDIs). 
Entrepreneurship researchers focused primarily on venture creation and the 
management of SMEs within a domestic context. In recent years however, the 
demarcation segregating international business and entrepreneurship has begun to 
erode (Gabrielson et al, 2006). The literature has reached the point of specifying that 
“international entrepreneurship is a combination of innovative, proactive, and risk-
seeking behaviour that crosses national boundaries and is intended to create value in 
organizations”, (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000:903).  
   
This chapter gives an overview of the most used theories on internationalization. 
Many of the theories on internationalization or choice of entry modes overlap. The 
theories have been divided into two main categories: economic theories, which 
include transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1971;1981) or internalization theory 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976), eclectic paradigm or OLI-framework (Dunning 1980/88) 
and different global management and strategic behavior theories (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1985; Knickerbocker, 1973; Porter, 1986). Then there are behavioral 
theories with their roots in the resource-based theory (Penrose, 1959), including the 
stages theory of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), network theory 
(Johanson & Mattson, 1988), social network theory (Granovetter, 1973), 
entrepreneurship theories (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Stevenson, 1984) and the 
organizational capability perspective (Madhok, 1997).   
2.2 Economic Theories 
2.2.1 The Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
The TCT belongs to the new institutional economics paradigm, in which the firm is 
viewed as a governance structure (Williamson, 1985). The TCT seems to be 
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especially effective in explaining vertical integration decisions, and has been used to 
predict entry mode for manufacturing firms a well as for service firms. Transaction 
costs are the costs of running the system and include ex ante costs, such as 
searching, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement, and ex post costs, 
such as monitoring and enforcing agreements. The transaction cost theory focuses 
on inter-organizational governance of a seller-buyer relationship. Specific assets, the 
frequency of economic exchange and uncertainty surrounding the exchange of 
resources between buyer and seller, represent the core dimensions of the transaction. 
The composition of these dimensions is decisive for the way cost efficient 
governance modes are assigned to the transaction (Williamson, 1971; 1981). The 
decisionmaker is supposed to be boundedly rational and sometimes display 
opportunistic behavior. In the last decades, TCT has been commonly applied in 
research on foreign market entry modes (e.g. Erramili & Rao, 1993). In choosing 
entry modes, firms are supposedly making trade-offs between control (e.g. benefit of 
integration) and cost of resource commitments (e.g. cost of integration).  
 
The “theory of internalization”, which the TCT is sometimes called, assumes that a 
multinational enterprise has somehow developed a firm-specific advantage in its 
home market (Johanson & Mattson, 1988). Usually this is in the form internally 
developed, intangible assets that give the firm some superior production, product, 
marketing and/or management knowledge. If this asset cannot be exploited and 
safeguarded effectively through market or contractual transactions, an “internal 
market” has to be created. Expansions outside the firm’s domestic market then, take 
place through horizontal and/or vertical integration. The firm establishes or buys 
manufacturing plants outside its home market. “Internalizing” has costs in the form 
of internal administrative systems and risk-taking. These costs of internalization will 
be lower the less different the foreign market is from the home market. Thus, the 
internalization model predicts that international expansion starts in “nearby” 
markets. The internalization model is not intended to explain processes, but attempts 
to explain a specific economic institution, the multinational enterprise. Lorenzo and 
Lipparini (1999:317) argue that “..transaction costs, focusing as it does on a single 
transaction, is not appropriate for understanding learning and innovative processes 
when knowledge is broadly distributed and the locus of innovation is found in a 
network of interorganizational relationships”. 
 
Most of the studies on foreign market entry modes, have made some modification of 
the TCT. The modified TCT predicts a positive relationship between asset 
specificity and propensity for high-control entry modes. Although the extensions of 
the TCT could enrich our knowledge of a firm’s entry mode, such modifications 
imply that the assumption of transaction cost minimization is abandoned. Use of 
other decision criteria than transaction cost minimization could lead to other 
conclusions concerning choice of entry mode, than would be suggested by the 
original TCT. TCT has limitations in that firms evaluate the merits of control not 
only on the reduction of transaction costs, but also on other non-TCT-related 
considerations, such as global integration and market power (Andersen, 1997; 
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Dunning, 2000). Madhok (1997) demonstrates that when using benefits or values 
instead of the transaction cost minimization as a decision criteria, other conclusions 
are reached concerning which entry mode a firm should select. Andersen (1997) 
raises other issues of concern with regard to the modified TCT, he points out that 
while most TCT-studies on entry mode have used firm level as unit of analysis, the 
unit of analysis should according to the theory be the transaction. Bloodgood, 
Sapienza and Almeida (1996) are also critical and argue that while some firms may 
internationalize to reduce costs by internalizing the transfer of goods and services 
across national borders, it does not explain activities that are directed towards 
accomplishing strategic goals having little to do with reduction of costs. In addition, 
according to Tallman (1991), TCT is an economic theory of organizational structure, 
not strategy, since international strategy is the main dependent variable here, this 
theory does not seem very appropriate for this study. Furthermore, the issues of 
control and integration subsume TCT, which is static in nature, and may not be 
completely relevant in the context of global technological advances and dynamic 
innovation wherein firms are able to both disinternalize through alliance capitalism 
and exercise control at the same time (Dunning, 1995; 2000). Additionally, there 
might be problems of operationalization since transaction costs are seen as difficult 
to measure a priori.   
 
The TC theory does not focus on firms’ potential production constraints, as there is 
no attention to what extent the integration of an activity will fit a firm’s existing 
competence or resource base. TCT has also been criticized for ignoring the 
importance of trust (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Although trust appears to be an 
essential element in explaining the nature of economic organization (cf. Braddach & 
Eccles, 1989; Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1982), it is not incorporated in the mainstream 
model of TCT. Relations and trust within the relationships to different actors, from 
customers and suppliers to research institutions, may be of even greater importance 
for these new types of internationalizing firms, born globals, than to the larger and 
more resourceful MNEs. The large MNEs and their FDI decisions have been the 
main focus of the economic theories of internationalization. 
2.2.2 The Eclectic Framework 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1979, 1980, 1987, 1988) endeavours to predict foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) by firms. Despite the significance of theories such as the 
International Product Life Cycle theory (Vernon, 1966; Onkvisit & Shaw, 1983; 
Toyne & Walters, 1993), the Markets Imperfection Theory (Hymer, 1976), Strategic 
Behavior Theory (Knickerbocker, 1973; Graham, 1978; Casson, 1987), the 
Resource Based Theory (Penrose, 1959; Cantwell, 1995; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; 
Madhok, 1997; and Andersen, 1997) and the TC theory (Williamson, 1981; 1985), 
Dunning (1995) states that they were singly incomplete and could not adequately 
explain either the choice of FDI over exporting and licensing or the choice of where 
to locate the FDI. As and alternative Dunning (1980;1988) proposed an eclectic 
theory of international production. The eclectic paradigm is, according to Benito 
(1995), by far the most popular general theory on internationalization. Benito (1995) 
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believes Dunning’s paradigm is more of a multi-level framework than a theory. He 
states that the eclectic paradigm is a synthesis of the perspectives of market power 
(e.g. industrial organization), internalization (e.g. transaction cost) and location (e.g. 
international trade theory). Dunning (1980;1988) suggests that the following factors 
will influence a firm’s choice of entry mode; ownership advantages (e.g. firm 
specific assets and skills), locational advantages (e.g. reflect attractiveness of 
specific country; market potential & investment risk), and internalization advantages 
(e.g. costs of choosing a hierarchical mode of operation over an external mode; 
transaction costs).  
 
The strengths of the theory can be characterized by its richness (e.g. several 
explanans) and its creativity (e.g. generation of new determinants and combinations 
of these with existing ones). The strengths may however, also be the potential 
weaknesses of the theory. When increasing the number of explanans, the problems 
of establishing demarcation lines between the different concepts may arise. Itaki 
(1991) for instance, believes that the concept «ownership advantage» is redundant. 
For predictive purposes, many economists would prefer to use relatively few 
explanans in order to ensure simpleness. Secondly, the use of several explanans is 
likely to create problems with regards to analyzing and interpreting the effects of 
interrelationships among the determinant factors. Solberg & Askeland (2005) stated 
that the broadness and multiplicity of the eclectic framework makes it vulnerable to 
complexity and tautology, leading to difficulties in predicting causality. Thirdly, the 
concept «locational advantage» is likely to have a direct influence on the 
international market selection (IMS). The assumption that the choice of entry mode 
and IMS can be regarded as independent decision processes may not be true; f.i. do 
firms select a country where the locational advantages are perceived as being great 
(e.g. high market potential, low production costs), but where the government 
restrictions narrow the feasible set of entry modes? Most entry mode literature 
assumes that the entering firm has the option to choose any entry mode in a given 
country. This may not be the case in a real setting. The focus of this paradigm is, as 
stated at the top, on FDI’s, this is a high-risk and high-commitment entry mode, not 
much used by the socalled born globals (Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais, 2000). 
Finally, unlike the behavioral approaches discussed in section 2.4, the eclectic 
paradigm is static, which might also make it inappropriate considering that 
internationalization is a dynamic concept, a process. 
2.3 Global Strategic Management 
2.3.1 Strategic Behavior Theory  
 
“The internationalization process of the firm cannot be seen in isolation; it can only 
be analyzed by understanding the environmental conditions as well as the actual 
relationships of the firm in question”, (Madsen & Servais, 1997:572).   
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Bell (1995), in his study of small computer software firms, found that existing 
internationalization models did not adequately reflect the underlying factors of the 
internationalization processes in these firms. He found that the process was strongly 
influenced by domestic and foreign client followership, the targeting of niche 
markets and industry-specific consideration rather than the psychic distance to 
export markets. 
 
The definition of “environment” in Madsen & Servais’ (1997) article is perceived to 
relate to what Johanson & Mattson (1988) term “degree of internationalization of the 
market”. “Level or degree of globalization” can be seen as a continuation or 
extension of that concept due to further change in environment since the 80ies when 
the network theory was developed. A large body of literature has evolved on 
strategic responses to the increasing degree of globalization in markets, but mainly 
on large multinational enterprises (Hamel & Prahalad, 1985; Porter, 1986; Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Yip, 1992). The strategic responses of SMEs to the development 
have received relatively limited attention (Knight, 2000; Solberg, 1997).  
 
Levitt (1983:102) define globalization as “the process of homogenization of demand 
and increasing economies of scale, forcing companies to standardize their 
production and marketing at high levels of output in order to cut costs and thus gain 
competitive edge”. Porter (1986) also sees the globalization trends, but calls for a 
global strategic approach coupled with local adaptation, “glocalization”. “Industries 
globalize when the benefits of configuring and/or coordinating globally exceed the 
costs of doing so” (p. 33). A more simple definition is given by Sölvell (1988), 
“global competition implies competition covering the world” (p. 182). In other 
words, globalization is seen as an extreme case of international competition. The 
definition used in this thesis is Sölvell’s (1986) relatively broad one and it is 
applicable both at firm- and industry level. 
 
The interplay of globalization forces such as governmental drivers (e.g. reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and creation of trading blocs), market drivers 
(e.g. convergence of consumer behavior, global customers, homogenous products), 
cost drivers (e.g. economies of scale/increasing minimum efficient scale) and 
competitive drivers (e.g. convergence of practices, global networks) eventually 
pushes the industry to becoming global (Yip, 1989). In many cases, a global industry 
is characterized by oligopolistic competition, with a high degree of transparence 
among the firms’ capabilities and strategic actions. Hence, the strategic choices of a 
firm can be expected to have an impact on other companies in the industry, also in 
other markets (Porter, 1986). 
 
In contrast is a so called multi-local industry characterized by heterogeneous 
markets and competition that occurs domestically and independently. In other 
words, actions in one market do not affect the activity in other markets (Porter, 
1986). There might still be a significant importance of international trade, but no 
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dominant international players (Solberg, 1997), and the MNC organizes its 
subsidiaries as a portfolio of national businesses (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). A 
global industry is, according to Solberg (1997), characterized by a limited number of 
global players, in addition to a segment of smaller, specialized companies. Moen & 
Servais (2002) state that the globalization on industry level, may be one of the 
reasons for the change found in the export behavior at the firm level over the last 
decade. 
 
Hamel & Prahalad (1985) offered a new framework for assessing the nature of the 
worldwide challenge. The argument above (by Levitt, 1983) emphasized the scale 
and learning effects that transcend national boundaries and provide cost advantages 
(Porter & Rudden, 1982). Levitt (1983) held the view that world products offer 
customers the twin benefits of the low-cost and high-quality incentives for foreign 
customers to lay aside culture-bound product preferences. Hamel & Prahalad (1985) 
believed that this perspective was incomplete and misleading; “Companies must 
distinguish between the cost effectiveness based on offshore sourcing and world-
scale plants, and the competitive effectiveness based on the ability to retaliate in 
competitors’ key markets” (p. 142). They believed what drives global competition is 
aggressive competitors using cash flows generated in their home market to subsidize 
attacks on markets of domestically oriented foreign competitors. Then there is 
retaliation, not in the aggressors’ home markets where the attacks were staged, but 
in foreign markets where the aggressor companies are most vulnerable. This is 
analogue to what is labeled the strategic behavior theory by Malhotra, Agarwal & 
Ulgado (2003). According to this theory, there is a propensity of firms in an 
oligopolistic industry to move in tandem to maintain industry stability 
(Knickerbocker, 1973) that is, they match the strategic behavior and activities of 
their rivals to minimize risk and uncertainty. The main motive of this theory is 
explaining the pattern of FDI and the main explanator identified, is the dynamics of 
international competition. Motivated by the desire to minimize risks under great 
uncertainty, most firms under oligopolistic industries resort to imitating each move 
their rivals make, including the establishment of production facilities abroad. Casson 
(1987) also showed that firms in global industries use FDI as a preemptive strategy, 
that is, as a way to protect their domestic markets from foreign competition by 
waging competition through FDI in the latter’s own market. With its focus on FDI’s 
and retaliation through the use of such high-commitment modes in the different 
competitors’ markets, the strategic behavior theory and other theories of global 
management might not explain very well the processes of SMEs lacking the 
resources to make such moves. However, whether or not the industry is global, is 
still important to establish in order to explain the reason for the firms’ speed of 
international expansion. How SME’s might overcome their disadvantage of being 
just a midge among the large olipolistic players in a global industry will be 
elaborated on in the next section.     
2.3.2 Niches 
Madsen & Servais (1997) state that the rise of BGs are due to at least three factors, 
the two first are closely connected; new market conditions, technological 
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developments and more elaborate capabilities of people. New market conditions 
have arisen because of increased specialization and hence a number of niche markets 
are seen. The domestic demand is too small (even in large countries) for these very 
specialized products. These new market characteristics are to a high degree caused 
by some basic changes in technology. New production process technology implies 
that small-scale operations may also be economically sound. Transportation of 
people and goods are more frequent, reliable and even cheaper than before, i.e. cost 
barriers for an international approach has been removed. World markets become 
more accessible because of developments in communication e.g. low cost due to fax, 
e-mail and so on.   
 
Fast paced internationalization is believed to be commonplace among firms that 
target small, highly specialized, global “niches” and is believed to be particularly 
prevalent among SMEs located in small, open economies that face the double 
jeopardy of targeting narrow “niches” in small domestic markets (Bell, McNaughton 
& Young, 2001). Moen (2000) also found that small firms tend to follow a niche 
focus strategy and that this strategy is further linked to product quality and high 
attention to personal selling. Both product quality and personal selling render a 
positive impact on export performance. Accordingly, the small firms in Moen’s 
(2000) study seem to have developed an export strategy (e.g. niche focus) that 
reduces their size disadvantages. This is in keeping with Pavitt (1990) who describes 
the key strength of the small, innovative firms as their ability to match technology 
with specific customer requirements. The link between niche strategy and personal 
selling revealed, in part, a way to try to reduce the perceived risk associated with the 
export venture. High attention to personal selling may be a means by which small 
firms gain the necessary understanding of customers’ needs in foreign markets. 
 
The finding that small firms often follow a niche focus strategy (Moen, 2000) is 
consistent with Solberg’s (1997) framework, aimed at analyzing the strategic 
options for small and medium sized firms competing in international markets. 
Implicitly in this strategic option, is the view that when small firms are operating in 
markets exposed to international competition (e.g. home markets), they do not have 
any other choice than to focus their resources on an international niche strategy 
targeting small customer groups. Christensen (1991) makes a similar description, 
linked to what he calls “the small and medium sized exporter’s squeeze” (p.49), 
where mainly external factors make it necessary for small and medium sized firms 
to start exporting when lacking internal resources and export competence (Moen, 
2000).  
 
Caves & Porter (1977) explain the advantages of following a niche strategy with the 
concept of “mobility barriers”. Mobility barriers are defined as barriers specific to a 
limited group of firms within an industry (Caves & Porter, 1977). One underlying 
factor determining mobility barriers is the strategic behavior of firms through their 
investments. Competitors can either match such investments or adopt a different 
strategy to counter the initial actions of their rivals (Caves & Porter, 1977). Then 
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gradually develop different strategic groups, with different sets of entry barriers, 
making their products non-substitutable within their immediate customer base. This 
is seen as one reason why smaller firms using suboptimal technologies and scales 
may profitable co-exist with larger, state of the art, low cost facilities. Focus allows 
the small player to avoid head-to-head competition with larger, broadly-based firms 
that tend to target mass markets. Nearly all respondents in Knight, Madsen & 
Servais’ (2002) study also applied what can be termed differentiation strategy, 
which is the offering of products perceived by customers as unique. “Younger firms 
typically lack the resources to compete with large MNEs on the basis of low costs or 
superior market power and thus, such businesses may distinguish themselves by 
offering superior quality products in niche markets” (p. 6). In other words, the 
choice of a niche strategy is closely related to the type of product a firm is offering 
and this will be discussed in more detail next. 
2.3.3 Product Characteristics 
Why may it be necessary to “jump stages” on the way to international markets? 
According to Solberg (2001) some market settings are characterized by extremely 
high growth or short product life cycles, and in such settings it might be necessary to 
get a broad (and therefore in most cases international) market coverage in the early 
phases of the life of the product in order to 1) capitalize on R&D investments and 2) 
preempt competition from gaining market share (Kogut, 1990). 
 
According to Porter (1980), the evolution of an industry is closely associated with 
the traditional product life cycle (PLC). During the process, industry structure is 
likely to change, in terms of competitive situation and customer sophistication. The 
difference in comparative advantage of small and large firms at different stages of 
the innovative process is discussed by Williamson (1975) “an efficient procedure to 
introduce new products is for the initial development and market testing to be 
performed by independent inventors and small firms (perhaps new entrants) in an 
industry, the successful development then to be acquired, possibly through licensing 
or mergers, for sequential marketing by a large, multidivisional enterprise”. There 
might thus be an expectation of the firms (e.g. the born globals) changing forms over 
time. Again, the focus is on large players and it seems to be an implicit assumption 
that only large MNCs are able to compete in the long-run in the global market place. 
Shanklin and Ryans (1984) divided the development of high technology industries 
into three separate phases, requiring different talents of the firms; the patent driven 
stage, the supply-driven stage and the demand-driven stage. Overall, this indicates 
that small firms may have an advantage over larger during initial stages of product 
development, due to flexibility and a possibility to engage in the close customer 
contacts required for successful product adaptation and application development. 
Therefore, a rapid speed of foreign entry would be preferred among these firms, in 
order to cover R&D expenditures before price competition increases or the 
technology becomes obsolete.  
 
Type of product may thus also influence the choice of strategies for going 
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international and/or global. If there is a product with a short product life cycle (as in 
most high technology products) this creates a need for large R&D costs. Short PLCs 
also call for higher innovativeness in order to launch new versions or products to 
compensate for the decline of original ones. This is even more problematic for small 
firms compared to larger, more mature firms, they are not likely to have the 
resources and capacity to enter the mass markets. In other words the small firms 
have to find a way to compete with the large MNCs, one way may be aiming for 
small, speciality segments not large enough to interest their large counterparts. 
2.4 Behavioral Theories  
2.4.1 Internationalization Process Theories 
A behavioristic approach to internationalization indicates the need for a sequential 
process of learning about foreign activities (Lindqvist, 1991). Researchers began to 
systematically examine the internationalization process of firms at the end of the 
1960s. These studies focused on attitudes and behavior of firms in the process of 
going international (Li & Cavusgil, 1995). Empirical studies in this area 
concentrated on testing whether internationalization was an incremental and gradual 
process. The results are non-conclusive. Karafakioglu (1986) found that the majority 
of the firms he studied experienced a sequential and gradual process starting as 
uncommitted exporters and increasing their commitment as firms’ size and export 
volume grew. On the other hand, Diamantopolous’ (1988) and Millington & 
Bayliss’ (1990) failed to support the incremental view of the process of 
internationalization. However, all researchers agreed that there were different stages 
in the internationalization process. These conflicting findings may suggest two 
different processes at work, sequential and random. In the former, firms go through 
different stages in sequential order. In the latter, firms leapfrog certain stages.  
 
Stage theory of internationalization contends that a firm’s international operations 
will gradually increase as it gains knowledge and experience in the international 
arena. The main point is thus, the more international experience a firm has the more 
able it will be to expand internationally. The next paragraph will briefly describe the 
main arguments within this string of literature, the so called U- and I-models. 
 
An underlying assumption of all these models is that firms are well established in 
the domestic market before venturing abroad (Bell, McNaughton & Young, 2001). 
Johanson & Vahlne’s internationalization model, The Uppsala Internationalization 
Model (U-model), rests on the resource-based theory (Andersen, 1997). The basic 
assumption of Johanson & Vahlne’s model (1977/90) is that performing activities 
creates internal assets such as skills and (experiential) knowledge. Johanson & 
Vahlne’s classification of market knowledge is based on Penrose’s definition 
(1959:53): “One type, objective knowledge, can be taught, the other, experience or 
experiential knowledge, can only be learnt through personal experience….”. The 
establishment chain, as Andersen (1997) calls Johanson & Vahlne’s approach, has 
some points of resemblance with the eclectic framework, concerning the emphasis 
on firms’ knowledge. The main difference between the perspectives, is that the 
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establishment chain describes the entry mode decision as a time-dependent process, 
i.e. the explanation of a particular state (e.g. entry mode) is based on some prior 
state or a sequence of some prior states. In contrast, the eclectic framework attempts 
to predict a firm’s entry mode based on current values of a set of independent and 
moderating factors. 
 
In The Innovation-Related Model (I-model), the internationalization decision is 
considered an innovation for the firm. They focus on the learning sequence in 
connection with adopting an innovation. The models (Bilkey & Tesar, 1977; 
Cavusgil, 1980; Czinkota, 1982 & Reid, 1981) are derived from Roger’s stages of 
the adoption process (Rogers, 1962, pp. 81-86).  All four models are very similar 
except the two first presume that the firm is not interested in exporting at stage 1 and 
partially interested in Stage 2. This, according to Andersen (1993), implies that they 
believe there must exist some sort of “push” mechanism or external change agent 
that initiates the export decision. In the two latter models, the firm is described as a 
unit more interested and active during the early stages. In these models Andersen 
(1993) believes a “pull” mechanism or internal change agent is more relevant 
explanation to why the firm moves to the next stage. 
 
The process theories assume that the firm will gradually increase its commitment 
from sporadic export to direct investment. On the question on which market to 
select, the process theories suggest firms would enter new markets according to their 
psychic distance. Psychic distance being defined as factors preventing or disturbing 
the flow of information between the firm and the market, including factors such as 
differences in language, culture, political systems, level of education, or level of 
industrial development (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). A learning experience in one 
culturally distant country produces a knowledge base for further expansion within 
the same cultural sphere. Thus, firms start internationalization by entering those 
markets they can most easily understand. There they will see opportunities, and 
there the perceived market uncertainty is low. The arguments for the gradual pattern 
are discussed in length in the article of Johanson & Vahlne (1977). Andersen (1993) 
states that the other authors explicitly or implicitly build on Johanson & Vahlne’s 
contribution. 
 
The focus here will be on the U-model, since that is the more general one that the 
others are based on. It should be noted that Johanson & Vahlne (1977; 1990) have 
not included co-operative modes of entry (e.g. franchising, licensing, management 
contract and so on) in their establishment chain. In view of the frequent use of such 
entry modes, this is obviously a weakness. When judging the early contributions of 
the U-model (and I-model), we have to take into account that the world may be 
considered far more complex than when these (traditional) theories were first 
advanced. Cooperative modes of entry were not as widespread in the seventies as 
they are today. The authors (of traditional theories) pay little attention to market-and 
firm specific characteristics that can account for the behaviors they observe, they 
focus more on the relationship between information acquisition and market and 
market commitment, rather than on the (critical) issue of strategy formulation. 
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Reid’s (1984) view is consistent with the writings of Penrose (1959), who argued 
that firms strategically and deliberately adapt to evolving circumstances in their 
market environment. The stages model has thus been criticized as being 
deterministic (e.g. the firm will start at stage A, then it will go to stage B and so on). 
The firm’s ability to make strategic choices regarding appropriate modes of entry in 
overseas markets, are then denied (Reid, 1983; Root, 1987). That may be missing 
the point. The main argument in the stages model is that internationalization is a 
process based on experiential learning in foreign markets (Madsen & Servais, 1997). 
This process may take different forms one of which has been suggested by Johanson 
& Vahlne (1977), e.g like “rings in the water”. Hedlund & Kverneland (1985) 
suggested that due to the internationalization of markets, market knowledge had 
increased and uncertainty then decreased, making the basic mechanisms of the U- 
and I-model less important than they had been in the past. Another important aspect 
with regard to the increased globality is the fact that, in a global industry, the firm 
would probably not have the option of comfortable choosing to initially enter 
markets depending on psychic distance or on internal resources of the firm (Solberg 
& Askeland, 2005). They will most probable be “forced” out by the strength of 
competition in their home market. However, Madsen & Servais (1997) state that a 
falsification of the surface manifestations is not necessarily the same thing as a 
falsification of the reasoning behind the traditional model. The basic assumptions 
may still be valid, even for fast internationalizing firms. Such firms’ perception of 
uncertainty with regard to international markets is typically lower because the 
founder and other employees have gained international experience prior to start-up. 
Since some of this international experience is confined within individuals, new 
ventures formed by these individuals may be able to capitalize on their experience 
and expand internationally (Bloodgood, Sapienza & Almeida, 1996). The same 
argue that the firm’s possession of specific advantages, knowledge, and experience 
are keys to whether new ventures will internationalize early and whether such efforts 
will be successful. 
 
The critique of the TCT and the IPT is quite similar in that they both focus on the 
firms’ internal development and do not take into consideration the importance of 
external assets, e.g. important relationships. They are both seen as losing their 
explanatory power as the firm and the environment gets more internationalized. In 
sum, both the transaction cost approach and the internationalization process model 
leave out characteristics of the firm and the market, which seem especially important 
in the case of “global competition” and co-operation in industrial systems. Another 
weakness of the IP perspective, is that it is not considering mode changes involving 
decreasing foreign commitment. The IP perspective’s focus on knowledge and 
learning as a presupposition for internationalization is however, very important. 
 
When it comes to the internationalization process theory which describes 
internationalization in terms of cognitive learning and competency development 
which increases, through experience, over time, this seems very valid indeed with 
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regard to the BG phenomena, only the process is moving a lot faster than assumed in 
the IP-perspective. But again, the internationalization is traditionally measured at 
firm level. The process of learning is still believed to take time, but the focus in this 
study is on the individual level. This means that the process of learning and building 
experience may have been going on (and most probable have) for quite some time at 
an individual level, before the BG firm has been established. There are evidence that 
founder(s) of BGs in many (most) cases have extensive experience from previous 
employment maybe from large multinationals, i.e. we still assume a gradual 
development at the individual level. However, the process of learning and building 
experience may still be a bit faster than traditionally assumed, due to today’s 
advanced information and communication technology which give better access to 
information than earlier. 
 
While the U- and the I-models are useful for classifying firms according to their 
degree of internationalization, neither model can be used to explain and predict the 
movement of the firm from one stage of development to the next (Andersen, 1993). 
In addition, the models make no attempt to explain how the internationalization 
process actually starts. While knowledge of market opportunities is presumed to be 
the key driver of both the dynamic U-model and alternative I-model, little is known 
about the ways and means by which firms come to identify specific exchange 
partners (Ellis, 2000). It is likely that the availability heuristic plays some role in the 
identification of exchange partners (Liang & Stump, 1996). This will be elaborated 
on in the next sections where networks’ importance on a firm’s development both a 
firm level and individual level, will be discussed at length.  
2.4.2 Network Theory 
Industrial Network theory  
“The sequential model….stresses only the early stages of internationalization….this 
model should be supplemented with research on new patterns of internationalization 
of the 1980s and 1990s…” (Melin, 1992:111). Pedersen & Petersen (1998) also 
suggest that the inclusion of other internal and external factors provide a more 
complete explanation of the pace by which a firm commits resources to foreign 
markets. In the special case of born globals, network theory may thus have some 
explanatory power. Johanson & Mattson (1988) pointed out that internationalization 
processes of firms will be much faster in internationalized conditions. Both in the 
case of a late starter and an international among others (Johanson & Mattson, 
1988:298) even a purely domestic firm has a number of indirect relations with 
foreign networks. Hence, market investments in the domestic market are assets, 
which can be utilized when going abroad. In that case it is not necessary to go from 
a nearby market to more distant markets, and the step abroad can be rather large in 
the beginning.    
 
Classically, there has been an assumption of a clear boundary between the firm and 
its environment and the environment has been defined as; “anything not part of the 
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organization itself” (Miles, 1980:195). Firms have been viewed as “solitary units 
confronted by faceless environments” (Astley, 1984:526 in Andersson, Håkanson & 
Johanson, 1994). In the 1990s the perspective was changing to one of a firm 
interacting with its perceived environment. In contrast with the classical 
specification, a network perspective better captures the notion that the boundary 
between the firm and its environment is much more diffuse (Andersson, Håkanson 
& Johanson, 1994). The environment is not completely given by external forces but 
can be influenced and manipulated by the firm, and there will also exist external, 
known actors that are influencing some of the firm’s internal functions. Ellis’ (2000) 
findings support the hypothesis that knowledge of foreign market opportunities is 
commonly acquired via existing interpersonal links rather than collected 
systematically via market research. The notion of relationships does, according to 
Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson (1994:2) “indicate that firms do not treat the 
environment in a generalized or standardized way, but that they interact with 
specific “faces” “. The network perspective has moved away from a “faceless” 
environment towards a more specified environment made up of identified 
counterparts. According to this theory thus, internationalization occurs as a result of 
multilateral externalization through business and social networks rather than through 
internalization (e.g. FDI). These network relationships influence initial market entry 
and mode of entry (Coviello & Martin, 1999). The same found that small software 
firms rely on network relationships for rapid growth in the internationalization 
process.  
 
Companies make use of resources; a combination of technical, personal, financial 
and other resources is always needed in a business enterprise. Some of the resources 
can be provided internally but a substantial part must be secured from external 
providers through relationships (Håkanson & Snehota, 1995). If a firm possesses 
some but not all needed resources, a common response is to combine resources with 
an external organization using co-operative arrangement. This is supported by Jolly 
(1989) who sees the growth in alliances as a direct result of globalization. The 
global logic of strategic alliances is based on the observation that the fixed costs of 
manufacturing, R&D, building and maintaining a brand, and operating a sales and 
distribution network on a global scale are too high for most companies to bear alone. 
For the resource constrained firm, the primary advantage of this tactic is that 
markets can be entered more quickly than if full ownership is used. As resource ties 
develop between two companies they become mutually and increasingly 
interdependent.  As a consequence the borderline between the internal and external 
resources becomes blurred. The potency of the resource collection of a company 
thus depends on how it is tied into those of others. 
 
When considering the limited resources of for instance born globals, it can be 
assumed that all types of co-operative modes, ranging from partnership agreements 
through strategic alliances to networks, will play an especially important role in the 
implementation of their globalization strategies. It has been argued that 
interorganizational learning is critical to competitive success. Von Hippel (1988) 
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found that more than two-thirds of the innovations he studied could be traced back 
to a customer’s initial suggestions or ideas. Several studies suggest that a firm’s 
alliance partners are, in many cases, the most important source of new ideas and 
information that result in performance-enhancing technology and innovations.  
“Relationships may well be, and we argue that they are, the most significant 
resource in what makes a company capable of unique performance”, (Håkanson & 
Snehota, 1995:137). They are the kind of asset that is difficult to reproduce and 
imitate for others and therefore critical for a company’s performance (e.g. Itami, 
1987). Relationships cannot be controlled by any single party in isolation but are 
controlled jointly by the parties involved. A relationship is jointly owned by the 
parties who have “invested” in it. Relationships are resources of a peculiar type as 
their value does not diminish with use, they cannot be used up, extensive use can 
often enhance its value. A company’s ability to handle the ties might be more 
important for its results than the amount and type of more physical resources it 
possesses. A company’s total capability is thus determined by the total resources it 
can mobilize through relationships. Bonds between companies arise because of 
bonds among individuals. This brings us on to the concept of social capital. Social 
capital can be defined as the goodwill which is engendered by the fabric of social 
relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action (Adler & Kwon, 2002).   
 
What has been regarded as one of the fundamental principles of organizational 
design is that organizations react to uncertainty in their environment by removing 
transactions from the market and placing them in more hierarchical contexts 
(Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1980). More recent research has started to question the 
generality of this principle by showing that when market uncertainty increases, 
individual companies tend to interact more, rather than less, with other 
organizations. For instance, Ellis (2000) found that decision-makers in practice 
respond to the inherent risks associated with foreign market entry (FME) by placing 
more not less, reliance on their social ties as a means of economizing on these higher 
search costs. The main effect of market uncertainty is thus, not the absorption of the 
source of uncertainty within corporate boundaries, but increased reliance on external 
partners who are known and trusted as reliable (Baker, 1992). Contrary to 
assumptions of the normative literature, international markets are not anonymous 
and the process of internationalization can be legitimately described in terms of 
establishing relationships in foreign markets (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990).   
The Organizational Capability Perspective 
“The firm seeks the maximization of profits based on long-term global strategy. The 
maximization of long-term global profits is not merely a matter of maximum rent 
extraction from a particular market, but building the capabilities and knowledge of 
the company as a whole”, Contractor & Kundu (1998:329). 
 
This perspective has recently been introduced to explain entry mode choices. 
Madhok (1997) present it as an alternative to TCP, while Aulakh & Kotabe (1997) 
have perceived it more to be complementary. The economic perspective has 
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dominated the literature on global strategy in the last two decades (Collis, 1991; 
Buckley & Casson, 1985; Hennart, 1991; Yip, 1992). The internalization theory is 
considered to be the TC theory of the multinational corporation and research on the 
topic of entry mode has predominantly been from this perspective (Madhok, 1997). 
This perspective analyzes the characteristics of a transaction in order to decide on 
the most efficient, i.e. TC-minimizing, governance mode. But lately, there has been 
increasing attention to the notion of firms competing primarily on the basis of 
capabilities. This argument is rooted in the resource-based perspective (Penrose, 
1959). In this perspective the historical dimension of a firm’s activities is critical, 
since its past experiences engender the underlying routines on the basis of which it 
undertakes subsequent actions. When applied in a global market the resource based 
theory builds on the international trade theory of comparative advantage (Malhotra, 
Agarwal & Ulgado, 2003) and is seen as analogous to the organizational capability 
approach. A firm enters global markets when it can exploit and develop its 
comparative advantage, capabilities and societal resources for a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Andersen, 1997). The entry mode chosen for foreign 
markets however, depends on the type of resource advantage. If the firm-specific 
advantage for instance, is superior knowledge based on tacit information, the firm 
should pursue a hierarchical governance structure (e.g. internalization) rather than a 
market structure. In contrast, if the firm faces capability constraint in an unfamiliar 
area of activity, collaborations are a useful vehicle for enhancing knowledge 
(Madhok, 1997). Similarly, a strategic alliance between two firms becomes a 
resource when the relationship promotes efficiency and effectiveness in a market 
offering. While the key consideration of the TC approach in selecting entry mode is 
cost minimization, the OC perspective focuses on the value of the firm’s 
capabilities. The focal concern shifts from the extent TC saved by not conducting 
the transaction through the market mechanism to the extent of value sacrificed, in 
terms of overall rent-generating capacity, by not conducting the transaction within 
the firm. Madhok (1997) believes the assumption of opportunism is not required, he 
claims that the very fact that collaboration is increasingly prevalent especially in 
globally dynamic and knowledge-intensive industries, suggests that firms are willing 
to trade off some potential losses from opportunism for the opportunity to develop 
their capability base. According to Madhok (1997), there is a distinct shift in 
orientation; the implicit default mode in TC theory is the market whereas the 
implicit default mode for OC is hierarchy.   
 
The OC perspective shares the notions of bounded rationality with the TCT and the 
eclectic perspective, but rejects the assumption of opportunism, which is central in 
the TCT. The OC perspective is rooted in the resource-based theory and shares the 
emphasis on experiential knowledge with the Process Theory on 
Internationalization. The focus on a firm’s resources or capabilities are important in 
that it might help managers differentiate between resources and/or capabilities that 
might support a competitive advantage from other less valuable 
resources/capabilities (Peteraf, 1993). Madhok (1997) stresses the importance of 
finding a balance between exploitation and development of a firm’s capabilities. 
Aulakh & Kotabe (1997) state that the organizational capability perspective is useful 
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in understanding firms’ skills and resources relevant to integration decisions in 
foreign markets. It has earlier been an implicit assumption in resource-based theory 
that competitive advantage comes as a result of resources and capabilities owned 
and controlled by a singel firm, but this view is changing, inter-firm cooperation 
permits firms to share resources and thereby overcome resource-based constraints to 
growth.  
  
The OC perspective, with its focus on both firm’s capabilities (of which knowledge 
is one component) and relationships, covers both the internal and the external 
aspects of the international development of firms. This theory may be seen to follow 
naturally from first the IP theory, where building knowledge through own 
experience is central, then the network theory where the importance of relationships 
for knowledge-transfer is central.   
 
A problem is that the broader network perspective offers little guidance to those 
firms whose network horizon is limited to the local market (presumably most 
SMEs). For such firms international expansion is problematic and is seen to follow 
the default hypothesis of psychic distance (Andersen, 1997). But this assumption is 
based on a level of analysis at firm level. By moving down to individual level we 
will find that even newly established SMEs may have a network of importance for 
international expansion. We should look towards social network theory, which 
considers the transmission of information through interpersonal networks; 
“information disseminates through society via social interaction” (Ellis, 2000:447). 
Seen from this perspective, knowledge of foreign market opportunities are 
contingent upon the idiosyncratic benefits of each individual’s social network. In 
other words, information search activities would appear to be selectively influenced 
by those existing social ties, linking the initiating decision-maker with others that 
are in some way connected to a particular foreign market. In addition to providing 
connections into other markets, social ties are useful for screening and evaluating 
potential exchange partners. Larson (1992 in Ellis, 2000) observed that 
foreknowledge of a potential partner’s reputation combined with a history of 
personal relations reduced exchange risk by providing a foundation for mutual trust.  
Social Network Theory 
Irrespective of “whether a relationship is strong or weak, it generates information 
benefits when it is a bridge over a structural hole” (Burt, 1992:28). The logical and 
intuitive appeal of the structural hole hypothesis is supported by anecdotal evidence 
reported in the literature highlighting the role played by personal contacts with 
individuals and organizations in going abroad (Bonaccorsi, 1992; Liang & Stump, 
1996, Reid 1984). “Structural holes”, are defined as the lack of a relationship or tie 
between individuals or groups. Such holes prevent the flow of information and 
knowledge between groups and thereby inhibit the development of new 
combinational capability. Granovetter (1973) showed the importance of casual 
acquaintances in filling structural holes and as sources of unique information. Casual 
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acquaintances or “weak ties” have information that the individual and others in the 
network do not have. The more weak ties, the more information the individual has 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1993). These “bridging” relationships, connecting 
otherwise unconnected groups, may be important for explaining how organizations 
extend their existing capabilities. Apparently, information garnered through weak 
ties can be an important source of new ideas, and by nurturing weak tie 
relationships, individual entrepreneurs can advance emergent social networks and 
the development of new organizational capabilities. Social network theory suggests 
that organizations absorb unique information through weak social ties and distribute 
it through social actors and hierarchical networks (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1999). The 
structural hole hypothesis is not biased towards larger firms with international 
network horizons. That is, social capital, rather than financial or human capital, is 
deemed to be the final arbiter of competitive success for all types of firms in all 
types of settings (Burt, 1992). From this perspective the unit of analysis is the 
structural hole itself, or the relationship that spans it, rather than the more indistinct 
network in which the focal firm happens to be situated. 
 
Uzzi (1997) found that special relationships, which were fewer in number (e.g. than 
arms’-length), characterized critical exchanges. This suggested that arms-length may 
be greater in frequency but of lesser significance and that stringent assumptions 
about individuals being either innately self-interested or cooperative are too 
simplistic, because the same individuals simultaneously acted “selfishly” and 
cooperatively with different actors in their network. His findings suggest that in 
networks of close ties, motivation is neither purely selfish nor cooperative but an 
emergent property of the social structure within which actors are embedded and that 
rationality is neither purely rational nor boundedly rational, but expert. He found 
that the critical transactions on which firms depend most are embedded in networks 
of social relationships that produce positive and unique outcomes that are difficult to 
imitate via other means.   
 
It follows that individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from 
distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and 
views of their close friends (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986:277). Entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be found in positions whose centrality is high and which are connected to 
lots of diverse information sources. Since the early 1990s there has been an 
increased academic interest in the fusion of the two areas of international business 
and entrepreneurship (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000). Wright & Ricks (1994) 
highlighted international entrepreneurship as one of three important emerging 
research thrusts in the field of international business. It is claimed that “international 
business researchers cannot afford to ignore the growing power of entrepreneurial 
firms in international competition, nor can entrepreneurship researchers ignore the 
internationalization of the marketplace” (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000:906). 
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Different Perspectives on Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is seen as a rich and complex phenomenon; “we should not expect, 
or even desire, that it be pinned down by a single, universal definition” (Wickham, 
2006:5). Kilby (1971) noted that the entrepreneur had a lot in common with the 
“Heffalump”, a character in A.A. Milne’s Winnie-the-Pooh, described as: “a rather 
large and important animal. He has been hunted by many individuals using various 
trapping devices. But no one so far has succeeded in capturing him. All who claim 
to have caught sight of him report that he is enormous, but disagree on his 
particulars”. The main focus in this study with regard to the meaning of the word 
entrepreneurship is the founding of a new business (Gartner, 1985). Still, many well-
known entrepreneurs have revitalized an existing organisation rather than building a 
new one from scratch. However, entrepreneurial behaviour in large, established 
companies, often referred to as “corporate entrepreneurship” is not included here. 
Entrepreneurial behaviour may occur at the individual, group, or organizational 
levels (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000), the focus here being on the individual level. The 
idea that the entrepreneur is someone who has established a new business 
organisation is also one which would fit in with most people’s notion of an 
entrepreneur (Wickham, 2006). Innovations have also been suggested as a critical 
characteristic. However, innovation is seen as an important factor in the success of 
all business ventures, not just the entrepreneurial (Wickham, 2006). If looking at 
Meyer et al’s (2002) classification scheme, the main focus here is on the 
entrepreneurial creation. 
Entrepreneurial creation Intrapreneurial creation
SME performance Corporate performance
Small and medium firms Large corporations
Entrepreneurship
Strategic mgmt
 
Figure 2: Meyer et al’s (2002) classification of the domain of entrepreneurship 
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Entrepreneurial creation is concerned with all aspects of the entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurship that address the issue of how entrepreneurs devise and implement 
innovative products, ideas and ways of doing things.  
 
A wider definition is Timmons’ (1994:7) “entrepreneurship is the process of 
creating or seizing an opportunity and pursuing it regardless of the resources 
currently controlled”. Due to the demarcation segregating international business and 
entrepreneurship has begun to erode in recent years, a definition of “international 
entrepreneurship” will now be presented: “international entrepreneurship is a 
combination of innovative, proactive, and risk-seeking behaviour that crosses 
national borders and is intended to create value in organizations” (McDougall & 
Oviatt, 2000:903).  
 
“Only truly internationally entrepreneurial firms are those that are “born global”” 
(Fletcher, 2004:289). Kuemmerle (2002) also stated that; “a growing number of 
entrepreneurs start ventures by simultaneously establishing operations in several 
countries in order to increase the likelyhood of venture success” (p.99). According 
to McDougall & Ovitatt (2000) international business researchers are broadening 
their traditional focus on large multinational companies to also include 
entrepreneurial firms in their research agendas. This is due to the accelerated 
internationalization that is being observed in even the smallest and newest 
organizations; “The use of efficient worldwide communications technology and 
transportation, the decrease in governments’ protectionist policies, and the resulting 
decrease in the number of geographically protected market niches has made it 
possible, if not necessary, for many of today’s entrepreneurial firms to view their 
operating domains  as international” (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000:902).  
 
Traditionally, approaches to research on entrepreneurship neglect the relational 
nature of the process. Instead they treat entrepreneurs either as atomized 
decisionmakers, operating as autonomous entities, or as prisoners of their cultural 
environment, predisposed to entrepreneurship. The embedded nature of social 
behaviour refers to the way in which action is constrained or facilitated because of 
its social context. Entrepreneurship can be described as “…embedded in a social 
context, channelled and facilitated or constrained and inhibited by people’s positions 
in social networks,” (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986:262). The same state that 
entrepreneurs must establish connections to resources and niches in an opportunity 
structure, and it is also believed they at some point are affected by relations with 
socializing agents who motivated them. Stevenson (1984) noted that entrepreneurs 
are driven by opportunity-seeking behaviour, not by a simple desire to “invest” 
resources. By contrast, managers are believed to be driven by a concern to invest the 
resources they manage, treating resources as an end in themselves, rather than as a 
means to an end the way entrepreneurs do. 
here are two undersocialized approaches to entrepreneurship: Personality theories 
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(e.g. which posit that people’s personal traits make them prone to behaving and 
succeeding as entrepreneurs) and economic, rational actors’ theories (e.g. 
neoclassical economic theories view entrepreneurs as rational, isolated 
decisionmakers) (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). With regard to personality theories 
there is a common impression that entrepreneurs tend to be flamboyant extroverts 
who are spontaneous in their approach and rely on instinct rather than calculation. 
Detailed studies, however, have shown that all types of personality perform equally 
well as entrepreneurs (Wickham, 2006). The same claims that personality type, does 
not correlate strongly with entrepreneurial performance and success. 
  
One oversocialized approach is also mentioned (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Certain 
groups are believed to possess beliefs, values, and traditions that predispose them to 
succeed in business. Various groups have been labelled this way; Jews, Chinese, 
Japanese and Lebanese. The unusually high value Chinese for instance, place on 
future-oriented activities (Hofstede, 1993) facilitates increased thrift and persistence, 
which is very favourable for entrepreneurship (Busenitz & Lau, 1996). Chan & 
Chung (1985) concluded that cultural factors were a better explanation of 
entrepreneurship, than structural disadvantage or financial explanations. However, 
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) believe that “national character” arguments must give 
way to models based on an underlying similarity in the economics of all Western 
advanced industrial societies. Rather than posit overdeterministic models, one 
should turn the attention to the situational conditions under which entrepreneurs 
enter business (p. 8).   
 
The social development view regards personality traits as a more complex issue. In 
this view, entrepreneurship is an output which results from the interaction of internal 
psychological and external factors (Wickham, 2006). The view is that personality 
develops continuously as a result of social interaction and is expressed in social 
setting rather than being innate to the individual. The way that people behave is not 
predetermined, but is contingent on their experiences and the possibilities open to 
them. In this view, entrepreneurs are not born, they are made. This is in accordance 
with Aldrich & Zimmer’s (1986) perspective that views entrepreneurship as 
embedded in networks of continuing social relations. ”Within complex networks of 
relationships, entrepreneurship is facilitated or constrained by linkages between 
aspiring entrepreneurs, resources and opportunities” (p. 8). This is in contrast with 
previous beliefs: “Much of the utilitarian tradition, including classical and 
neoclassical economics, assumes rational, self-interested behavior affected 
minimally by social relations….” (Granovetter, 1985:481). Classical and 
neoclassical economists operate with an atomized, undersocialized conception of 
human action.  Granovetter (1985) maintains that actors will not behave or decide as 
atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for 
them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. 
Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations. Granovetter (1985) further argues that the anonymous 
market of neoclassical models is virtually non-existent in economic life and that 
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transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections described. This view is 
supported by Coviello’s study of a New Zealand software firm (1996) where she 
found that the case firm’s extensive network of licencees, distributors, and other 
alliances around the world have been essential to its start-up and survival. 
 
In the ideal-type atomistic market, exchange partners are linked by arms’length ties. 
Self-interest motivates action and the exchange itself is limited to price data, which 
supposedly distil all the information needed to make efficient decisions. At the other 
end of the continuum are embedded relationships, which are characterized by trust 
and personal ties, rather than explicit contracts and these features make expectations 
more predictable and reduce monitoring costs. Embeddedness creates economic 
opportunities that are difficult to replicate via markets, contracts, or vertical 
integration. It is thus a good basis for sustainable competitive advantage for the 
firms involved. 
 
An important difference between theories of multinational enterprise and a theory of 
international ventures seems to be the unit of analysis. Theories of international 
entrepreneurship argue that some firms start out internationally because of certain 
entrepreneur-specific capabilities (vs. firm specific) (Bloodgood & Sapienza, 1995; 
Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; McDougall & Oviatt, 1996). When the entrepreneur 
creates the enterprise, there are no routines in place, but the entrepreneur has a 
vision and a network of contacts that he or she is going to build up further. Thus, the 
study of international ventures has to be concerned with individual learning by the 
entrepreneur as well as with organizational learning of the emerging entrepreneurial 
firm. 
 
From  Fletcher’s (2004) study of two case firms’ international development, it is 
possible to argue that the language of strategy and structure, which is often 
prescribed by many models of international business to enable firms to survive in 
competitive global markets (Levitt, 1983; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Ohmae, 1989), 
is somewhat limited for explaining small business internationalization. Close 
consideration of small business practice highlights the importance of multifaceted 
frameworks of analysis which go beyond the structural, strategic and behavioural 
and which take account of the often chaotic, opportunistic and incremental process 
through which entrepreneurs build international relationships and transactions 
(Buckley, 1991; Andersen, 1993; Calof & Beamish, 1995; Bell & Young, 1996; 
Jones, 1999). “..means that when evaluating the international activity of small firms, 
there is a closer relationship to entrepreneurship than there is to international 
strategy and structure that has tended to dominate small business research” 
(Fletcher, 2004:294). For born global firms the realization of entrepreneurial 
activities cannot be separated from the international business context and market in 
which they are being created. International entrepreneurship is a tightly integrated 
process whereby entrepreneurs envision and realize the emergence of their business 
as an international entity. For these firms, internationalization is not an extension of 
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what has already occurred or “has been” in the home market. For small firms that 
internationalize some years after start-up, on the other hand, the international arena 
is seen as another “site” in which entrepreneurial activities are tried out or practiced. 
Internationalization is seen as an extension of what has already occurred in the 
domestic market and in this sense is also local or regional. As a result of Fletcher’s 
(2004) analysis, it is argued that in staged or gradual internationalization, 
international entrepreneurship is characterized by the extension and broadening of 
entrepreneurial capabilities that have already been developed at home. 
2.5 Discussion 
Broadly speaking, the resource-based view suggests that firms seek to capitalize on 
and increase their capabilities and endowments, whereas organizational economics 
asserts that firms focus on minimizing costs of organizing. The aim of this thesis is 
not to explain choice of entry mode, but rather a firm’s pace of internationalization. 
Thus, the use of process theories on firms’ internationalization, are considered more 
relevant than the more static economic theories.   
 
Traditional theories and models of internationalization have been based on research 
examining the international activities of large, mature firms, often in the context of 
the U.S (McDougall, Shane & Oviatt, 1994). Although these theories explain a 
substantial amount of international business activity of large, mature firms, these 
theories and models do not fully explain the formation and operation of international 
new ventures, especially in today’s new environment. Solberg & Askeland (2006) 
also state that the economic theories appear to be too narrow to cope with the 
complexity of the global competition. 
 
The born globals probably fit in the third cell of Solberg & Askeland’s (2006) 
framework (see below), where theories of networks and alliances are seen as most 
useful to explain firms’ internationalization.  
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Figure 3: Framework for classification of internationalization theories 
Source: Solberg & Askeland (2006:3) 
This position is also analogous to what Johanson & Mattson (1988) term late 
starter. That is, the born globals can be described as firms with low preparedness for 
internationalization and doing business in a global industry. Even though the born 
globals are considered prepared on some dimensions, e.g. committed and 
experienced managers/employees and therefore in possession of foreign market 
knowledge, they are most likely lacking on other important dimensions such as 
market position and solid financial base. If we then look at Solberg’s (1997) nine 
windows  (see below) there are two strategies that are suggested for firms in such a 
position, e.g. seek international niches and prepare buy-outs, it can be interesting to 
see whether these are the preferred strategies of the cases studied here.  
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Figure 4: The nine strategic windows 
Source: Solberg, 1997:11 
Firms in this cell (p. 14) e.g. born globals, do not have the option to carry out a 
stepwise internationalization towards a global market due to the threat of large, 
established MNCs rapidly imitating their products. Born globals do not have the 
financial strength to compete head-on with their larger counterparts, and they also 
most likely lack key capabilities such as distribution channels and established 
customer networks (Solberg & Askeland, 2006). The reason why network theories 
seem most fit for explaining the internationalization of firms in this position, are that 
such firms are likely to have an urgent need to combine internal capabilities with 
resources outside the firm. By nature, such embryonic firms (as born globals) lack 
the internal resources for competing head-on with large MNCs, and thus suffer from 
the “liability of newness” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). However, these firms are able 
to build core competencies through knowledge sharing and development through 
personal networks, mainly through weak ties among key individuals (Sharma & 
Blomstermo, 2003). Born globals are further suggested to internationalize through 
the development of such networks, enabling a stronger adaptation to foreign markets 
(Sharma & Blomstermo, 2003) and actually facilitated by the absence of a leading 
company history or administrative heritage. As suggested by Johanson & Mattson 
(1988), the success of a foreign entry relies on its relationships within a particular 
market rather than the cultural and market specific characteristics. The OC 
perspective makes even more emphasis on the advantages of combining resources in 
a business relationship, it claims that the advantages of a firm are very often linked 
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to the advantages of the network of relationships in which the firm is embedded. 
With its focus on values, as opposed to TCTs more “negative” focus on costs, and 
on the development of resources and capabilities, as opposed to the more short-
termed focus on exploitation of resources, the OC perspective seems more in tune 
with today’s dynamic and increasingly global environment. However, it is not fully 
developed yet and cannot be seen as an established theory. With regard to the 
study’s focus on SMEs and their international development, the resource-based or 
behavioral theories with the special focus on experience and network factors at an 
individual level have been considered most suitable for this study. It is important to 
be aware that both the behavioral and the economic theories assume firms are well 
established in the home market before venturing abroad. This may be seen as a 
concequence of these theories being developed in the 1970s and 1980s where large 
MNCs made out the basis for analysis and the focus of these was that of 
coordination and controlling their foreign acitivities mainly through the use of FDIs. 
New theory has to be further developed with the focus on combining 
entrepreneurship literature and international business as this is more in line with the 
increasing prevalence of socalled born globals or international new ventures. 
However, the conceptual framework will also include elements from the global 
strategic management area. 
2.6 Summary 
Following these theories it can be argued that a firm’s possession of specific 
advantages, knowledge, and experience are keys to whether new ventures will 
internationalize and whether such efforts will be successful. The theories are 
summarized in the table on next page. 
 Economic  Theories 
 
Behavioral Theories 
      
Criteria TCA Strategic     Internationalization Network 
   
Behavior 
  
Unit of Transaction Firm Firm Firm Firm 
analysis           
Explanatory Characteristics of O, L and I Strategic behavior Firm's experiential Firm's business 
variable the transaction (asset advantages of competitors knowledge (formal) and social 
  specificity and      (know-how) (informal) networks 
  uncertainty)         
            
Assump- Bounded rationality Bounded rationality Bounded rationality Bounded rationality Relationship  
tions and opportunism and opportunism and opportunism   oriented 
            
Decision Minimization of  Trade-off between Minimization of risk Trade-off between Network opportuni- 
criteria transaction cost risk and return and uncertainty resource (growth) ties and firm 
        and risk resource constraint 
            
Source of  Efficient management OLI:FDI:OI:contrac- Firm's imitation and Path dependence and Development and 
competitive- of transactions tual agreement:O: preemptive capa- firm's experiential exploitation of 
ness   exporting bility knowledge of market: networks 
        O advantage   
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Modes of Contractual agree- Independent, colla- FDI Indirect and direct  Externalization and 
entry ment, collaborative borative and inte-   exporting and foreign collaboration 
  and integrative grative   production   
            
Strengths Effectively explains Multi-theoretical  Global competitive  Empirical support Support specifically 
  vertical integration approach: RA,TCA dynamics: explains (albeit mixed):rooted for SMEs: focuses 
  decisions in both and international industry stability in the RA and O- on dynamics rather 
  manufacturing and  trade theories   advantage theories of than description of  
  service firms     the eclectic paradigm internationalization 
            
Weakness- Static orientation:does Three theories Considers oligopol- Time-dependent and It is not a predictive 
ess not consider non-TCA 
provide 
overlapping istic industry deterministic evolutio- model and seems  
  cost benefits: most  
explanation of 
entry structure: new nary path does not ad hoc in nature;  
  past studies have used mode choice: L forms of co- include cooperative  qualitative methodo- 
  firms as units of  advantage likely to  operative arrange- entry modes;strate- logy used may be 
  analysis: transaction 
influence entry 
mode ments not gic factors ignored: difficult for theory- 
  costs can not be and international considered less valid in techn- testing: does not  
  accurately measured market selection   ology and services explain internatio- 
        industry nalization of firms 
          that do not have 
          networks 
Table 1. A summary of theories explaining the internationalization process and entry mode choice 
Source: Malhotra, Agarwal & Ulgado, 2003:8 
To sum up, the choice of internalization, e.g. carrying out an FDI as the TC, the 
Eclectic and the Strategic Behavior theories are most focused on, is not a very viable 
strategy for the very young firms with both little resources and firm experience on 
internationalization. According to Solberg & Askeland (2006) the choice of 
internalization depends on high preparedness of the firm in question, in that it 
presupposes extensive human- and financial capital, both in the pre-entry, entry and 
post-entry phase, due to the need for information, and the high resource commitment 
implied by a higher controlled mode. Even though we assume the founders and other 
key employees of so called born globals have extensive experience from working, 
living and/or studying abroad, and in that way the firm can be said to have some sort 
of preparedness to internationalize, the physical and other human resources of the 
firm are often lacking and thus making it unviable to make such a commitment as an 
FDI is to the different the markets they enter. Preparedness is taken as an 
assumption by TCT (Solberg & Askeland, 2006). This implies that for a firm to 
carry out a rational economic analysis, as the TC theory assumes, it must have a 
certain level of preparedness for internationalization. Another factor is also the fact 
that these BG firms are often  seen to enter several markets simultaneously and are 
often aiming for small niches in each country market and it may thus, not be 
justifiable to make large investments in each market. In addition, the economic 
theories appear to be too narrowly focused to cope with the complexity of the global 
competition.  
 
Although it may be useful to establish whether the industry to which an SME belong 
is global or not and the writings on strategic groups (Caves & Porter, 1977) and 
globalization drivers may be seen to contribute strongly to the understanding of the 
emergence of global industry structure, the strategic options that are suggested 
according to this theory for the firms, are to grow and become a dominating player 
through the creation of structural barriers, and thus create oligopolies. This strategy 
is not very viable for internationalizing SMEs, and the theory thus seems limited in 
its ability to advice on moves of an SME, as is the focus of this study.  
 
On the one hand, the “stages” view suggests an evolution to internationalization 
based on cognitive learning and competency development, which increases, through 
experience, over time. It is an internally driven approach to internationalization in 
which firms expand their market scope and operation modes as managers gain 
confidence and learn from personal experience. On the other hand, the network 
perspective shows that international market development activities emerge from and 
are shaped by, an external web of formal and informal relationships. From this 
network-driven behavior, cognitive development also occurs, with learning focused 
on markets entered, the modes of entry used, and the relationships developed during 
the process of internationalization. Therefore, both perspectives encompass 
cognitive processes. Integration of these perspectives brings the internally and 
externally driven views together, allowing a richer understanding of both drivers of 
internationalization, and the emergent patterns of international market development 
activities. It might thus, be useful to use these theories in combination as they 
complement each other, when analyzing firms’ internationalization process.  
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Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The existing literature shows no agreement regarding the conceptual framework and 
constructs that should be used to explain a firm’s internationalization (Andersen, 
1997). The present framework will be based upon some of the most important 
contributions for explaining the pace of internationalization of SMEs. Bloodgood, 
Sapienza & Almeida (1996), argue that new ventures will seek an international 
presence for two reasons: (1) industry conditions (e.g. increased globalization) may 
require an international presence for the company to be competitive, and (2) a 
venture may seek a global presence to capitalize on its unique set of resources (e.g. 
the management team’s experience in global markets, new technologies or 
innovations). According to the same authors, these conditions must be present for 
rapid internationalization to be viable.   
3.2 Independent Variables 
3.2.1 Globality and product characteristics 
One reason for the differences observed in the speeds by which traditional 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and fast globalizing firms become 
international/global, is due to different environmental conditions.  “…the slowness 
of the whole process is a consequence of incremental adaptations to changing firm 
and environmental conditions rather than the result of a deliberate strategy” (Knight 
& Cavusgil, 1996:13). In other words, when the environmental conditions rapidly 
change, as they do when there is increased globalization, the process of 
internationalization is likely to speed up as well. In a closed domestic industry, a 
company accustomed to weak competitors and undemanding customers has little to 
fear, there are no new competitors that might grow strong in more demanding 
competitive arenas. In an open global industry, new and strong competitors abound 
(Yip, 1992). As a consequence, it is important to understand just how the industry 
globalization drivers affect the competitive environment of SMEs. When moving to 
the industry and company level, it has been argued (by e.g. Lindqvist, 1991) that 
increasing speed in the development of new technologies has led to shorter product 
life cycles (PLCs) and higher innovation intensity, which in turn leads to intensified 
global competition. The shorter PLCs have led to more emphasis on R&D, and on 
recognizing new opportunities and exploiting them as rapidly as possible with 
successful timing (e.g. PCs and cellular phones). In short, product characteristics are 
an important aspect to be considered. For firms with small home markets it may be 
difficult to achieve competitive advantage in terms of economies of scale. In the 
case of some products, significant economies can be achieved only by operating in 
multiple countries. The shorter the PLC, the shorter the time period for returns on 
investments for product development. Consequently, companies with small domestic 
markets need global volume, so that the costs for product development can be 
apportioned.   
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3.2.2 Individual resources: Experience & Network 
The experience and background of founders and their relationships are important 
resources for a firm and are important drivers or facilitators of internationalization. 
International experience is defined as the understanding and realistic perceptions of 
foreign operations, risks and returns in foreign markets (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997). 
The reasoning here, which is based on the organizational capability of the firm, is 
that firms are initially risk-averse when entering new markets, and therefore not 
willing to invest substantial resources in unfamiliar terrain. As a firm’s management 
gets a better feel for the foreign markets, it gains better understanding of the risks 
and returns, and becomes more confident and aggressive, but also more realistic. 
This may be manifested by a willingness to commit more resources, but it may also 
enable management to make better investment decisions. For firms, international 
experience has traditionally been measured by making an assessment of the 
geographic scope and depth of the firm’s experience. This is done by registering the 
number of different countries in which a firm is active and the length of experience 
in each of those countries (Erramilli, 1991). In the present study, the variable will be 
analyzed at the individual level. Information about the founder(s)’ and/or other key 
employees’ international experience will be collected. Several studies (Oviatt & 
McDougall, 1994; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Ellis, 2000) show that key employees in 
BGs very often have extensive international experience from previous employment. 
Furthermore, Reuber & Fischer (1997) argue that decision-makers with more 
international experience are more likely to have a foreign business network in place 
and are more likely to have developed the skills needed to identify and negotiate 
with firms in a different culture. Oviatt & McDougall (1994) further argue that 
partnerships provide concrete critical resources, i.e. specific skills and finances, as 
well as more abstract resources, such as legitimacy and market power. These 
resources are seen as being particularly important when a new and young firm, with 
relatively small resources, attempts to increase foreign sales. The founders’ or other 
key employees’ relationships from previous employment may enable these firms to 
enter new markets at a faster rate than would otherwise be possible (e.g. by 
providing the firm with complimentary resources and by opening up markets). This 
view is supported by Ellis’ (2000) findings, which support the notion that awareness 
of foreign market opportunities (which has been identified as being a critical 
antecedent of foreign market entry) is commonly acquired via existing social ties. 
McGaughey, Welch & Welch (1997) also emphasize the important role of personal 
networks in triggering initial export inquiries or orders. They found that the 
network’s key individuals importantly affected the case company’s international 
activities. These people were critical for both the content and direction of the 
company’s internationalization.  “…much of the ability of the company to initiate 
and carry through international operations resided in the decision-makers’ personal 
networks” (p. 179).  
3.2.3 The Conceptual Framework Illustrated 
From the discussion above, a conceptual framework is proposed where four main 
factors are posited as having an impact upon the firm’s pace of internationalization. 
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These factors are; (1) the experience and background of the firm’s founders or other 
key employees, (2) the same person’s network, (3) the globality of the industry in 
which a firm does its business, and (4) different product characteristics. 
Industry
globality
Product
characteristics
Personal
experience
Personal
network
Pace of
Internationalization
 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual Framework 
 
Boundaries between domestic and international markets are becoming less relevant 
as businesses increase their activities abroad. A global industry is, in this thesis, 
conceptualized as follows: “an industry in which a firm’s competitive position in 
one country is significantly affected by its position in other countries or vice versa” 
(Makhija, Kim & Williamson, 1997:680). In this regard, the global industry “is not 
merely a collection of domestic industries, but a series of linked domestic industries 
in which rivals compete against each other on a truly worldwide basis”  (Porter, 
1986:18).   
 
In order to find an explanation as to why some SMEs still follow a more step-by-
step approach, while others choose a faster and more erratic approach that leapfrogs 
over many stages, Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais (2000) argue that globalization 
may enable firms to more freely choose their own model for becoming international. 
International sales both become easier and more difficult, in the sense that 
international markets have become more accessible for most firms, but the level of 
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competition and the demand for international competence have increased. There is 
both a “positive” pressure, from the increased level of globalization, in the form of 
an increase in the accessibility to markets, and a “negative” pressure from tougher 
competition, since it has become a necessity for a host of new companies to be 
present in many markets. Both of these pressures work to increase the pace of 
internationalization. The positive pressure lures the company to new territory, while 
the negative pressure forces the company to find new markets.  
 
These pressures may work differently depending upon the size of the home market. 
According to Bloodgood, Sapienza & Almeida (1996), new European firms are 
more likely to consider internationalizing some of their activities when their 
enterprise is initiated compared with new US firms. One reason is the fact that a new 
US firm, operating in a 500-mile radius around its base, may do so without crossing 
borders, a European firm, with the same operating radius around its base, may have 
to deal with five or six other countries. Luostarinen & Gabrielsson (2001) state that 
global firms from large countries globalize because of the demand-based pull forces 
in global markets, but global firms from small and open economies globalize 
because they are pushed. Small domestic markets and the fear of expected future 
competition, from global firms in large countries, puts a lot of pressure on these 
firms, pushing them to find new markets. According to Hamel & Prahalad (1985), 
companies that safely nestle in their home beds will increasingly experience a 
resource disadvantage. “They will be unable to marshal (the) forces required for a 
defense of the home market” (p. 146). 
3.3 The conceptual framework elaborated 
3.3.1 Pace of Internationalization 
 A conceptual framework can be based on more than one theory (Andersen, 1997). 
A conceptual framework is not a theory since it will not have all the prerequisites of 
theoretical constructions. A theory can be represented by various conceptual 
frameworks. This model brings together a resource-based framework with industrial 
network elements. The organizational capabilities focused on here, is a firm’s 
business relationships and its experiential knowledge both defined as important 
individuals of the firm’s relationships and knowledge either developed in the present 
firm or in previous employment. Initial resources influence the relationships a firm 
is able to develop and experience, which again are assumed to influence the strategy 
a firm chooses when going international. As the firm becomes more international 
(e.g. in terms of having more international relationships and becoming more 
experienced) this increases its resource base in terms of relational capability (e.g. its 
ability to build new and develop/maintain existing relationships) and experiential 
knowledge which again influences further the international strategy of the firm. 
According to Moen (2000), there are numerous studies that have focused on the 
strategy-performance relation and there is strong support to the notion that strategy 
affects performance, i.e. it is important to study which strategies are used and what 
influence them.   
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With regard to the market selection dimension, Bell (1995) states that ”psychic 
distance” has become much less relevant as global communication and 
transportation infrastructures improve and as markets become increasingly 
homogeneous. Crick & Jones (2000) also found that decisions to enter markets with 
a perceived low psychic distance were less important than decisions based on global 
trends in technology markets and relations in networks.   
 
Resource availability has not been a particular focus of much of the research on 
internationalization, but it is nevertheless an important issue to consider (Benito & 
Welch, 1994). For instance smaller firms, given their limited financial resources, can 
be expected to face a narrower set of viable foreign market servicing options than 
larger firms (Bonaccorsi, 1992). Still there is evidence of such firms succeeding in 
international markets. Knight (2000) claims that the success of SMEs under 
globalization depends in a large part on the formulation and implementation of 
strategy. A firm’s international strategy and its degree of internationalization are 
defined as the pattern of entry modes and subsequent foreign operation modes 
chosen, which market(s) are entered when and how large the export rate is after a 
certain time. According to the firms’ choices made on these dimensions, we get 
different categories of firms where some are more or less global on one or both 
dimensions. 
 
A common assumption, thus, seems to be that firm size is one of the factors 
influencing the strategic options available and that firms should develop export 
strategies that reduce their size disadvantage if they are small and have limited 
resources (Moen, 2000). The entry modes traditionally used at the initial stage of 
internationalization seem to be shifting.  Hedlund & Kverneland (1985) provide 
evidence of a speeding up of the internationalization process and posit that: “the 
establishment and growth strategies on foreign markets are changing towards more 
direct and rapid entry modes than those implied by theories of gradual and slow 
internationalization processes” (p.). Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais (2000) found 
that BGs were quite consistent in choosing foreign distributors as their main export 
channel, the authours did not think this was a very “global” way of governing 
foreign operations. Young (1987) suggests that alternative strategies, such as 
licensing and joint ventures (JVs), are being adopted more widely by smaller firms 
as initial foreign market entry mode. According to the same, this is most likely to be 
manifest among high-technology firms where high R&D costs, shorter product life 
cycles and a concentration of the market for high-technology products accelerate the 
pace of internationalization. This may be explained by the fact that BGs often 
operate on many different markets which are all important to them. Due to their 
limited resources, they are not able to invest in market knowledge and market 
infrastructure in all markets, they are often only able to invest in close market 
contacts in very few countries. Such factors may force them to use more low-
commitment type of operation mode, in addition they may not need or want a higher 
commitment mode such as a sales subsidiary, since their targeted market segment 
may be too small to justify the investment.  
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hus, one reason for the difference observed, between traditional MNCs and BGs, 
may be that BGs are much younger companies that have not yet got the financial 
resources to invest in sales subsidiaries. Another explanation may be, as mentioned 
above, that such investments are not economical because their product is targeted 
towards a very narrow segment which cannot generate sales enough to warrant the 
establishment of sales subsidiaries in each single foreign market. Therefore, the BGs 
must rely on less capital intensive and more low-commitment type of modes such as 
cooperation with foreign distributors instead. Very young firms are not supposed to 
have established subsidiaries, but since these (BGs) are very global (despite their 
young age) and one characteristic of very global/international firms are that they 
have established subsidiaries or even local production units, they diverge from other 
very international firms.   
 
There is an underlying assumption here that BGs are entering markets fast due to 
competitive pressure. According to Kim & Hwang (1992), the greater the intensity 
of competition in the host market, the more the firms will favor entry modes that 
involve low resource commitments, because such markets tend to be less profitable 
and therefore do not justify heavy resource commitments. This is confirmed in 
Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais’s (2000) study, they state that BGs, because of their 
small size and limited resources often operate on arm’s length in foreign markets. 
They found that BGs mainly export through agents, distributors and importers. 
Using low-commitment or collaborative modes, imply that not so large investments 
are being made and also the risk of being present in a foreign market is not 
perceived as very high. This may (if desired) enable the SME to enter more markets 
than if they were using high-commitment modes.   
 
Some born globals have attracted investments enabling them to invest in high 
commitment modes, but organization is lagging behind very often leading them to 
deinternationalize after some time (Petersen, Welch & Liesch, 2000). Borsheim & 
Solberg (2002) also found in their study on four born global internet firms that the 
two companies using mainly subsidiaries as their initial entry mode have by far the 
highest revenues, but also the highest deficits, forcing them to downsizing on 
employees and consolidating and closing down subsidiaries after some time. The 
fact that not one of the entrepreneurs in Borsheim & Solberg’s (2002) study had 
previous international experience, maybe one reason for “failure”, their ambitions of 
growth exceeded their competence. This is not a new phenomenon and is labeled 
“the Penrose-effect” by Rugman & Verbeke (2001), i.e. a limitation to a firm’s 
growth rate (is) due to managerial constraints (p. 6).   
3.3.2 Key Employees’ Experience and Background 
To achieve the benefits of globalization, the managers of worldwide business need 
to recognize when industry conditions provide the opportunity to use global strategy 
levers; global market participation, global products and services, global location of 
activities, global marketing and global competitive moves (Yip, 1992:31). Zahra 
(1999) states that in such a dynamic and competitive environment (e.g. as a global 
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economy is), entrepreneurial leadership will take central stage. It is assumed that the 
ability to recognize such opportunities is increased with top management or key 
employees’ foreign experience level. Although much of the research on top 
management teams are based on large firms, the correspondence between top 
management experience and organizational outcomes is expected to be even more 
pronounced in SMEs, since these businesses reflect the dominant role of the 
founding team to a greater extent (Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Mintzberg, 1988).  
Crick & Jones (2000) found that several firms were started by managers with 
experience operating in international markets from firms in which they were 
previously employed. As such, they have developed experience in dealing with the 
complexities of international operations, have an appreciation of the risks and 
resource implications, and have developed a network of customers and contacts on 
which they could build after starting their own firms. 
 
Although the traditional explanation is that firms can gain valuable knowledge and 
resources as they become older and larger, small and young firms are not necessarily 
disadvantaged if they develop other mechanisms to acquire the requisite knowledge 
and resources. There is some evidence in the literature to show that 
internationalization is more strongly affected by the characteristics of the decision-
maker or management team than other variables such as firm size and age (Axinn, 
1988; Reuber & Fischer, 1997). Hambrick & Mason (1984) also state that the top 
management team is a key source of competitive advantage for a venture, since the 
quality of decisions made by a venture is very much a reflection of its top 
management team. The small amount of variance in export behaviour explained by 
firm size (Calof, 1994) calls into question the relevance of firm size as a strong 
determinant. Also, the emergence of born globals (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) 
questions the relevance of a domestic track record as a consistent predictor. Reuber 
& Fischer (1997) even argue that a domestic track record may influence a firm’s 
chance to succeed internationally in a negative way. Ghoshal (1987) has argued that 
organizations that internationalize earlier are likely to develop fewer routines and 
resources which make it difficult for them to move out of domestic markets. Other 
researchers have also argued that large, established firms typically face “inertial 
pressures” that inhibit their flexibility. These pressures can be in the form of 
organizational routines (Dosi, Teece & Winter, 1990), structural impediments to 
change (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), or perceptual biases of managers (Bower, 
1970). Thus, large domestic firms may find it difficult to operate in the international 
market. It is therefore argued here, in accordance with Oviatt & McDougall (1994), 
that in newer and smaller firms, the skills and knowledge of the top decision-
maker(s) are likely to be more predictive of, and influential on, patterns of 
internationalization than more traditional factors such as age and size of the 
company. 
3.3.3 Personal Network 
Ellis’ (2000) findings supported the hypothesis that knowledge of foreign market 
opportunities is commonly acquired via existing interpersonal links rather than 
collected systematically via market research. The focus here is on personal 
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relationships of the founder(s) and other key personnel to individuals or 
organizations that they state have been of importance for the firm’s road to 
internationalization. The founder(s) of socalled born globals and/or key employees 
are assumed to have established such (important) relationships before start-up of the 
firm. Traditionally, a firm’s relations and the development of the firm through 
certain stages (e.g. both relationship- and internationalization stages) have been 
studied. It is assumed that key employees’ personal development and networking 
prior to the start-up of these small fast internationalizing firms, influence the firm’s 
road to internationalization in a positive way.  
 
It is sometimes argued that interorganizational trust does not exist. This view is 
based on the belief that organizations cannot themselves “feel” nor can feelings be 
experienced towards them (Young, 1992). This is not an issue here, since the focus 
is on the individual level; founder(s) and or other key employees’ personal 
relationships. The basis of trust differs, for example attraction and liking are seen as 
less important reasons of trusting in business relations, and competence and 
openness are even more important. An interpersonal relationship is defined as that 
which possesses “a tie of affinity” (Little Oxford Dictionary, p417 in Young, 1992 
p. 53). In other words, there is some bond between parties; they are likely to have an 
(emotional) attachment to one another. In a continuing relationship this attachment 
will in part stem from shared past and expectations of a shared future. However, 
when interactions commence, there is no such history upon which to base 
expectations. Interfirm relationships are strengthened further if their development 
includes increasing socialization, i.e. personalization (Turnbull, 1990). The breadth 
of what is achieved via the interactions increases thus as business relationships also 
become social relationships. In early part of a relationship between firm members 
the motivation for cooperation may be to continue the relationship as a means of 
fulfilling economic goals and the resulting bonds between the parties would be more 
impersonal and utilitarian. As the relationship continues to develop, such economic 
motives can become “overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of 
trust and abstention from opportunism” based on the personal relationships 
individuals have formed (Granovetter, 1985:490). This further bonds the parties, 
enhances and expands their ability to interact. It should be noted that this process of 
development is observed in Western countries. In Asia and the Middle East the 
personal relationship is likely to be more integral and may be a precondition for any 
commercial relationship (Albaum, Strandskov & Duerr, 2002). 
3.3.4 Level of Globalization 
As stated earlier, a series of globalization drivers (e.g. growing interdependence of 
national economies, improved international communication and transportation, 
homogenization of markets) has contributed to an overall trend towards integration 
of markets and competition. This trend should simplify and shorten the process of 
firm internationalization, which means, firms may skip stages of international 
development that have been observed in the past or the process may not occur in 
stages at all. This development (e.g. globalization) may thus be seen as major 
explanator of the born globals appearance. Facing the situation where a firm’s 
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position in one country is affected by its position in other countries (Porter, 1986), 
companies are believed to internationalize in a quest for scale, scope and learning 
economies (Benito, Narula & Pedersen, 2002), leading to an increasing minimum 
efficient scale (Hamel & Prahalad, 1985). We can conclude that globalization in a 
wider sense is the growing interdependence of national economies, involving 
consumers, producers, suppliers, and governments in different countries. Boundaries 
between domestic and international markets are becoming less relevant as 
businesses increase their activities abroad (Knight, 2000).  
3.3.5 Product characteristics 
Closely related to level of globalization are the characteristics of the product a firm 
offers. It is assumed that the product strategy of globalizing high technology SMEs 
is based from the start on an innovative, global product, which has been developed 
in response to a detected global industry shift (Alahuhta, 1990). It is also assumed 
that the product strategies of the high technology companies will be constantly 
updated through the introduction of new versions of the original, physical product 
and through additions to the product scope in the form of new physical goods and 
related value-added services. However, as pointed out by Alahuhta (1990), this will 
be done keeping within the companies’ narrow business focus. We have earlier 
stated that increasing global competition, together with increasing speed in the 
development of new technologies, has led to shorter product life cycles and higher 
innovation intensity. The shortening of the product life cycle creates a need for large 
R&D costs. The shorter the PLC, the shorter the time in which returns on investment 
in product development can be earned. Thus, especially companies with small 
domestic markets need global volumes over which these costs can be divided. Short 
PLCs also call for higher innovativeness in order to launch new versions or products 
to compensate for the decline of original ones. The characteristics of the product the 
firm is exporting are thus likely to influence the firm’s pace of internationalization. 
3.3.6 Summary 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be assumed that experience, network, industry 
and product factors may lead to greater preparedness to commit resources or a 
reduction in a manager’s perception of risk or both, this again leads to a faster pace 
of internationalization. Experience is believed to change the perception of psychic 
distance, it may have the effect of reducing perceived psychic distance and this may 
thus explain the observed pattern where SME’s enter several foreign markets 
simultaneously and these markets may as well be far away as close in terms of 
psychic distance. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Data Collection 
 
4.1 Research Design 
4.1.1 Introduction 
A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions 
to be drawn to the initial questions of a study (Yin, 1989). Choice of methodology 
thus, depends on the research questions and the objectives of the study. The 
purposes of social research may be organized into three groups based on what the 
researcher is trying to accomplish, explore a new topic, describe a social 
phenomena, or explain why something occurs (Neuman, 1997). Studies may have 
multiple purposes (e.g. both to explore and describe), but one purpose is usually 
dominant. The objective of this study is to describe the process of 
internationalization of SMEs and to explore the reasons of some firms becoming 
gradual or traditional globals and some born globals. Even though there has in the 
last decade been some studies on the internationalization process of SMEs 
(Alahuhta, 1990; Junkkari, 2000) most research conducted in the field of 
globalization are mainly focused on large multinational companies usually 
originating from large countries (Junkkari, 2000). There still seems to exist a gap in 
the literature when it comes to explaining the rapid globalization of born global 
SMEs. The focus of this thesis was to identify which factors determine a firm’s pace 
of internationalization. The process of internationalization is identified as having 
two main dimensions, that is, international market selection and the choice of 
foreign operation mode (Bradley, 1995). Thus, the research intent of the study was 
stated as: which factors influence the pace for SMEs to gradually increase their 
resource commitment to a foreign market and which factors influence the pace for 
entering new country markets?  
 
Quantitative research looks at a large group of cases, people or units and measures a 
limited number of features. A case study is more distinct. It usually involves 
qualitative methods and focuses on one or a few cases during a limited time period. 
In this study it seemed most appropriate to start with an exploratory, in depth study 
to get a better understanding of the topic at hand. That is, the aim is more to develop 
new insights about the phenomenon of born globals (or fast versus slow pace of 
internationalization), “context of discovery”, than in testing the validity of existing 
theories, “context of justification”. However, it should be noted that since this study 
is going to probe the extent to which existing theoretical perspectives of the 
internationalization process can help explain why some SMEs expand faster 
internationally than others, the approach also includes aspects related to “context of 
justification”. The intention is thus to draw on insights from the different theoretical 
perspectives when gathering data and analyzing the internationalization process. 
 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) argue that social research should be inductive in nature and 
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that theory development should be “grounded” in the data material. However, within 
the philosophy of science it has been argued that the notion of pure empiricism is 
impossible. Also when attempting to follow grounded-theory approach, the 
researcher is influenced by his/her frame of reference (Hanson, 1958). This fact has 
to be taken into account when carrying out empirical studies. Next, the process of 
data collection are described and then the cases studied will be presented and key 
concepts operationalized before different validity and reliability issues are discussed 
at the end. 
4.1.2 Primary Data 
The data has been gathered from in depth interviews. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
(2003) have found that managers are more likely to agree to be interviewed, rather 
than complete a questionnaire, especially where the interview topic is seen to be 
interesting and relevant to their current work. An interview provides the respondents 
with an opportunity to reflect on events without needing to write anything down. 
This situation also provides the opportunity for interviewees to receive feedback and 
personal assurance about the way in which information will be used. Personal 
interviews are also advantageous to the researcher as Healey (1991:206) points out: 
“…the interviewer…has more control over who answers the questions” in 
comparison with a questionnaire, which may be passed from one person to another. 
Semi-structured interviews also provide the researcher with an opportunity to 
“probe” answers, when there is a need for the interviewees to explain or build on 
their responses. Case studies within business research are a very demanding 
exercise, and for that reason, only twelve cases were chosen. 
 
The founder/CEO or another key employee (who has been in the company from the 
start) of the firm was contacted, with a request to participate in the study. The 
potential case companies were selected by using procedures that are appropriate for 
samples that are needed for theoretical purposes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Yin, 
1994). The logic that justifies the use of samples for theoretical purposes is different 
from the logic of sampling for statistical purposes, which often requires random 
selection. Purposive sampling to explore theoretical considerations does not require 
too great a concern for sample size. The size of the sample is seen as relatively 
unimportant. What is important is the potential of each case to aid in developing 
theoretical insights into the dynamics of the internationalization process being 
studied.  
 
The case companies were selected from a pool of respondents to a survey that was 
carried out in the autumn of 2001. The population of that survey was defined as 
being SMEs in Norway, founded after 1990 (and registered in Kompass Norge AS – 
a leading Norwegian Industry Directory). SMEs are defined as being firms with less 
than one hundred employees. The reason for choosing recently established firms is 
to ensure that the details surrounding the founding of the firm are not lost to history. 
The focus on SMEs is due to the fact that several studies have found that most of the 
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rapidly internationalizing firms have far less than 100 employees (see e.g. Knight, 
Madsen & Servais, 2004). In addition, Solberg (1988) found successful exporters to 
be significantly smaller than unsuccessful exporters. This finding led him to suggest 
that smaller units are better able to create the right atmosphere for successful 
exporting, necessitating a closeness to the market and an open-minded organization, 
not always present in large corporations with rigid bureaucratic decision-making 
procedures.   
 
Finally, firms that were stand-alone entities were preferred. This preference was due 
to the expectation that sub-units of larger firms have greater access to resources, i.e. 
capital, human resources and information (Harveston, 2000). Despite this, three of 
the cases chosen were not independent, partly because the dichotomy between 
dependence and independence is not always that simple to determine, and because it 
might be useful to have some cases that are not independent for reasons of 
comparison. A relatively wide population was chosen at the outset, in order to 
enable a continuum to be drawn with firms that have a gradual pace of 
internationalization, at one extreme and true born global firms, at the other. It is 
according to Churchill (1991) cases that display contrast or an extreme situation that 
are most useful.  This is because it is easier to find differences or determine what 
distinguishes two extreme cases than to compare and find differences between two 
average or normal cases. 
4.2 Operationalization 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Operationalization is about how to mirror concepts to give meaning in an empirical 
context. While measures of imprecise concepts are never completely valid or 
reliable, researchers strive to maximize these qualities (Knight, 1997). The research 
literature deals only to a modest degree with measurement problems when it comes 
to exploratory/”qualitative” research (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). However, Berg 
(2007) goes so far as to say that failure to define and operationalize concepts will 
spell disaster in many cases. The problem is usually approached by using semi-
structured questions, based on an interview guide as in this study. The interview 
guide was developed by surveying previous studies. Even though this type of study 
may be seen as “data-driven” problem solving, without the use of concepts and 
theory, an explanation (e.g. theory) will never emerge. Berg (2007) also claims that 
if it is not made clear what the concepts mean, the results may be meaningless in 
terms of explanatory power or applicability; “..if you have not worked with the 
literature in developing  relevant meanings and measureable attributes, it will be 
impossible for you to see how eventual results fit into this extant body of 
knowledge” (p.37). Thus a mapping between empirical observations and 
concepts/theory should take place. The researcher should be able to demonstrate the 
validity of the findings and to do that the researcher must supply evidence. The 
questions, responses, inferences made and what support these inferences should be 
reported. 
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4.2.2 Pace of internationalization 
Measuring the pace of internationalization was achieved by identifying how many 
regions an SME enters during a specific time period, which types of regions the firm 
enters, and, in what order (close or far away from the home market in terms of 
psychic distance). In addition, the export rate of the firms three years after founding 
was measured, since this is a common cut-off point for defining so called born 
global firms (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Knight, 1997; Madsen Rasmussen & 
Servais, 2000; Harveston, 2000; Junkkari, 2000). More specifically, these same 
authors define born global firms as SMEs with an export rate of more than 25% 
within three years of their founding. Finally, this research identified the entry mode 
which was initially used when the firm entered its first foreign market and, the 
foreign operation modes that were currently being used. This was done to measure 
the rate of resources committed to the market over time. 
4.2.3 Key Employees’ Experience and background 
Top management experience is defined as the amount of experience that a manager 
has accumulated in an international context. Harveston, Kedia & Davies (2000) state 
that most studies using this construct have used the amount of time spent in foreign 
countries as an indicator. This indicator includes time spent at foreign assignments, 
at foreign educational facilities, and on vacation in foreign countries, as measures of 
international experience. This indicator accounts for one dimension of the construct, 
length. The second dimension is scope. From which continent(s) do key employees 
have experience? Have these key employees mainly worked abroad or at home? 
Another measure of foreign experience gages the extent to which the manager has 
engaged in foreign travel. They are asked about the number of languages that the 
manager speaks and how fluent he or she is in those languages. Was the top 
decision-maker born abroad? Has s/he lived abroad (Miesenbock, 1988; Reid, 
1981)? What was the mindset of the founder at start-up (Harveston, Kedia & Davis, 
2002)? In this study, international experience was measured by determining how 
long the founder(s) had been abroad, in which countries they had worked or studied, 
and what position(s) they held while living abroad. In addition, the foreign 
languages that were mastered were identified.  
4.2.4 Personal Networks 
According to Solberg (1997), the more global the industry structure is, the more 
important is the presence of an active and widespread network. Motives for entering 
a new market were investigated and the characteristics of prior relationships and the 
role they have played have been sought. Personal relationships, studied in this paper, 
were relationships that key employees define as having an impact on their road to 
internationalization. These are either relationships in their home country or 
relationships in the target country, established when previously working or studying 
abroad, or developed from their previous work assignments in their home country. 
What types of relationships exist between the key employees and the network of 
people they identify as being most important? How close are these relationships? 
This can be measured by documenting the frequency of contact (e.g. daily, weekly, 
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once a month) and the type of contact (e.g. face to face, telephone, e-mail). We 
assume that the more frequent the contact and the closer the type of contact is (e.g. 
face-to-face), the more trust exists between the parties. Whether the contact is 
formal or informal may also be of some importance. We assume that the more 
informal the contact is, the closer the relationship, and the more closeness, the more 
trust. The interviewees were asked to elaborate upon the relationships they 
considered to be important for the development of the firm. How and on what 
occasion did the parties first meet, and, in what way did these relations contribute to 
the firm’s internationalization process. In addition, interviewees were asked to 
characterize the type of contact they have at present.   
4.2.5 Globalization 
Globalization may be conceptualized in terms of a continuum from low to high, 
along which different industries fall (Porter, 1986). An industry at the very low end 
of globalization is highly independent of industries in other countries. An industry at 
the very high end is significantly linked to similar industries in multiple countries in 
which its various value-added activities are located. The extent to which an industry 
is characterized by international linkages within the industry is seen as being an 
important indication of its level of globalization (Makhija, Kim & Williamson, 
1997). It is rather difficult to find good measures of an industry’s global 
characteristics. However, according to Porter (1986) and Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989), 
establishing the extent to which an industry is global is a necessary first step, before 
one can adequately examine global strategies. Each industry’s unique blend of 
competitive pressures is likely to result in varying levels of globalization, which in 
turn are reflected in the strategies the firm utilizes in these industries (Prahalad & 
Doz, 1987; Yip, 1992). One way to measure this is to use the ranking of different 
industries in Yip (1992:34), but in this study subjective measures have been used. 
That is, the managers in the SMEs are asked how they perceive their industry, 
according to a certain set of dimensions that aim at revealing the industry’s global 
characteristics (Solberg, 1997:5). These dimensions are: industry structure (e.g. 
oligopoly or fragmented), which is influenced by the strength of globalization 
drivers (e.g. trade barriers, internationalization of customers/suppliers, international 
demand pattern), and the interdependence of national markets (e.g. international 
price sensitivity, intra-industry trade).     
4.2.6 Product characteristics 
Product characteristics, it has already been pointed out, are believed to be influenced 
by macro factors, such as the competitive conditions within an industry. Questions 
were asked about the product’s life cycle and about its uniqueness when compared 
to competitive products. (“Is it one of a kind?”) The degree of specialization of the 
product (Madsen & Servais, 1997) was also queried. The researcher asked managers 
to classify the product as being either an industrial product or a consumer product.   
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4.3 Selection of Cases (sampling) 
4.3.1 Introduction 
A central question in doing case studies is whether to include one or several cases. 
The problem with using only one case is that it limits generalizability and leaves 
little room for comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989). Use of several cases is a way to solve 
this problem (Leonard-Barton, 1990). Several cases open up for replication and 
enable us to compare results in one case with results you get in another. This can 
strengthen the results. 
 
If we use experiment as an analogy, it is not number of cases that are important, but 
whether you achieve the variation required, at the same time as disturbing variation 
are “excluded” (Andersen, 1997). By selecting and limiting the cases in a way that 
give as much theoretical variation as possible at the same time as we limit other 
forms of variation, it is possible also with the use of case studies to reach a high 
degree of control (Andersen, 1997). To limit other types than the wanted variation, 
cases were chosen from one country and time of establishment are quite limited (e.g. 
between 1989-2000). By choosing all the cases within one country and within a 
short time period, it can be easier to study connections between relationships, 
experience, globalization and product characteristics on a firm’s pace of 
internationalization, because several contextual factors are held more or less 
constant. At the same time the wish to do the study in a larger and more realistic 
context is maintained, as opposed to in an experiment. 
 
In case studies you usually select cases based on theory (e.g. theoretical sampling). 
When using several cases, they should be selected so as to a) predict same results, or 
b) give opposite results, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 1994). When using several 
cases, it can be useful to use an explicit framework to choose from. This frame 
should be guided by the research question and the conceptual framework. The 
framework developed consists of a 2x2 matrix. The horizontal line stating volume of 
export reached within three years of founding and the vertical line stating number of 
market areas the firm is present in, i.e. it includes my two main dimensions 
measuring a firm’s degree of internationalization or globality.    
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BGM TBG
GI BGE
Export within 3 years
50% 100%
No. of
continents
One
Several
 
Figure 6: Classification of global SMEs 
 
TBG = True Born Global 
BGM = Born Global on Market dimension 
BGE = Born Global on Export dimension 
GI  = Gradual International 
4.3.2 Short Description of the Cases 
The firms had to be selected as to satisfy the framework conditions and it was also 
desirable to find cases that fit each of the four types of “globals”. The cases are 
presented below in alphabetical order. In the analysis (e.g. chapter 6) we will take a 
closer look at how each case fit within the framework. 
 
ColorMatic AS was established in 1997 and started exporting in 2000. Export rate 
after three years was 90%, today it is 95%. They are present in Scandinavia, 
Western-Europe, North America, Australia and Asia. 
 
Dolphin Interconnect Solutions AS was established in 1991 and started exporting in 
1992.  Export rate after three years was 90% the same as today. They are present in 
North-America, South-America, and Europe. 
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Fras AS was established in 1996 and started exporting in 1998 (90). Current export 
rate is 80%, after three years it was 20%. They are present on ships all over the 
world. 
 
ICAS AS was established in 1989 and started exporting in 1992. Current export rate 
is 45%, after four years it was 30%. They are present in Europe and sporadically in 
South-Africa (2001) and Australia (2000). 
 
Incatel AS was established in 1993/94 and started exporting 1996. Current export 
rate is 80%, after three years it was 50%. They are present in Europe. 
 
IRTech AS was established in 1995 and started exporting the same year. Export rate 
after three years was 100%, the same as today. They are present in Europe, North 
America, Australia, and Asia. 
 
Kay Lindegaard Incinerators was established in 1999 and started exporting the same 
year.  Export rate after three years was 50%, same as today. They are present all 
over the world. 
 
NOR-REG AS was established in 2000 and started exporting in 2001. Export rate 
after three years was 75%, same as today. They are present in Western Europe and 
Japan. 
 
Norsk Display AS was established in 1993/1994 and started exporting in 1994. 
Current export rate is 60%, after three years it was 65%. They are present in 
Western Europe and North America. 
 
Opera Software ASA was established in 1995 and started exporting the same year. 
Export rate after three years was 99%, same as today. They are present all over the 
world. 
 
Optoflow AS was established in 1993 and started exporting in 1997. Current export 
rate is 90% and after three years it was 85%. They are present in Scandinavia, 
Western Europe, North America/Australia, Asia and Africa/Arabia. 
 
Superject AS was established in 1990/1991 and started exporting in 1991. Current 
export rate is 80%, after three years it was 70%. They are present in Europe (mainly 
Western part). 
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4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 Introduction 
It is recommended in case studies to make use of triangulation as method of data 
collection to provide stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In triangulation, “..researchers make use of multiple and 
different sources, methods, investigators, and theories to provide supporting 
evidence”, (Creswell, 1998:202). Triangulation reduces the risk of the conclusions 
reflecting systematic biases or limitations tied to one specific method and also make 
it possible to increase the validity in a study (Denzin, 1970). Yin (1994) 
recommends that data should be gathered from a wide range of sources. This allows 
the researcher to strip away the biases, including her own, and try to get a true 
picture of what is involved. This study is mainly based on interviews and secondary 
data. The recommendation of triangulation is therefore at least partially fulfilled. 
4.4.2 Personal interview 
The use of personal interviews represents the most important data collection method 
in this thesis. These interviews were carried out by seeking insight from key 
informants in the different firms. The choice of informants were made with the use 
of organization maps and based on background knowledge of the firms in question. 
Most informants were founder/owner or some other type of key employee, for the 
firm’s international development. In addition to the personal interviews some 
telephone interviews have been carried out when elaboration on pieces of 
information has been needed and also e-mail correspondence has been used in this 
regard. 
 
Before the data collection took place, an interview guide was constructed which 
included the different areas to be covered. The starting point for this guide is the 
model in chapter 3. In studies consisting of several case studies on the same topic, it 
is recommended according to Miles & Huberman (1994) to use a relatively 
structured interview guide, so as to ascertain that all the topics are covered in each 
single case. The questions are asked of each interviewee in a systematic and 
consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress; that is, the 
interviewer are permitted to probe far beyond the answers to the prepared 
standardized questions. 
4.4.3 Secondary data 
In addition to the interviews secondary data has been used in the study. Secondary 
data can be defined as: “data that have already been collected for some other 
purpose (than the researcher faces)” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003:188). 
Secondary sources of information can have their origin from within the company 
and may include documents such as annual reports, reports to stockholders, different 
research papers, internal newsletters and company publications. However, secondary 
data can be gathered from outside the company as well. Sources here may include 
published information data from various trade and industry associations, 
governmental reports, public statistics, newspaper clippings and journal articles. In 
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this study there has been made extensive use of the internet searching for articles 
related to the firms or their area of business. In addition reports have been bought 
with information on the financial situation of each firm from the “Brønnøysund 
register”, this to get an update and to confirm the figures from the interviewees. 
Some interviewees supplied the researcher with annual reports, detailed customer 
lists (e.g. which year sold to who/which country), list over important relations and 
CV’s of key employees and various other types of company publications, but some 
of the smallest firms did not have much written material and formal reports/plans. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
“Quality, not quantity is my measure.” (Douglas Jerrold in Ghauri & Grønhaug, 
2005:202). 
 
A research design should not only tell you what data are to be collected, it should 
also state what is to be done after the data have been collected. That is, one should 
seek to find the logic linking the data to the propositions and criteria for interpreting 
findings, “it is the intimate connection with empirical reality that permits the 
development of testable, relevant and valid theory”, (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 in 
Eisenhardt, 1989:532). In this part it is accounted for the way the data are analyzed. 
Data analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing process (Nachmias & Nachmias, 
1992). A thorough description of this process enables others to better see how the 
conclusions are reached (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The same describe data 
analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows of action: data reduction, data 
display and conclusions and verifications (pp. 10-12). Data reduction is about 
transforming raw data into a more manageable form and this occurs throughout the 
research project (e.g. transcribing interviews, making summaries, identifying 
analytic themes etc). In the next phase, data display, the data ar presented are 
presented in as an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusions to be analytically drawn (e.g. matrices and summary tables). These 
displays assist the researcher in understanding and observing certain aptterns in the 
data or determining what additional analysis or actions must be taken (Berg, 2007). 
After the data have been collected, reduced and displayed, analytic conclusions may 
begin to emerge and define themselves more clearly. A qualitative researcher should 
be aware that qualitative analysis needs to be very well documented for others to be 
able to see how you have arrived at the conclusions. The next paragraph will go into 
somewhat more detail of how the analysis in this study has been carried out. 
 
Unlike hypothesis-testing research, more inductive research lacks a generally 
accepted model for the central creative processes and therefore does not follow an 
established format of analysis (Miles, 1979). One way to analyze data collected 
through case study methods is to look for commonalities and differences, this is 
particularly useful in this study where we have multiple cases. This phase, the 
analysis, is the most difficult and the least codified part of the process in a 
qualitative study, e.g “..one cannot  ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 
3600 pages of field notes to the final conclusions sprinkled with vivid quotes they 
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may be” (Miles and Huberman, 1984 in Eisenhardt, 1989:539). Following 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) each of the twelve cases were analyzed 
independently, within-case analysis, which is basically a detailed case study write-
up. This is often simply pure descriptions, but it is central to the generation of 
insight. There is no standard format for such analysis. The overall idea is to become 
intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity. Another method used was 
to search for cross-case patterns. That is, categories or dimensions were selected 
and then within-group similarities coupled with inter-group differences were 
searched for. A 2x2 design was used to compare several categories at once. Overall 
the idea behind these cross-case search tactics is to force investigators to go beyond 
initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses of 
data. These tactics improve the likelyhood of accurate and reliable theory, i.e. a 
theory with a close fit to the data. 
 
To sum up; within-case analysis gains familiarity with the data and preliminary 
theory generation; cross-case pattern search using divergent techniques forces 
investigators to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence through multiple 
lenses and these are the two methods of analysis chosen in this study.   
 
This approach was guided by recommendations made by several authors (e.g. 
Pettigrew, 1990; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986), who 
argue that the division of the data analysis is critical in order to deal with the data in 
a meaningful way, given the almost overwhelming volume of data collected through 
a qualitative research project. In addition, the deep analysis of each case is important 
in order to understand its uniqueness (Gersick, 1988). There was clearly a need for 
the within-case analysis as a facilitating step in this study. A considerable effort was 
put into learning as much as possible about each case before a cross-case analysis 
was undertaken as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). 
4.6 Validity & Reliability  
4.6.1 Introduction 
While there are a number of situations favouring the use of qualitative research 
interviews, there are also a number of issues associated with them. One being data 
quality issues related to reliability, different forms of bias and validity and 
generalizability (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003). Those who judge qualitative 
research using quantitative standards are often disappointed. Nevertheless, most 
people enjoy reading reports of qualitative research (Neuman, 1997:328). Case study 
is chosen because of its advantages for creating novel, rich and in-depth theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Case studies are most appropriate in the early stages.  
“…although a myth surrounding theory building from case studies is that the process 
is limited by investigators’ preconceptions, in fact, just the opposite is true. This 
constant juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends to “unfreeze” thinking, and so the 
process has the potential to generate theory with less researcher bias than theory 
built from incremental studies or armchair, axiomatic deduction” (Eisenhardt, 
1989:546). 
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Qualitative social research relies largely on the interpretive and critical approaches 
of social science. The two approaches are both alternative to positivism, which is the 
foundation of quantitative research. The criteria for judging qualitative research 
according to Yin (1994) is reliability, construct validity, internal validity and 
external validity. There is a basic dilemma; to secure unambiguous evidence about 
causation, one frequently sacrifices generalizability. Designs that are strong on 
internal validity tend to be weak on external validity whereas designs that are weak 
on internal validity are, by definition, weak on external validity. Without internal 
validity, no generalizations can be made (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992:143). The 
different types of validity that have to be considered in this study will be discussed 
next. 
4.6.2 Construct validity 
Construct validity is about establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied. Construct validity is strong if correct operational measures are 
established for the phenomenon, i.e. one must specify what to be studied and then 
establish measures and indicators of this. Often in qualitative research “what to 
measure” and “how to measure” might be somewhat unclear. If this was very 
straightforward, i.e. the relevant data can easily be identified and coded, it would 
probably be more appropriate to use a large-scale statistical study to test hypotheses. 
In order to increase the construct validity of these case studies, Yin’s (1994:34-35) 
recommendation was followed, that the researcher must specify what to be studied 
and then establish measures and indicators for this. The research questions guided 
the data collection and also made it gradually clear what kinds of measures and 
indicators were appropriate. The main dimensions used for classifying data were 
export rate and number of market areas in relation to time since founding. At first 
resource commitment to the foreign market was also considered a relevant 
dimension for measuring pace of internationalization, but it soon became clear when 
analysing the data that this was not a very important dimension to these particular 
types of firms.  
 
There are two main tactics to increase construct validity; (1) use multiple sources of 
evidence such as articles, annual reports and interviews with top executives and 
establish chain of evidence via case data, case notes and case descriptions, and (2) 
having drafts of the case study reports reviewed by key informant(s). These 
suggestions were followed in this study; multiple sources have been used as 
described above and the reports with the firms’ milestones have been reviewed by 
most of the interviewees, this to ensure correct operational measures. 
4.6.3 Internal validity 
Internal validity is high if no alternative explanation can be considered. This type of 
validity is seen as important in explanatory or causal studies, not in exploratory or 
descriptive. Since this study has both a descriptive and an element of explanatory 
purpose, the internal validity of the study has to be considered. It is about 
establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to 
other conditions as distinguished from spurious relationships. Due to the closeness 
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to the data and the unfolding nature of the study, familiarity with the data is high and 
thus there is reason to claim high internal validity (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To deal 
with this validity problem, pattern search within each case have been used and we 
searched of evidence for “why” of relationships in the cross-case analysis. 
 
All information was included in the transcribed notes. All interviews were written 
down soon after each interview and the interviews were taped in all but, one case 
(e.g. Optoflow). In the case were there was no tape recordings, notes were taken 
throughout the interview and written down in more detail straight after the interview 
when memory of the conversation was still fresh to ensure that as much information 
as possible was captured. In majority of the cases, interviewees were contacted after 
the interviews to clarify or expand upon the material. The generation of much 
“thick” data makes it reasonable to conclude that the data and theory closely 
describes the actual internationalization process in the twelve cases. The 
interviewees were also contacted this year (e.g. 2006), again to check that the 
information was correct understood by the researcher and to get an update of where 
they are now in terms of how international they are and whether there has been any 
organizational changes such as f.i. an acquisition, change of leadership and so on 
(see postscript for more detail on this). 
4.6.4 External validity 
External validity is about establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalized. That is, the extent to which a study’s findings are generalizable beyond 
the cases studied. The aim is thus to generalize to larger populations and to more 
realistic settings. This design is believed to be quite strong with regard to external 
validity in terms of closeness to reality. External validity problem has been a major 
barrier in doing case studies.  The scientific value of case studies is often questioned 
because it lacks generalizability, but case studies have generalizability, but to 
theoretical propositions as opposed to populations or universes. The case study (e.g. 
like the experiment) does not represent a “sample” and the investigator’s goal is to 
expand and generalize theories (e.g. analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (e.g. statistical generalization) (Yin, 1989). The aim is thus to come up 
with analytic, not statistic generalizations. In analytic generalization the investigator 
is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory. A theory 
must be tested through replications of the findings in a second or even third 
company, where the theory has specified that the same results should occur. To deal 
with this one should use replication of pattern search in the cross-case analysis. 
According to Yin (1994), replication may be claimed if two or more cases are shown 
to support the same theory (if it does not support a rival theory, even more potent), 
which then provides a basis for a generalization to a “theoretical” universe. When 
doing case studies one should thus, aim toward analytic generalizations and avoid 
thinking in such confusing terms as “the sample of cases”, or “the small sample size 
of cases”, as if a single case study were a single respondent in a survey or a single 
subject in an experiment (Yin, 1989).    
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Case study methods are criticized for a number of reasons (Miles, 1979). One of the 
more critical issues is the generalization that is made based on one case study. In 
terms of generalization, it is believed that the more cases you have, the higher the 
validity of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989). The study becomes more robust in the sense 
that there are several cases that you can generalize from (Eisenhardt, 1989). As 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:30) argue: “A single case can indicate a general conceptual 
category or property; and more cases can confirm the indication”. Only if one is able 
to relate the study to existing theory, will there be a situation where the findings can 
be demonstrated to have a broader significance than the cases that form the basis of 
this work (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). This relationship to existing theory will 
allow the study to test the applicability of existing theory to the settings under 
scrutiny. It will also allow theoretical propositions to be advanced that can be tested 
in another context. 
4.6.5 Reliability  
The lack of standardization in these interviews may lead to concerns about 
reliability. Reliability refers to the consistency of a measuring device, i.e. it should 
be able to demonstrate that the operations of a study can be repeated with the same 
results. In relation to qualitative research, reliability is concerned with whether 
alternative researchers would reveal similar information (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & 
Lowe, 2002). If results are reliable, an investigator should at a later stage, by 
following the exact same procedures and by conducting the same case study, arrive 
at the same findings and conclusions (i.e. not replicating, but doing the same case). 
For this to be possible, documentation of procedures is needed (e.g. use case study 
protocol, and case study database). As many steps as possible should be made 
operational and research should be conducted as if someone were always looking 
over the shoulder. Reliability can be increased by the use of multiple measures.  
Multiple measures may be of particular importance if the variables are difficult to 
operationalize.   
 
A case study protocol was developed for each case, where the purpose of the study 
is stated, field procedures to be followed (e.g. interviews, site visits), questions to be 
addressed, plan for analysis of the data, guide for case study report, i.e it is guiding 
the whole process of undertaking a field study. Using a case study protocol is seen 
as a major tactic in increasing the reliability of case study research (Yin, 1994). The 
notion of reliability was kept in mind throughout the project, emphasising note 
taking, the listing of facts, and the documentation of every step in the data collection 
process. To try to avoid systematic bias it was attempted to cross-check and 
triangulate data as much as possible. By triangulation is here meant the use of 
several types of data on one particular issue, which may be one strength of the case 
study method (Yin, 1994:91-94). Moreover, in order for the reader to assess the 
reliability of the findings, openness in the write-up of the case descriptions has been 
emphasized. This has been done by (1) providing extensive descriptions with the 
rich use of quotes (i.e. so the reader has a basis for interpreting the findings), (2) 
citing who is quoted and (3) listing the interviewees for each case.  
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4.7 Summary  
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the 
relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1989). Case study relies on many 
of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually 
included in the historian’s repertoire, direct observation and systematic interviewing. 
Case studies are thus very demanding to carry out, for this reason only relatively few 
cases were chosen. The advantages of carrying out more in-depth case studies are 
that it allows the researcher to study complex issues in their real-life context and to 
collect and analyze multiple types of data (Yin, 1994). It is worth noting that 
qualitative and case study research is not identical, but “almost all qualitative 
research seeks to construct representations based on in-depth, detailed knowledge of 
cases” (Ragin, 1994:92 in Neuman, 1997).   
 
The research objective was to find how the different factors in figure 5 influence an 
SME’s pace of internationalization. The use of qualitative methodology has the 
advantage of giving the researcher the possibility of catching the complete picture 
surrounding this phenomenon. This is achieved by collecting data from actors that 
are in some way involved in the object or activity being studied (Støle, 1997). 
 
There are several advantages of conducting a case study, but also some 
disadvantages, one being the issue of subjectivity. When it concerns the source of 
subjectivity that comes from interpretations of the data in the analysis, the challenge 
is to present the complex social reality without being too reductionistic, on the one 
hand, while presenting a clear cut and in-depth analysis on the other. In order to 
ensure that the interpretations made are in line with the understanding of the 
members of the organizations, drafts and milestones drawn up, have been given to 
the informants for revision during the period of analysis and unclear issues have 
been probed. 
 
In order to reduce sources of bias different actions needs to be considered. It was 
useful to prepare carefully for each interview. By being informed about the 
organizational or situational context in which the interview was taking place the 
credibility of the interviewer was demonstrated and thereby the interviewee was 
encouraged to offer a more detailed account of the topic under discussion. A further 
benefit of this is made clear by Healey & Rawlinson (1994:136): “A well-informed 
interviewer has a basis for assessing the accuracy of some of the information 
offered”. As a number of interviews were undertaken, it was possible to draw on the 
initial analysis that was made of the data previously collected. Credibility may also 
be promoted through the supply of relevant information to participants before the 
interview. First contact was established by telephone, then an e-mail was sent 
containing a list over the main themes to be covered in the interview. This should 
promote validity and reliability by enabling the interviewees to consider the 
information being requested and allowing them the o
 67 
supporting organizational documentation from their files. Access to organizational 
documentation and also use of public sources such as the Brønnøysund register also 
allowed for triangulation of the data provided.  
 
It can be concluded that case studies, as were the chosen method of data collection 
in this study, are appropriate as a research design in a theory development context. 
The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence. 
The main weakness of the case study is the practical problems of analysing the 
results. As elaborated on in section 4.5. 
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Chapter 5 Case Descriptions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The cases were chosen for theoretical rather than statistical reasons, to replicate and 
extend emergent theory under examination. Individual sample elements (e.g. key 
informants), is founder/owner of the firm, managing director/chief executive and 
key informants identified by managing director or founder. The data analysis is 
designed to identify patterns relevant to international market growth and the 
influence of the earlier mentioned factors on the case firm. To highlight this, critical 
events in the case firms’ internationalization process have been used. This chapter 
will provide a detailed description of each case, a within-case analysis.  
 
Data and interview notes were coded by the author using the software 
“HyperResearch”. This was done for each firm along a number of dimensions. This 
makes it easier to identify the different statements that represent each dimension 
studied, because in the left margin of the document you see the codewords and the 
corresponding statement is then marked. In this chapter the cases and their 
internationalization process will be described in detail. Then the cases are classified 
according to the two dimensions that were deemed most important to describe their 
degree of globalization. In chapter 6 a comparison between the cases and groups of 
cases are made.  
5.2 Description of each case  
Since data displays help the researcher see patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994:433) 
critical events of each case’s history are drawn up (see below):  
5.2.1 ColorMatic AS 
Year  Important events 
1983  Tronrud Engineering AS (parent company) was established  
1991  2 printers, Mr Randsberg and Mr Bjelland started to develop the 
con- 
cept of an inkdosing machine 
1995  The prototype was ready and the two printers approached Mr 
Tronrud 
1996  Color Matic 2000 presented at Grafex and Nordgraf fair in 
Stockholm – no success - the machines were considered too large, 
complicated and expensive and thus difficult to sell (sold only 5-6 
machines) 
1997   Tronrud AS bought all the patents and ColorMatic AS was 
established – Tronrud AS is to produce the machines and 
ColorMatic AS to market and sell them 
1998  The prototype of Inkdoser 2500 was presented at the Ipex fair in 
Birmingham 
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1999  The first machines were sold to England, Belgium, Denmark, 
Australia and New Zealand.  Contact with the buyers was made in 
Birmingham. 
Mr Schaefer (the interviewee) was employed to strengthen the 
marketing effort 
2000  USA, Germany and France were entered 
2001  They are presently in 22 countries mainly using low-commitment 
modes such as direct export and distributors. They have one 
employee abroad, at a sales office in England. 
  Their focus for the future is on the US and the Japanese markets 
 
ColorMatic AS, which is a subsidiary of Tronrud Engineering AS, started up in 1997 
as a sales and marketing function for the inkdosing machine. A previous version had 
not been very successful and the establishment of ColorMatic was an attempt to 
improve sales with more focus on that particular product. The product was also 
improved and the new version was ready for sale in 1999. The first edition was 
initiated by two printers, Mr Randsberg and Mr Bjelland, who approached Mr 
Tronrud in 1991, they had been looking for a machine that could mix paint in-store, 
but had been unable to find it anywhere and wanted Tronrud to build one. The first 
edition turned out to be too large and heavy and thus difficult to sell, the new edition 
was a completely new machine, but the basic idea was kept intact. The major change 
was the size, which was reduced to a minimum. The weight was now half of the old 
one and the design was also improved, it looked nicer and was easier to handle; “you 
can mix colours in a white shirt with this machine” (Inventor, Randsborg, 1998:6). 
ColorMatic got their first sales to England, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand in 
1999, the interviewee stated that the sales came as a consequence of the IPEX fair in 
Birmingham in 1998 where the prototype were presented. They got sales to USA, 
Germany and France in 2000 following from this fair. ColorMatic presently sells to 
22 countries around the world using relatively low-commitment modes such as 
direct export and distributors. Another motivation for establishing ColorMatic AS, 
in addition to creating a better sales apparatus for the Inkdoser, was that Tronrud 
Engineering AS wanted to exploit excess capacity in down-periods. The first entry 
mode used was direct export.   
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
ColorMatic’s founder Mr Tronrud is the CEO of Colormatic’s parent company, 
Tronrud Engineering, he has technical background. The interviewee who is the 
marketing manager of ColorMatic, Mr Schaefer, only started in the company in 
1999, two years after start-up of ColorMatic. 1997-1999 was a product development 
phase, i.e Mr Schaefer was there when the first product entered the market in 1999. 
He has no higher education, he studied business for two years in the US. Mr 
Schaefer also worked in the Netherlands for 6 months, he was then employed in a 
Swedish company, it was in digital printing, his position there was export manager. 
His experience is from much the same markets as he works in now, the Netherlands, 
England, Germany and Denmark. The languages he masters are English, some 
German and Swedish. 
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Personal networks 
Mr Schaefer, states that in ColorMatic they are not too concerned with establishing 
close relationships; “..it is more “purchase and sale – it is one shot and then we are 
out again – people buy a machine and that’s it” (Schaefer, 2002). He states that the 
relations they have to their customers are very pleasant, but it is not continuous 
business where people buy more and more from them. Mr Schaefer states that he 
definitely has a network from his previous positions, but he will not put any 
emphasis on any of them in terms of one being more important than the other. In 
general the relations have aided them with regard to questions of infrastructure and 
things like “which are the five largest printing companies in Denmark?” (Schaefer, 
2002). In other words, the relations help them get an idea of who to work with, 
which are the relevant suppliers and distributors in a new market. “It is convenient 
to have good contacts then you can check potential partners with people you know – 
confirm or disconfirm rumours. To succeed it is important with good alliance 
partners that know the local market” (Schaefer, 2002). 
Industry globality 
The industry ColorMatic belongs to, seems to have a relatively low degree of 
globalization; “England is more a local market, and USA is typically the same” 
(Schaefer, 2002). When the market is local it means there is not much intra-industry 
trade going on and it indicates relatively low interdependence of national markets. 
ColorMatic also have to make adaptations and modifications to the product to 
comply with the different standards in each country markets. The market is also 
described as consisting of some large, dominating actors and a vast amount of 
subsuppliers and third-part suppliers and the industry structure as such does seem to 
be rather fragmented. 
Product characteristics 
ColorMatic produces a standard product, an inkdoser. They have produced and 
installed about 100 machines worldwide. It is an industrial product, it is specialized 
and at least medium complicated. The product life cycle is relatively long, it does 
not have to be renewed very often. When it comes to price, ColorMatic actually did 
a test where they reduced the price by 20% the response they got was not very 
enthusiastic, “we could not see any significant change in demand after our little test” 
(Schaefer, 2002). The demand is very sensitive to quality on the other hand, partly 
because it is a very costly product in this market.  The product is described as unique 
compared to competitors’ products. Most others produce socalled industrial systems, 
that is, big systems where you need a large room to place it in and you need many 
permanent installations. The product ColorMatic deliver is described as more 
flexible and simpler systems, where the customer can start at a relatively low cost 
and expand the system after some time without losing any of its functionality, they 
just add to it. The product market ColorMatic is aiming for, is the packaging or 
wrapping market for boxes and cartons. It is seen as quite a narrow niche.   
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5.2.2 Dolphin AS  
Year  Important events 
1991/92 Dolphin AS was established by 20 previous employees of Norsk Data 
1992  Direct export started to the US market 
1994  Ownership of Dolphin AS moved abroad to the US i.e. parent company 
  located in the US, but the owners are the same as at the outset. 
1996  Buy-up in the US 
1997  Dolphin AS established an agent in France 
2000  Dolphin AS established an agent in England 
2002  Dolphin established and agent in Germany 
  Their focus for the future is on the US and the Chinese market 
 
Dolphin Interconnect Solutions AS was established by about twenty previous 
employees at Norsk Data AS in 1991/92. Norsk Data was dissolved in 1990. 
Dolphin started out as a subsidiary, but they later got net financing and a little 
concern was established. In 1994 the ownership was transferred to the US, but it was 
the same Norwegian owners as at the outset. Dolphin “develops, manufactures and 
markets high-speed, high bandwith interconnect products based on the Scalable 
Coherent Interface” (Dolphin’s homepage). Their first sales were to the US in 
1991/92, the founders explains that with the product being made for larger systems 
than the one made by Norsk Data, “and for that, there is only an international 
market” (Løchsen, 2002). As we can see above this company uses only low-
commitment modes, starting out with direct export to the US in 1991/92 and 
establishing agents in France, England and Germany in 1997, 2000 and 2002 
respectively. 
 
Dolphin started exporting the year after founding and the export share has varied 
from 100% in year 2 to 90% today (year 12). They are currently present in Europe 
and America (10-12 countries) and are thus quite international on the market 
dimension even though it is mostly in Western type of countries. The type of entry 
modes they use most frequently are agents.   
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
The interviewee is the present CEO of the firm and he is also one of the founders, 
Mr Løchsen. He has cand.real degree in physics from the University of Oslo, but he 
emphasizes that what he is really interested in and has worked with, is data and 
electronics in relation to computers. He explains that the physicists were early in 
making use of computers and that was the reason he decided to study physics. Mr 
Løchsen emphasized that he was interested in computers from the start. He has lived 
and worked 6 months in Sweden. He has not lived abroad other than in Sweden, but 
in all his working life he has travelled extensively both in Europe and the US both 
on the technical side and as a seller and in management. Mr Løchsen has not studied 
abroad and has only worked in Norwegian companies, but with international 
operations. He speaks well English, and some French and German.   
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Personal networks 
When it comes to Dolphin, Mr Løchsen gives an example of how they got their 
agent in UK. The connection was made through relations. The seller they had in the 
US was British and had previously been a co-worker with the individual who 
became Dolphin’s UK agent. Mr Løchsen describes the general business climate as 
largely of technical nature before and after the sale. He states that they always make 
contracts that give them a chance to get out.  Mr Løchsen believes his network from 
previously has aided Dolphin in its internationalization process. His network in 
England has somehow disappeared or he did not consider them to be of much use, 
but in Europe (e.g. Germany, Switzerland and France) the contacts were of 
importance, they introduced him to distributors and potential customers in the 
foreign market. Another important type of relations that have had great importance 
is a European Research Cooperation. It is a framework program located in Brussel 
and it is part of the EU. The companies which are interested in cooperating, get 
together and write up a project proposal. They then apply for financing in Brussel. 
Dolphin took part in this from an early stage and Mr Løchsen believes they have 
established a good network from it and also quite a few good customer relations 
accordingly. The projects are described as of mainly technical nature, the 
cooperating parties have to be from different countries and the project should result 
in commercial products. The types of relations Dolphin has or the ones the CEO 
sees as important, are mainly research relations/projects.  
Industry globality 
The industry Dolphin is part of seems to have a high degree of globality, the 
interviewee have not experienced any barriers and there is no need to adapt the 
product to different markets both factors indicate strong globalization drivers being 
present, “in my opinion the industry we are a part of, electronics, is very 
international!” (Løchsen, 2002). Mr Løchsen also describes the competition as 
strong and describes how they do business with relevant actors “..whether they are 
in Korea, the US or Norway are of no importance!”. This may be indicative of a 
strong interdependence of national markets and thus high industry globality.    
Product characteristics 
The product Dolphin sells is hardware. It is an industrial product and highly 
specialized, it is standardized in terms of them having to follow an international 
standard, it is also described as a very complex product, one has to have technical 
knowledge to sell it. The product life cycle for this product is described as medium 
long for being in the computer industry, about 4-5 years. Demand for the product is 
not very sensitive to changes in price, Mr Løchsen does not believe they will sell 
more if they lower the price. He believes the product is quite unique and they invest 
in product development to maintain this uniqueness, but he does not specify what 
exactly is unique about it. 
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5.2.3 Fras Technology AS  
Year  Important events 
1975  Mr Fjerdingstad (founder of Fras Technology) established a 
subsidiary of Parker Hannifin a subsidiary of an American 
corporation in Norway 
1986  Mr Fjerdingstad established a subsidiary of Hägglunds Drive in 
Norway  
1990  The first step for the product was to follow a customer out – namely 
they followed Norske Skog to France 
1991  Mr Fjerdingstad was employed at Veritas as a strategy to prepare a 
  a platform for the product   
1996  Fras Technology AS was established by Mr Fjerdingstad  
1998  Fras Technology AS established contact with Lloyds of London 
1999 Fras Technology AS sold licences to Germany for the 
pharmaceutical industry 
2000  Fras Tecnology AS followed Statoil to China 
2003  Fras Technology AS is currently looking for new investors 
2003  A cooperation agreement was formed with Lockheed Martin in the 
USA 
They do not focus on country markets but on product markets: 
offshore, ships, process industry and energy production 
 
Fras Technology AS or its product was first a service of Norske Veritas. The 
founder, Mr Fjerdingstad holds all the patents, the product is his invention. The 
business idea was to work with preventive maintenance on large hydraulic and oil-
lubricated systems, but the patent is described as being applicable for all liquids and 
gasses under pressure. The product, a fluid sampler (e.g. DynaSamp), is not so 
complicated in itself, but the surroundings are. The founder thus, describes the 
product as difficult to sell. Fras Technology has chosen to focus on a very narrow 
niche, lubricated technical systems and hydraulics. Mr Fjerdingstad believes that to 
get new technology into a market you need a large reference as an alibi to get the 
product on the market. The decision to work for Veritas was thus a very conscious 
one on his part and it was made to build a platform for the product. Fras Technology 
AS is described as a competence center for condition monitoring, troubleshooting 
and advisory service for the operation of fluid systems by the founder. By the use of 
unique technology and their patented DynaSamp fluid sampler/injector they can 
offer an accurate diagnosis of their customers’ systems. In addition, they offer 
general consulting and third party services. The founder has more than 30 years of 
experience from the hydraulics industry. When it comes to other areas where the 
product can be made use of, they use licensees. For instance can the product be used 
in a pharmaceutical system or in hospitals as well. Fras Technology has a German 
licence producer that has started to work with the pharmaceutical industry and they 
have produced one sampler that is put up in Rikshospitalet University Hospital in 
Norway on the dialysissystem for kidney patients. It measures the purity of the water 
that is used for rinsing the blood. Another area for the sampler to be of use is clean 
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water from the tap or to cleanse drainage water from different industries. Fras has no 
competence in these areas and therefore aim to license the product for such use. The 
years from 1990 to 1996 was an establishment and learning phase both for the 
founder and the market, they had to figure out what the product could do. The first 
step abroad was taken by following a Norwegian customer, Norske Skog, to France 
in 1990. The speed of the firm’s internationalization is quite fast, on both 
dimensions. Fras actually exported before the company was established, because Mr 
Fjerdingstad, who has the patent, had his first sale on this product to France in 1990 
while Fras was established in 1996. Because the method they use abroad is 
following large customers out or piggyback as it is more commonly known as, they 
are present all over the world, e.g they are very international on the market 
dimension. The export rate is currently 80%, but was only 20% 3 years after 
founding, e.g they are not that global on the export share dimension. The entry mode 
they use is “using other firms’ network” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). For instance, Lloyds 
in London, but they do the selling directly themselves since it seems to be a very 
difficult product to sell. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
The CEO of Fras Technology AS is also the sole founder of the firm, Mr 
Fjerdingstad. He is an engineer and has also some business education. He owns 
95.5% of the shares. The founder of Fras Technology has been through the process 
of establishing new firms on two earlier occasions. These establishments have been 
on behalf of large international companies. First he established a subsidiary for an 
American company called Parker Hannifin in 1975. He started on his own and led 
the subsidiary for ten years, the subsidiary has about 60-70 employees today. Then 
he established a subsidiary in Norway for the Swedish company Hägglunds, that 
was in 1986. After that, he worked in Veritas from 1990 to start-up of Fras 
Technology in 1996. He has always worked internationally, “..if you understand the 
technology – you can always communicate with people that understand the same 
technology no matter which country you are in” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). Mr 
Fjerdingstad has lived in Sweden and worked on developing similar products and 
has in general worked in very international industries so he sees no barriers in 
dealing with f.i. a French man compared to a Norwegian “you just have to learn to 
drink wine and bear with them and get to know them” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). He 
masters English, German, Danish and “Svorsk”. 
Personal networks 
Fras Technology has had a conscious strategy to find Norwegian partners with roots 
abroad that is, they have aimed at the shipping and offshore industry. Then they 
have followed these customers out, which is a traditional and relatively low risk way 
of becoming international. Later on they have established relations to partners 
located abroad such as Lloyds Register in London and Naval Research in 
Washington. These relations come as a result of their close connection with 
classification companies. Fras Technology or Mr Fjerdingstad to be more specific, 
knows how they work. He states that they are conscious about building close 
relations. The strategy is not only to sell the product, DynaSamp, but to build in a 
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service aspect into the product. Fras Technology has developed a service called 
CMP, the analysis is used to show the customer what the product can do for them. 
They have also developed a DNA analysis because they have found that many 
systems have growth of bacteria and this growth can be analyzed by the use of DNA 
analysis. The founder, has a network from working in the industry previously, it is 
described as a small industry, the hydraulics industry, where everybody knows 
everybody. He does not see different cultures as any problem, “..it is all about 
technology – if you know the technology you know the market” (Fjerdingstad, 
2002). He has established an industrial network that he believes contributes to their 
business (and success). An example is a Norwegian employed at a cruise company 
in Monaco. Mr Fjerdingstad met this person in Sweden through Rolls Royce in 
2001. This individual has many contacts with other ship owners that have similar 
types of ships, f.i. in the US, “..then rumours start to spread and we have now got 
many customers among these ship owners” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). There is regular 
contact between Mr Fjerdingstad and his relations. He has many contacts that he 
considers important, he meet them at trade fairs and they write Christmas cards to 
each other “they are my friends – that’s the way it goes!” (Fjerdingstad, 2002).  He 
has known many of his relations for years, f.i. some in Ulsteinvik where the ship 
building industry is big, he has known since the 1970s. Another important contact is 
located in England whom Mr Fjerdingstad visited this summer (e.g. 2002) to sing at 
his wedding. This contact works at Lloyds in London. Mr Fjerdingstad thus 
considers personal contacts as very important when it comes to export and turnover. 
He keeps in touch with the relations mainly by phone or e-mail. The relations are 
considered very important and he is very content with them. He defines a good 
relation as “cooperation with your friends”, it is close relations and they are 
developed over time. He states that he enjoys the personal aspect and that the focus 
is not constantly on sales. 
Industry globality 
The industry Fras is part of is described as very international, “there is a global 
demand! We have to follow a market and not a country’s borders…it is a very 
international industry - we work the same way as shipyards and shipowners and for 
them there is no borders” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). This indicates a strong 
interdependence of national markets in this industry and thus relatively high degree 
of industry globality. The founder also states, “we almost only work with large 
customers such as Statoil, Shell, Esso, Hydro, Lloyds and so on, because we have a 
very unique technology and it is particularly large customers that have high costs of 
termination” (e.g. they support a “mission critical” function with customers) 
(Fjerdingstad, 2002). Since the market they aim for are for instance companies in the 
shipping industry and this industry has been international almost for centuries, then 
it follows that the industry Fras Technology is part of is very global (even though 
the product can be of use for many other industries as well, maybe not so global e.g. 
the health industry).  
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Product characteristics 
Fras Technology works with technical problemsolving and the markets they aim for 
are not country markets, but product markets, e.g. offshore, ship, process industry 
and energy production. The high-pressure fluid sampler can be used not only for 
sampling, but also for identifying growth of bacteria in the system. Their main 
competitor is seen as, “old-fashioned methods”. That is, the potential customers may 
prefer to stick with the way “they always have done it” and may be sceptical to try 
out new, and in Mr Fjerdingstad’s opinion, improved methods. It is an industrial 
product and it is specialized, the product itself is not so complicated, but the 
surroundings are. The product has a long product lifecycle. The demand is not seen 
as very sensitive to price, but to quality. Mr Fjerdingstad considers the product to be 
unique with regard to design and technology. 
5.2.4 ICAS AS  
Year  Important events 
1989  ICAS AS was established by Mr Olving 
1990/91 Legislation required that all homes in Norway have smoke 
detectors 
  ICAS AS started production in Norway 
1991  All production moved to the Czech Republic (55 employees) – 
only marketing and sales in Norway (5 employees) 
1993  Established agent in Finland 
1997  Started selling to Sweden – considered as the most important 
international market for ICAS AS 
2000  Some sporadic sales to Australia 
2001  Some sporadic sales to South Africa 
2003  Established subsidiary with one employee in England 
  The markets they focus on in the future are Germany and England  
The entry mode most used is agents or importers 
 
ICAS AS’ initial business idea was to develop “smarthouse” solutions, that is, to 
make a house intelligent by communicating on the electronic net. In 1989 when the 
firm was founded, they had no possibility of financing such an ambitious project so 
in order to survive they focused on a simpler product, smoke detectors. The founder 
of ICAS, Mr Olving, knew that a new legislation would require all homes in Norway 
to have smoke detectors from 1990/91 and ICAS’ founder had already established 
contact with insurance companies that wished to be presented with such a product. 
ICAS started out producing the detectors in Norway in 1990, but within the same 
year they moved the production abroad due to high costs. All production is thus 
currently taking place in the Czech Republic. The products are distributed through 
wholesalers, insurance companies, electricians and suppliers of technical products to 
the farming industry. In addition to the smoke detectors, ICAS represent 
manufacturers of FG approved house alarms. The founder describes ICAS as market 
leaders in Norway and Finland, but they experience the fastest growth in Sweden 
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and Germany. In England a subsidiary was established in 2003 in cooperation with 
English partners, ICAS owns 76% of the shares.  
 
ICAS started exporting about four years after start-up, they then entered first Finland 
and then Sweden, the latter being described as the most important current market for 
ICAS. They started production in the Czech Republic already the first year, but had 
sales only to Norway the first three years after start-up. The export rate today is 
about 45% and it was about 30% four years after start-up, so the internationalization 
process can not be described as very fast for this firm. They started with the close 
Nordic market first, the first entry mode used, were agent or rather their first 
international experience was with the establishment of production facilities abroad, 
but their first mode in terms of outward internationalization was an agent.   
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Mr Olving in ICAS is the CEO and he took part in the establishment of the firm 
together with two other men. Mr Olving has some education in marketing and he is 
also an electrical engineer, one of the other two founders has business education and 
the last one has technical background. Mr Olving owns about 30% of the shares. 
Neither of the founders had any experience from the industry they are presently in, 
before start-up. Mr Olving has never lived abroad, but he has worked in 
international organizations for 15 years. He has had the responsibility for export 
worldwide. Companies he has worked for is f.i. ABB and Musta International in 
Switzerland. He speaks well English and some German.   
Personal networks 
The founder states that they have many personal, international contacts, but they try 
to avoid the Norwegian Export Council which they consider a waste of time and 
money. He considers building relations as a continuous process. They support 
activities with the distributor. They consider themselves a support function to 
distributors’ own sales staff. With regard to his personal networks, he states he 
might have some, “we manage to find the contacts we need” (Olving, 2002). He 
considers the experience from previous work life as of more importance than the 
relations. “With experience you know where to start and do not have to waste time – 
you go straight to the right organizations” (Olving, 2002). Mr Olving states that 
there is no particular important relation, it is more about knowing who to contact. 
Although afterwards, he states that the leader of the board of directors have lived 
abroad and have many contacts especially in Eastern Europe and also in rest of 
Europe that they find useful. Mr Olving has known this person for years through 
previous workexperiences. 
Industry globality 
The industry ICAS is part of does not seem to be very global since there are 
different rules and standards in different markets which work as barriers for foreign 
companies, “Germany has their own rules, they do not accept English standards, like 
we do in Scandinavia. It is the same in the US – they have a completely different set 
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of standards which is a tradebarrier” (Olving, 2002). The founder also describes the 
competition as very strong, “there is no way we can compete against the cheapest 
Chinese solutions, so we try to have broader product offering and better technology” 
(Olving, 2002). The first point indicates not so strong globalization drivers in 
motion, but the latter where the founder describes strong competition from a distant 
country may indicate some interdependence of national markets and an industry at 
least moving toward some degree of globality, but it may currently more correctly 
be described as more of a multi-local or potentially global industry. 
Product characteristics 
ICAS’ product is a consumer good and they have decided to aim for two product 
markets; fire alarms in households and in agriculture. It is not a very specialized 
product and many can produce similar products, but they try to differentiate 
themselves by making use of new technology and design, in addition they have good 
distribution channels. The product is standardized and massproduced. They try to 
get away from the focus on price and try instead to use technology and design as 
competitive factors. The product is according to the founder quite unique, they try to 
advertise it as environmentally friendly and in addition, they have a particular 
technical solution in the production phase that he believes make them unique. Mr 
Olving does not consider the product life cycle to be short, the product does not have 
to be renewed very often, but it is considered important to bring in new features and 
to signal that you keep up with the change in demand in the market. 
5.2.5 Incatel AS  
Year   Important events 
1959  The founder of Incatel AS, Mr Vedeld made his first computer 
program 
1961  Mr Vedeld started to work for IBM  
Early 1980s There was a pilot (INKA) in what was then called Televerket – the 
idea was based on the fact that if you could keep track of accounts 
by using computers it should be possible to keep track of a 
telephone network as well  
1987  A firm called SysScan won a bid from Televerket to deliver a 
computer solution that should manage the telephone network – the 
solution was not complete 
1989  A new company with former employees from SysSan was 
established, it was called Amis. It was to complete the product 
development. IBM had entered the scene and was to supply Amis 
with the Unix platform on which Televerket had demanded INKA 
to be developed – IBM Europe agreed to funding the product 
development in exchange for the marketing rights all over the 
world 
1991  Amis demanded more funding which IBM refused – and it thus 
went bankrupt.  The owners of Amis had put money into the 
project with intellectual property rights as security without IBM’s 
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knowledge – they moved these rights into an American company 
called Cimage corp. 
1992  IBM Europe established a new firm called Corena which was to 
continue the development  
  Mr Vedeld was employed in Televerket 
1993/94 Cimage Corp came up with the best solution – Corena was 
dissolved 
Televerket made an agreement to buy the solution of Cimage Corp 
with IBM Norge as integrator 
Cimage Corp was closed down in Norway, and Incatel AS was 
established – it is owned by Telenor Venture (40%), IBM Europe 
(40%), Norpet/Vedeld (10%) and employees (10%)  
1997  Incatel AS sold their software to Tele Danmark 
1999  Incatel AS sold their software to Czech Telekom (KPN) 
2001  Incatel AS sold their software to Belgia Telekom 
2002  Incatel AS sold their software to the Swedish telecom, 
TeliaSonera 
2003  Incatel As sold their software to ELISA, a telecom in Finland 
   
 
Incatel AS started with a group of 10 persons. Historically it all started with what 
was a pilot project in Televerket (e.g. INKA) in the early 80s. The business idea was 
that if you can use computers for keeping track of accounts one should be able to use 
computers to keep track of a network of telephone lines. Televerket saw the 
potential for high profits if they could make this work. Incatel AS was established in 
December 1994. To understand the background of Incatel AS a more detailed 
description of the different phases of development is needed. The establishment of 
Incatel is also closely connected to the founder’s previous work experience and this 
will be elaborated on under the experience section.  
 
Phase 1 (1987-1991) 
In 1987 a firm called SysScan won a bid from Televerket to deliver a computer 
solution, a system that could manage the telephone network. SysScan’s solution was 
not complete at this time, this happened parallel with the entire public sector 
demanding Unix operative systems to substitute older systems. It was demanded that 
INKA (e.g. the Televerket’s project) should be developed on Unix as well. The 
interviewee stated that this was in the childhood of Unix. IBM saw the danger of 
losing this large customer, Mr Vedeld thus went to SysScan asking for cooperation. 
He then started the lobbying to convince IBM centrally, of the large potential in 
winning this project and that this could be a standard application for IBM to sell 
internationally. It came to a large meeting in Televerket where the marketing 
manager for IBM Europe was present and Mr Vedeld who represented IBM 
Norway, the leader of the board of directors of Televerket were there, the Chief 
Technician and one of the owners of SysScan. The main issue for Televerket was 
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whether IBM would commit long-term or if they would get tired of the concept in a 
year or so. IBM was interested because they had two analogue cases in France and 
Germany. In the meeting it was decided that SysScan changed their platform and 
IBM became the supplier of Unix. A new company, Amis was established in 1989, 
Amis brought with them the people from SysScan that had worked on the project, 
including one Mr Smilden. Amis was 100% owned by a group of Norwegian ship 
owners, more specifically Høegh Invest. IBM provided funding, that is, IBM Europe 
financed the product development in exchange for them getting the marketing rights 
for the product all over the world. Intellectual property rights were to stay in Amis, 
but IBM got derivity rights, e.g. IBM can do whatever they want with the code, but 
so can the owner. IBM would get the right to modify the product under certain 
circumstances.   
 
Phase 2 1991-1993/94 
Mr Vedeld then became member of an international steering committee and had 
many tough discussions with the French and the Germans concerning the features of 
the product. Televerket felt a bit sidelined and complained to Mr Vedeld. The 
situation became chaotic and it became critical around Christmas in 1991, the ship 
owners (e.g. Amis) told IBM that they have to fund more, they did not have the 
capacity to fund more themselves. IBM Europe answers that they cannot agree to 
this. The ship owners then brought Amis to the bankruptcy court. The ship owners 
had been clever and put money into the project with intellectual property rights as 
security, the French representative who was responsible at IBM, had not been aware 
of this. IBM then established a new firm, Corena that was 100% owned by IBM 
Europe, this was in 1992. Amis now became bankrupt and the ship owners moved 
the intellectual property rights into an American company called Cimage Corp. 
which they had 100% ownership of. The deadline was approaching fast, a pilot had 
to be finished by the end of 1992. Corena did not make it and IBM lost interest. In 
mid-1992 Mr Vedeld left IBM to work in Televerket. He worked in IT and the first 
co-worker he picked is now the CEO of Incatel. Mr Vedeld stayed in touch with 
IBM and the project, IBM asked if he had any solution to the problem that was still 
not solved. Mr Vedeld went to the ship owners at Cimage Corp. they had now come 
up with a new and simpler solution, the earlier mentioned Mr Smilden (currently 
executive VP in Incatel) was a key individual in this. The American company, 
Cimage Corp., had by now established a branch in Skytterdalen near Oslo with 9 
employees. Mr Vedeld now had to balance between IBM and the ship owners, IBM 
was not too pleased about the way the ship owners had acquired the intellectual 
property rights. The projectleaders at Televerket asked Cimage Corp. to present a 
demo of what they had come up with, in Skytterdalen it became clear that something 
revolutionary had happened to the architecture. Televerket then went to IBM Norge 
and asked them to find a way to get an offer from Skytterdalen. They demanded that 
IBM Norge should be the integrator between Televerket and Cimage Corp. In the 
Autumn 1993, IBM Norge went to Corena and Cimage Corp. to get an offer, 
Cimage Corp. had the best offer. Corena, the company IBM had established was 
dissolved in 1994. A contract was written between IBM Norge and Televerket and 
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Cimage Corp. Cimage Corp. was closed down in Norway and a new company was 
established, Incatel AS.  
 
Phase 3 1993/94  
Incatel AS was owned by Telenor Venture (40%), IBM Europe (40%), 
Norpet/Vedeld (10%) and Cimage’s employees (10%). All intellectual property 
rights were moved to Incatel AS including what IBM must mean they had. Incatel 
AS got ½ a million NOK from the shareholders in start capital and 1 ½ million NOK 
as responsible loan, that is, there is no interest on the loan, but it has an option to be 
converted into share capital, in Incatel’s case the loan was paid back in its total. 
Incatel AS got a head start with this contract, IBM as integrator, Incatel AS as 
supplier to IBM and Televerket as customer.   
 
In 1997 Incatel got a contract with TeleDenmark, then in 1999 they got a contract 
with Czech Telekom, in 2001 they got a contract with Belgia Telekom and finally a 
very important contract with Swedish TeliaSonera was finalized in 2002. 
 
Since there is only one customer for this product in Norway they very early had to 
look outside the home market for new contracts. Their first foreign contract was 
with TeleDenmark this was about three years after founding and the export share 
was then 50%. Even though it is quite international the internationalization has been 
gradual in that they started at home first and when they went abroad they started 
with the neighboring countries. The entry mode they use is direct sale, “you yourself 
have to knock on the doors you want opened!” (Vedeld, 2002). 10 years after start-
up they are still only present in Western-Europe. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Mr Vedeld was one of the founders of Incatel. He was CEO of the firm until early 
2001, then he became COO (Chief Operating Officer) and then Business 
Development Manager. These changes came as a consequence of him bringing in a 
new Vice President of Sales at the end of 2000 and then a new CEO, she took over 
the leadership in February 2001. Mr Vedeld has worked 30 years in IBM from 1961 
to 1992, then 1½ year in Televerket before establishing Incatel in 1993/94. When 
taking his military service Mr Vedeld worked at the armed forces’ research institute 
where he got his first contact with a computer called “Fredrik” at Kjeller on which 
he made his first computer programme, this was in 1959/60. At the same time he 
also attended the university where he studied statistics at a basic level. At the same 
time as he was employed by IBM he was admitted to Norwegian School of 
Economics and Business Administration (NHH) in Bergen. He studied there part-
time for 2 years. He worked mostly on operation research, that is, optimalization of 
for instance production processes, e.g. calculate the optimal product mix based on 
sales price and raw material costs. In the mid-80s he was account executive in IBM 
where Televerket was one of the largest customers, later on he became the head of 
public sector which included all state institutions and Televerket was part of that. In 
mid-1992 he started to work for Televerket, the first co-worker he employed there is 
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now CEO of Incatel. He has several years of experience in dealing with people from 
the other Nordic countries because of IBM’s “Nordic Education System”. This was 
a Nordic IBM-school, where new sellers were trained, Mr Vedeld taught at these 
courses in the early 1970s. He lived in Sweden when working for IBM from 1971-
1972 and then in the US from 1983-1986. In Sweden he worked as an instructor at 
the Nordic IBM school and in the US he was marketing manager. We can conclude 
that the founder, Mr Vedeld has had extensive contact with international markets. 
The languages he speaks, are English, German and some French. 
Personal networks 
In the Board of Incatel they had a Mr Rinnan who is still manager at Telenor 
Venture, then there was one Mr Kumar who was responsible for the contact between 
IBM and Televerket, and then Mr de Vibe was in the Board, he was from IBM 
Norge (he is currently the head of Kistefos Venture). When Mr Vedeld was in IBM 
Mr de Vibe reported to him. Mr Vedeld states that personal relations are very 
important to him and much used when getting new customers. He has a list over his 
contacts from his time in IBM. Many of the relations are considered personal friends 
due to the long time they have been in contact and the closeness of the contact. One 
example of him making use of his contacts in going abroad is the extensive use of 
Telenor International. Telenor International has for instance let Mr Vedeld use their 
subsidiaries abroad as a base. Mr Vedeld elaborates that in Prague for instance, there 
was this employee from Telenor who said “I know the manager at Televerket – we 
were students together!” He then called the boss at the Telecompany in Prague and 
made sure he knew who Incatel was. Until now these services have been given 
without any form of compensation, but Mr Vedeld states that soon Telenor 
International will act as agents and get commission when their services lead to sales 
for Incatel. Another example of Telenor’s assistance is in Moscow. Employees of 
Telenor stationed in Moscow pick up Mr Vedeld at the airport and provide him with 
a translator and driver who take him to different potential customers. According to 
Mr Vedeld Incatel would not be able to afford this on its own. Mr Vedeld has a lot 
of contacts in Telenor. They were his customer when he worked in IBM and later on 
he was headhunted by Telenor from IBM. In addition, he has a very valuable 
network from his time in IBM, the IT-director in TeleDenmark for instance, was his 
student when Mr Vedeld taught at the Nordic Education Center. We can conclude 
that he got an extensive network in the IBM system from working there and teaching 
at the Nordic Center. In addition, when he worked for IBM in the US, his job 
involved making study trips for Nordic customers of IBM. This gave him a wide 
network outside of IBM. Mr Smilden is another important relation who came from 
SysScan and took part in the start-up of Incatel.  Mr Håkonsen, the chief technology 
officer in Telenor, has been the “godfather” of many projects in the Norwegian IT-
environment according to Mr Vedeld. He is described as very visionary, “if he did 
not say INKA was a good idea – it would never have happened” (Vedeld, 2002). Mr 
Vedeld got in contact with Mr Håkonsen when IBM took part in the negotiations. 
That is, when Amis started up back in 1989. He also entered Incatel’s Board of 
Directors after a while. Another relation that has been important is Mr Hesjedal, IT 
Director at Telenor, he was Mr Vedeld’s superior in Telenor. A Mr Torgersen has 
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been of great help in Russia, he is the Executive Vice President in Telenor 
International. Mr Vedeld describes that for a period he made use of the entire top 
management at Telenor. Mr Hermansen was important when negotiating with the 
Danes, and Mr Vedeld adds that the Danish are very tough to negotiate with. When 
the net-manager at TeleDanmark came to visit, Mr Vedeld made sure that Mr 
Hermansen came into the office where the TeleDenmark manager met someone 
from Telenor, and when he was asked how the Inka project was going Mr 
Hermansen answered; “oh very well!” That is how they work; “good references is 
everything!” (Vedeld, 2002). When Incatel got their contract with the Swedish 
Telekom a very important reference was Alcatel who had used their technology in 
the Czech Republic, “it is always more efficient when someone else say something 
is great – than to say it yourself” (Vedeld, 2002). When the Swedes took their 
decisions they sent out a very nice press release. For the future Mr Vedeld believes 
the Swedes will be their best reference. The founder is very satisfied with the 
relations they have. 
Industry globality 
The industry Incatel is part of is global according to the founder, but there is a need 
for some sort of adaptation when it comes to languages which might be particularly 
complicated in f.i. Asian countries. Since he also states the importance of “local 
presence” it does not seem to have reached a truly international demand pattern as 
yet and the globalization drivers can be seen as not so strong. However, the demand 
is quite global in that there is similar need all over the world if the wish is to have a 
modern and efficient Telesystem and the founder also states that they do not 
experience barriers of any kind. The competition as described seems to be quite 
transparent and dominated by a few large actors which indicates oligopoly structure 
which again indicates higher degree of globality. In conclusion the the degree of 
industry globality may be described as potentially global. 
Product characteristics 
Incatel’s business concept is based on the fact that the network structure of different 
Telecommunication operators is very similar. The pilot in Televerket belonged to 
something you call geographical information systems (GIS). Based on a data model 
that represents the network structure, Incatel were to develop, market and maintain 
standard software that will optimize Telecom’s use of resources (e.g. ducts, bores, 
cables and transmission equipment) in the physical and logical network. Incatel aims 
for niches “we are the world’s largest supplier of standard software in our niche” 
(Vedeld, 2002). The niche is software for established Telecoms. It is an industrial 
product and very specialized. It is standardized and has a relatively long product life 
cycle. The product is not very price sensitive, but very sensitive to quality, it is in 
the core of a firm’s operations and contributes to rationalizing. One very important 
feature that makes Incatel’s product unique compared to its competitors according to 
the founder, is the fact that they can hook up or connect the product they started with 
to the new version they have come up with lately. According to Mr Vedeld is not 
one of the competitors able to do that. They are the only ones to offer a product on 
both areas that can be integrated, GIS and logical level. Another thing that is unique 
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for Incatel is that they base themselves 100% on ITU-standard 805. Mr Vedeld also 
claims they are the only ones to have object oriented database, a more intelligent 
solution than the competitors’ with lines on a drawing, “lines do not know who they 
are” (Vedeld, 2002). 
5.2.6 IRTech AS  
Year  Important events 
1980s  Elkem AS developed a system to detect cracks in the 
surface of steel 
1982/83 First system sold to Germany by direct export 
1983  System sold to the Czech Republic 
1984  Systems sold to France, USA and Germany 
1985  System sold to South Korea 
1986  Systems sold to England and China  
1987  Systems sold to South Korea and Japan 
1988  Systems sold to England, Taiwan, Sweden, Turkey and 
Germany 
1989  System sold to USA 
1991  Systems sold to USA and Australia 
1993  Last system sold to Italy.  Elkem AS considered the 
market to be saturated and wanted out 
1994  A licence agreement made with Daido Steel Ltd in Japan 
1995  IRTech AS was established by Mr Hovland who had 
been employed in Elkem Technology AS on this system 
since 1981 – IRTech AS now took on the responsibility 
to give support to the about 20 systems around the world  
1999  IRTech AS did some upgrading of a system in England.  
They changed the old electronics with new 
2000-02 One plant has been closed down in Australia, one in Sweden, 
one in South Korea and one in Taiwan. 
Mr Hovland is currently using agents from the time in Elkem in 
South Korea, Japan and the Czech Republic. To the rest of the 
world he travels himself   
 
The product of IRTech AS, the Therm-O-Matic, is an automatic billet/bar surface 
inspection system. It was the interviewee, Mr Hovland, who started up IRTech AS on 
his own. That is, he took over when Elkem AS did no want to carry on any longer. It 
was Elkem that started to develop the system in the early 1980s. The system is made 
to detect cracks in the surface of steel material. To get an understanding of why the 
firm was founded we need to get into the founder’s background. Mr Hovland 
worked in CERN in Genova from 1973 to 1981, he then came back to Norway to 
work in Elkem Technology AS on this system. It is described as very much a niche 
product to the steel industry. Mr Hovland states that there is no market for this in 
Norway so they have never sold anything at home. The very first system was 
operational in 1983. After Elkem had installed 20 systems to the largest actors 
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around the world, they considered the market to be saturated. In addition to deliver 
new systems they had to further develop the electronic signalling part of the system, 
Elkem was not interested in carrying out this development. They decided it was not 
core business anymore and wanted out. This was in 1993 and the division was 
reduced from 16 to 3 employees. Elkem made several attempts at selling the whole 
system, but with no luck. Then Mr Hovland decided to take on the responsibility of 
giving support to the old customers, to which Elkem was responsible for giving 
support for a certain number of years, this was in 1995. Mr Hovland then established 
IRTech AS to take care of this. With the income from the support and sale of spare 
parts, he has managed to further develop an important part of the system, the task 
that Elkem was not interested in carrying out. Above we see when they installed the 
different systems around the world, this information is found on a list the CEO 
provided. The first system was sold to Germany and the entry mode used was direct 
export. When it comes to the country markets selected, it did not matter where in the 
world the market was, the founder stated that they just had to aim for markets where 
there was a large steel industry. Mr Hovland would like to build and sell new 
systems, but the firm is currently too small and lacks financial resources. 
 
IRTech have sold plants to 13 countries all over the world the first market entered 
were Germany. They have an export rate of 100% and they have not sold anything 
to the “home market” because, according to Mr Hovland, there is no market for the 
product at home. The entry modes they use are agents and direct sales. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Mr Hovland in IRTech is CEO of the firm and he took part in the establishment. He 
has technical education from Sweden, EPA-engineer e.g. electronics. He took over 
the operations when Elkem wanted out. Mr Hovland worked as a project engineer in 
Elkem from 1982 until start-up of IRTech in 1995. He worked at CERN in Geneva 
before that, as mentioned above. He speaks English, French and German, which he 
sees as a great advantage when entering these markets. He did not start the 
development of the product, Therm-o-Matic, but he was in it from a very early 
stage. He has lived three years as student in Sweden and worked eight years in 
Switzerland, in addition he worked in the armed forces from 1967-1973 in the secret 
services and spent a year in the US in that connection and also quite some time by 
the Russian border in the Northern part of Norway.  
Personal networks 
The type of contact IRTech has with their relations is very much direct contact. The 
founder describes it as “close” where telephone contact is mostly used. IRTech 
develops products together with suppliers, f.i they have had a very good cooperative 
relationship with Scanmatics. Mr Hovland goes so far as to say that the new 
development would not have taken place had it not been for a certain individual 
working at Scanmatics. This man at Scanmatics had previously worked on the 
Therm-o-Matic system at Elkem. The people Mr Hovland works with, are people he 
has known since he installed the plants 15-20 years ago, “..we are almost personal 
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friends now! The reason I have done so well are the personal contact!” (Hovland, 
2002). He also states that the personal contacts simplify the negotiations. The most 
important relations are the ones that he knows from Elkem, it is vital for future 
development of the product that they have frequent contact. 
Industry globality 
The industry IRTech is part of appears to be very global, “we sell the same product 
all over the world – the demand pattern is global!” (Hovland, 2002). In addition, the 
founder states that they experience low barriers to trade across borders, both of the 
abovementioned factors indicate strong globalization drivers in motion and thus a 
high degree of industry globality. In addition, the customers are described as large 
and very international, a further indication of interdependence among national 
markets and thus high degree of globalization. 
Product characteristics 
IRTech’s product is a system that is made to detect cracks in the surface of steel 
material. Elkem sold about 20 systems that were installed all over the world. It is 
very much a niche product to the steel industry. It is very specialized and 
technologically quite advanced. IRTech has not got the capacity to produce and 
install new products so they only do service and upgrading on the existing ones 
today. The founder of IRTech believes he is the only one in the world today that 
knows the testmethod this is based on. The product has a long product life cycle and 
it is very complex, according to Mr Hovland, the Japanese have tried to copy the 
system twice and failed both times, in the end they had to buy a license. When it 
comes to price it is difficult to compare with competitors “..for a plant that does the 
same job, our price is about 30% above that of the competitors, but our plant has far 
larger capacity so it is difficult to compare! The costs of running the operations are 
also far higher for the competitors,” (Hovland, 2002). Mr Hovland claims that the 
ones that have tried their system will never go back to old methods, the demand is 
thus not seen as sensitive to price. He also believes they have a very unique product. 
5.2.7 Kay Lindegaard Incinerators AS  
Year  Important events 
1932  Kay Lindegaard AS (parentcompany of KLI) was 
established 
1960  KL AS started producing incinerators to local waste 
1970s  KL AS started producing incinerators for ships and they 
thus became international since many Norwegian 
shipowners built ships abroad – first foreign sales were 
to Poland – they followed a customer out 
1979  Mr Hendriksen (interviewee and CEO of KLI) started to 
work with this product 
1990s  KL AS found that it was too costly to produce in Norway 
and moved the production to Croatia 
1999  KLI AS was established and Mr Hendriksen became the 
CEO 
 87 
2002  KLI AS has agents all over the world 
KLI AS is considering starting production in South 
Korea as it is seen as the most important future market 
along with the Russian market 
 
 
Kay Lindegaard Incinerators AS (KLI) is a subsidiary of Kay Lindegaard AS. KLI 
was established in 1999/2000 as a continuance of the oven division in Kay L, they 
started producing incinerators for local waste in the 60s. Kay Lindegaard AS was 
established in 1932, but their focus was on the home market, only in 1970 when they 
started with a niche product, incinerators on ship, did they become international. 
Norwegian ship owners built many ships abroad, this explains why KLI became 
international when they started producing for ships. KLI had their first foreign sales 
to Poland some time in the 1970s. The interviewee, Mr Hendriksen, has worked with 
this product since 1979 it was thus natural for him to be in charge when KLI was 
separated from the parent company in 1999. All production has been moved to 
Croatia. KLI have been in contact with this producer for 20 years, they produced on 
licence for 10 years, but then in the early 1990s KLI found out that it was too 
expensive to have production in Norway especially when they had a good and 
professional firm that could take care of it in Croatia. They are currently considering 
establishing production in Korea which is the most important future market with 
over 100 ships built a year. Russia is another very important market, it is believed 
that about 500 ships are about to be built there. KLI wants to take part in that. Their 
Croatian representative is working towards the Russian market. 
 
KLI exported first to Poland and since they sell to ships they were very fast present 
in most parts of the world. The export share is about 50%, but they have more and 
more sales to the home market these days, “we deliver to almost every yard in 
Norway!” (Hendriksen, 2002). The company is thus, very international on the 
market dimension, but not so much with regard to volume, export share. The modes 
they are using are following customers out and agents in addition, all production is 
taking place in Croatia. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Kay Lindegaard Incinerators (KLI) is not an independent firm, its parent company is 
Kay Lindegaard AS, but Mr Hendriksen who is the present CEO of KLI took part in 
establishing this subsidiary. Mr Hendriksen has no ownership in the firm, but he felt 
it was natural that he should run the operations when it was separated from the 
parent company in 1999. The reason for that is that he has worked with this product 
for more than 20 years, since 1979. Mr Hendriksen has technical background, he is 
an engineer. He has never lived abroad nor worked in international companies, but 
he has travelled extensively all over the world and worked on many different boats. 
He has worked as a service technician, that is, he goes on board and carries out 
something called commissioning, he tests the plant after it has been installed on 
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board the ships. He starts it, do adjustments and hand it over to the yard and the ship 
owners. Mr Hendriksen speaks reasonable well English, German and French.   
Personal networks 
KLI had one very important relation about 30 years ago, his name was Mr Risøen 
and he was an agent in Bergen. This agent sold other products to yards and he knew 
a lot of people in the yard industry and among ship owners, he was thus the one who 
got KL in contact with the customers. The general contact is characterized by 
discussions on prices and technical details, but it may vary. Mr Hendriksen states 
that some relations are closer than others. He does not believe he has a network of 
importance from previous work, but he has worked in KL since 1979 and thus the 
most important connections are made within this company. Before 1979 they were 
contacted directly by the yards, there were no need for assistance to “find” 
customers. Today the most important relations are the network of agents they have 
worldwide. In the Norwegian market there is an agent in Ulsteinvik that has turned 
out to be very valuable for them, the sales in the home market has risen markedly in 
the last 2-3- years and he believes it is largely due to this very active agent.   
Industry globality 
The industry Kay Lindegaard Incinerators is part of is quite global in that they sell 
the same product all over the world, the demand pattern can thus be seen as global. 
They sell to ships all over the world and the shipping industry is described as much 
the same everywhere. There are international standards KLI has to comply with that 
are made by IMO (International Maritime Organisation), but it is the same for 
everyone. However, there exists some type of barriers in some markets, f.i. Korea 
demand local production. Since most of KLI’s competitors already have production 
in Korea it is hard for KLI to enter the market. It may seem to be quite some 
interdependence among national markets even though there are some countries that 
have special demands, this indicate a rather high degree of industry globality.   
Product characteristics 
The niche Kay Lindegaard Incinerators is focusing on is very small. According to 
Mr Hendriksen there are only two other competitors. He states that there are only 
one Danish firm and one Norwegian firm that sell incinerators for ships. KLI’s 
product is an industrial product and quite specialized and complex. The founder 
believes KLI has a slightly lower price than their competitors, he thinks the low 
price is the reason for their strong foothold in the home market. The product does 
not have to be renewed very often so the product life cycle is described as quite 
long. The customers are very focused on prices according to Mr Hendriksen. 
5.2.8 NOR-REG Machine AS  
Year  Important events 
1967  NOR-REG AS was established (parent company) 
1997  Parent company got agents in Denmark and Sweden 
1999  Parent company established sales subsidiaries in 
Sweden, UK and Germany 
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2000  NOR-REG Machine AS was established. Mr Ingeberg 
(interviewee) became CEO – they started production in 
Germany - Germany is seen as a core area in the 
packaging industry 
2002  Merged back with parent company – Mr Ingeberg 
became business developer 
They aim to only use subsidiaries as foreign operation 
mode due to bad experience with agents and distributors 
The most important future market is seen as the snacks 
market and the US market  
 
NOR-REG Machine AS was separated from the parent company in 2000, but is today 
(2002) merged with its parent company again and the interviewee’s position has 
changed from CEO of NOR-REG Machine AS to business developer in the parent 
company, NOR-REG AS.  NOR-REG AS was established in 1967 by two brothers. 
NOR-REG AS claims to be a leading supplier of end-of-line packaging solution in 
Europe, with Scandinavia, UK and Germany as strongholds (NOR-REG AS 
Homepage). NOR-REG Machine AS makes transport lines and palletizing 
equipment and machines that forms the wrapping/packaging before filling. The 
parent company’s product is similar, but it is more about the filling and sealing of 
the packages. The decision to establish the subsidiary, NOR-REG Machine AS, was 
based on a need to focus on certain tasks that the parent company itself did not 
consider core activities. NOR-REG Machine AS was supposed to only supply the 
parent company, but they became a lot more independent than intended, less than 
half of their deliveries were to the parent company. When it comes to their 
internationalization, it started with NOR-REG Machine AS getting an agent in 
Denmark in 1997, when they entered the German market later in the same year it 
was also through an agent. This entry was made, according to Mr Ingeberg, because 
of the parent company having agents there. The first sales subsidiary was established 
in Sweden then in Germany and UK, all of them in 1999. These subsidiaries are 
described as being established by NOR-REG Machine AS although it was not 
separated from the parent company until the year after, in 2000. In 2000, NOR-REG 
Machine AS also established a production unit in Germany. This establishement was 
explained by the advantages of the Euro being more stable than NOK and also the 
fact that they see Germany as a core area for the packaging industry “this is a very 
German industry” (Ingeberg, 2002). Their most important geographical market 
today is, according to the CEO, the Scandinavian market and the British. 
 
They started export relatively parallel with home sales, “it is like this, the market is 
international and the market in Norway is limited” (Ingeberg, 2002). They are 
currently present in 7 countries, mainly Western European and Japan, but started out 
relatively slow and gradual with regard to the market dimension, “we started with 
the closest – Scandinavia and UK” (Ingeberg, 2002). The entry mode mostly used is 
wholly owned subsidiaries, but they also have a couple of agents. The export share 
two years after start-up is 75% and increasing. The firm has moved fast in terms of 
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two dimensions, the export share is high after only a few years of operation and they 
make use of high-commitment modes at an early stage in the internationalization 
process, but they move rather gradual on the market dimension. Even though Mr 
Ingeberg stated that they started with entering the closest markets first, they entered 
several markets more or less simultaneously so in that respect they moved quite fast 
on this dimension as well.   
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
NOR-REG Machine AS is not independent, it was a subsidiary for about two years 
(from 2000-2002), but is now merged back in with its parent company. The parent 
company was established in 1967 by a man with technical background. The CEO of 
the subsidiary whom was interviewed, Mr Ingeberg, was the CEO from the start and 
is today Business Developer in the parent company. He has a Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Marketing and Finance from Denver, Colorado (4 years). In addition, Mr 
Ingeberg worked in Germany for one year and in Sweden for four years. He speaks 
English, German and some Spanish and French. 
Personal networks 
NOR-REG Machine AS has many very large customers and the relations to them are 
not very close, “Our large customers such as Kraft, General Foods, Nestlè and that 
kind of customers, we don’t have very close relations to them! We are kept at a 
distance which suits us fine - we are not very good on relations anyway” (Ingeberg, 
2002). Opportunism is seen as large a problem, “..if we are approached in a way we 
consider informal, suddenly the “table catches” – they hold against you anything 
that has been said earlier. We have become much better at this now – and the 
contracts have become much longer he he..”, (Ingeberg, 2002). Mr Ingeberg states 
that he has some sort of personal network, “but a surprisingly small network really, 
maybe I’m not very good at staying in touch” (Ingeberg, 2002). He has a network 
from his time as a student, but he does not feel he is very good at using it. He still 
believes it has helped somewhat in the internationalization process, he knew some 
people in the packaging business from previously. There is no particularly important 
relation. Mr Ingeberg has people from earlier jobs and from his student days he can 
contact when something comes up, but cannot pinpoint anyone of particular 
importance.    
Industry globality 
For NOR-REG Machine it seems the industry is not that global, “you may say, in 
France I don’t think we have ever experienced not competing with at least two or 
three French companies and the French companies do not sell anything outside 
French borders! There is relatively high degree of adaptation…but it does not matter 
which country we sell to – we make customer adapted solutions…” (Ingeberg, 
2002). Mr Ingeberg states that it is global markets they are operating in, but it seems 
to differ a bit according to which product markets they target with their packaging 
machines. When it comes to the industry’s degree of globality, it seems there exist 
some sort of oligopoly, “..there are 4 or 5 really large industrial concern that work 
on this all over the world, then there are 10-15 under them again and then its full 
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stop. We are positioned relatively high up among the 10-15” (Ingeberg, 2002) and 
then the customers and suppliers are described as “relatively international”, but it 
seems certain markets (e.g. French, USA) demand certain local aspects, so the 
industry does not seem to be truly global as of yet.   
Product characteristics 
The niche NOR-REG Machine AS is focusing on, is “end-of-line packaging 
solutions”, that is packaging for transport and display purposes, including conveyor 
systems and palletizing. Their most important market today is the snacks market e.g. 
potato chips, peanuts and so on. This is an industrial product and it is quite 
specialized and complex. The product life cycle is 5-8 years so it is quite long, 
“..this is not computer equipment!”, (Ingeberg, 2002). They sometimes retrieve old 
machines and rebuild them to markets with lower standards. Mr Ingeberg assesses 
NOR-REG Machine’s products to be in the medium to high price category 
compared to competitors. NOR-REG Machine’s product is unique especially in the 
snacks market and Mr Ingeberg believes them to have a technological advantage in 
this market compared to competitors. That the product represents high quality is 
illustrated by the last order they have received, “We just got a large order that we 
actually share with a German company named Schubert. And if you ask anyone in 
our industry what Schubert represents, it is like the Rolls Royce….we are going to 
deliver 60% of the order and Schubert 40%.” (Ingeberg, 2002). 
5.2.9 Norsk Display AS  
Year  Important events 
1993/4  Mr Wahl establishes Norsk Display AS – they got their 
first sales this year to the Netherlands – they used direct 
export which is the only mode used 
1995  Norsk Display AS got sales to Denmark and Finland 
1996  Developed their homepage on the Internet – got sales to Germany 
1997  Norsk Display AS got sales to the USA 
1999  Norsk Display AS got sales to Belgium and the UK 
2002  Norsk Display AS currently has direct export to about eight 
countries 
They see the US and Germany as the most important future 
markets 
 
The initial idea of Norsk Display AS was to make displays for the transport market, 
that is, personal transport (e.g. railroad, bus, train, airplanes). To get a head start and 
to build trust in the market, they started out making some simpler products that 
could generate income already from the start. The way it turned out, even these 
simpler products demanded a lot of time and energy, moreover the projects ranged 
from 1 million to 20-30 million which the CEO, Mr Wahl sees as difficult to handle 
without having back-up from a larger owner. Norsk Display thus, planned initially to 
do more advanced things, but it became too difficult and capital- and time 
demanding it was therefore not given priority. Instead they decided to take the 
simpler products a little bit further. Examples of the more complex products they 
 92 
wanted to make, are the plates at Oslo Centralstation showing the departure times, 
but he emphasizes that it consists not only of the plates, but also of the data and the 
system surrounding it. A relation in a firm close to where Norsk Display is located 
in Drammen, was established before start-up when the founder was working as a 
consultant. This relation later became the direct cause of Norsk Display AS entering 
the US market. The first foreign market they had sales to was the Netherlands in 
1994. This sale came before they had any sales at home, the mode used was direct 
export, which is the only foreign operation mode they use. They have since had sales 
to Denmark and Finland in 1995, Germany in 1996, the US in 1997 and Belgium 
and UK in 1999. The founder sees the US and Germany as the most important future 
markets.   
 
The export share has been up to 90-95%, but is currently around 60%, it varies quite 
a bit because they have few and large customers. This company can be said to have 
relatively fast pace on their internationalization process on both dimensions. There 
was not any delay between start-up and export, the export rate was very high from 
very early on, and they went to two foreign markets in their first year of operation, 
but the market dimension is not that fast in that they mainly stick to Western 
countries. They use only direct export as an entry mode. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
The founder of Norsk Display AS, Mr Wahl, has never worked nor studied abroad. 
He was about to take a master in the United States, but then he got his first child and 
it was cancelled. As he has only worked on the technical side, he has not had direct 
contact with foreign countries/customers. Mr Wahl still believes that he, through his 
previous work before starting on his own, has worn off any unnecessary respect for 
foreign products, services and demands, “it is not worse out there than here!” (Wahl, 
2002). He speaks English and a little bit of German and French. Mr Wahl states that 
the technical language is English so he does not consider it important to know other 
languages in the industry they belong to. 
Personal networks 
Before start up, the founder had been in contact with several potential customers and 
he had already made systems that had been accepted. Based on this they felt they 
knew what to expect for the first years. Many personal relations have “disappeared” 
somehow since firms grow and people change jobs, but the founder, Mr Wahl, has 
one relation he considers particularly important. This relation is a man who lives in 
Drammen, he has been very stable in the firm he is working for and he has been very 
active selling for Norsk Display. Mr Wahl considers him the direct cause of them 
entering the US market. The relation contacted his company’s headquarter in the US 
and sold in Norsk Display’s product. Mr Wahl has regular contact with this relation, 
but only through work, not privately. The relation started a bit before start-up of the 
firm, when Mr Wahl worked as a consultant. They keep in touch both by telephone 
and face-to-face. In general they use little direct contact with customers abroad. 
They use middlemen in Norway and believe that this strategy has been quite 
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successful in that they feel they have built up much trust and credibility in the 
market, Mr Wahl believes Norsk Display has a good reputation. He believes the 
good relations to larger well-known customers make less need for direct contact 
with the smaller customers, the large customers’ work is seen as invaluable as 
references for Norsk Display. Mr Wahl himself describes the general contact with 
customers and suppliers as “not too good”. He does not feel they spend enough time 
to cultivate contact with customers. He explains this by them being too technically 
oriented. They are too absorbed in technical things and not in nursing personal 
contacts. They have some contact, but from a seller’s perspective it is sporadic and 
not very close. Despite this, Norsk Display has managed to make all their 
Norwegian customers approach their headquarters and sell in Norsk Display’s 
products even if several of the headquarters both in Sweden, Denmark and the US 
have own products that do what Norsk Display’s products do. These companies 
have closed down their own production to buy from Norsk Display. Mr Wahl 
believes the sales they get are very much based on trust, trust in that they have 
competence in what they do. When they started out they hoped that they should be 
able to build that kind of trust with their customers so that they could cooperate in 
making as good products as possible. They have not accomplished this, which 
means they have to use their own knowledge and experience to make the products, 
there exists no R&D cooperation. Mr Wahl feels relations are very important for 
current and future success and the relations they have work well, but he finds that it 
is often difficult to find the right person in large companies to relate to. Mr Wahl 
does not feel their sales efforts have been successful, they sell mostly through 
relations, he can not see that own sales and marketing efforts have influenced sales 
much.  
Industry globality 
The founder of Norsk Display states that the industry they are part of is very 
international, but in addition he states that there are most often many local small 
suppliers and that the industry is very fragmented and he does not consider the 
competition to be very strong, an indication of the industry not being very global. 
The product does not need to be adapted to different country markets, and they 
manage to stay in touch with customers from their office outside Oslo, this may 
indicate relatively low barriers to trade. In conclusion the industry may seem to be 
potentially global. 
Product characteristics 
Mr Wahl states that they focus on niches, that is products to producers of electronic 
scales (i.e. truck scales, train scales etc). The founder feels they have ended up very 
much in the weight industry, but they want to show that they can be used for other 
things as well, they wish to differentiate. Mr Wahl believes the combination of niche 
and a few large customers is not so good, it makes them too vulnerable for 
fluctuations in the demand of the few large customers. It is an industrial product 
they sell and is described as a relatively simple product that is easy to understand 
and use. Mr Wahl adds that there is no need for service and it can also easily be sent 
by post. It is also a highly standardized product with a relatively long product life 
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cycle, but he believes it is important to continuously improve it to make it better, 
but, “..it is rare that one can afford to make a whole new generation” (Wahl, 2002). 
Mr Wahl does not see that the product is very sensitive to changes in price, quality 
or trends, he position themselves as a bit below those delivering quality products and 
a bit above those producing very simple products “we deliver quality products at a 
relatively low price” (Wahl, 2002). Norsk Display uses LCD technology, which is 
seen as quite unique compared to competitors. They use it on large formats and the 
lighting makes it look different from others, and Mr Wahl also states that their 
product is seen as more reliable than others.    
5.2.10 Opera Software AS  
Year  Important events 
1991  One of the founders, Mr Tezchner started to work for Telenor 
Research 
1994  The Opera browser started out as a Telenor project 
1995  Telenor did not wish to pursue this product and Mr Tezchner and 
Mr Ivarsøy founded Opera Software AS – they got permission to 
keep the research. 
1996  The first Opera browser was released on the internet 
1998  Embraced emerging market of internet devices 
2000  Opera Software AS teamed up with key players in the internet 
device market: Ericsson, Nokia, Sony, IBM and Psion. 
  Opera Software AS acquires Hern Lab (Sweden) 
2001  Opera Software AS became part of Symbian (a strategic alliance 
  of leading handset and mobile computing manufacturers: 
  Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Panasonic and Psion) 
  They aim for the cellularphone- and the digital-TV market 
 
Opera Software AS was established in 1995. The Opera browser started out as a 
research project in Norway’s telecom company, Telenor in 1994, and in 1995 the 
project branched out into an independent development company. One of the 
founders, Mr Tetzchner worked for Telenor Research from 1991 to 1995. In 1995 he 
and his colleague, Mr Ivarsøy, founded Opera Software AS. Telenor decided at 
some point that an internet browser was not something they wanted to pursue and 
therefore abandoned the project in 1994. Mr Tezchner and Mr Ivarsøy still believed 
in the idea and got permission to keep the research, Telenor even provided the new 
company with offices and consultance at start-up. Opera Software AS developed the 
Opera web browser “a high–quality, multi-platform product for a wide range of 
platforms, operating systems and embedded internet products” (Opera Software 
Magazine: Highlights 2001:4), which was released in 1996. The firm operates in two 
major markets, browsers for desktops/traditional PCs and browsers for internet 
devices (Solberg & Borsheim, 2002). This company has hardly had any sales in 
Norway at all, the export share is 99-100%, they sell all over the world and all 
distribution is over the internet. Everything is run from Norway.   
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Experience/background of founder/key employees 
The founder of Opera Software has technical background from the University of 
Oslo.  The CFO, whom was interviewed, has business education from Copenhagen, 
he did not take part in the start-up in 1995. The CFO, Mr Jebsen, has previously 
worked in the Royal Bank of Scotland and Nomura International and Enskilda 
Securitas, e.g he has a very international background as he has lived abroad most of 
his grown-up life. He speaks English and some French.  
Personal networks 
The CFO of Opera Software, Mr Jebsen, states that they have very close contacts 
with customers. This is because they work on very large deals and it is very research 
based, e.g. they work towards markets they think will emerge in the next few years 
and they are dependent on new technology. An example is the deal with IBM, it 
took them six months just to negotiate a contract and then another year of 
developing a product. All the time they cooperated very closely to end up with a 
product. The same goes for Nokia, Ericsson and all the other large customers, they 
work with them and take part in the development of new products. Mr Jebsen has 
got a personal network from previous studies and worklife, but he does not consider 
it to be of importance on sales, but for financing.       
Industry globality 
The industry Opera Software is part of is characterized by a few, large actors. There 
exists no barriers of trade in this industry and the demand pattern is global, “we can 
in most cases sell the same product all over the world without any need of 
adaptation” (Jebsen, 2002). This indicates strong globalization drivers present and 
we can conclude that this industry has a high degree of globality. 
Product characteristics 
The product follows for instance the trends in cellular phones so in that way the 
product life cycles varies, but tend to be very short. It is a consumer product even if 
they sell to large industrial firms such as Nokia and Ericsson, the end-product is 
meant for consumers. The question of adaptation is a bit tricky, they adapt to the 
large customers (e.g. Nokia, Ericsson), but they sell a standardized product to a 
massmarket. Mr Jebsen, believes their price level is about the same as the 
competitors’. The product is described as unique in terms of it technically being very 
strong, it is smaller and faster than other similar products.    
5.2.11 Optoflow AS  
Year  Important events 
1993  Mr Gjelsnes established Optoflow AS 
1994  Mr Gjelsnes was awarded a Reodor Price for his invention 
1995  The product is ready for sale – first sale to Norway 
1996/97 A prototype was sold to England – it was an OEM contract (seen 
as least costly) 
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1998  Established contact with most of the distributors (e.g. Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, England) 
2000  The firm was sold and changed name to BioDetect  
BioDetect got a distributor in Japan (has waited with that market 
because far away wrt service) 
Optoflow has sold to 12 countries: In addition to the ones 
mentioned above, Belgium, the Netherlands, France (agent), Italy 
(agent), Jordan, USA (2 agents) and Singapore 
The founder prefers agents – he is disappointed with the 
performance of the distributors 
 
Mr Gjelsnes started Optoflow AS on his own in 1993. Eight years later it was bought 
by investors and the name was changed to BioDetect AS. The firm lost a lot of 
money last year which is very disappointing to Mr Gjelsnes. Mr Gjelsnes is pleased 
with making money on the sale, but disappointed on the result. He does not have 
much contact with the firm today. The management is new from when he was 
running the firm. Mr Gjelsnes started on his own, but soon needed money and to get 
that he issued shares several times and thus his ownership declined. He owned 30% 
of the firm when it was bought in 2001. The product is called a portable flow 
cytometer which is made for detecting microorganisms in f.i. water. He states first 
that they started by selling abroad, but then it becomes clear that the first sales were 
actually to the home market. However, it is emphasized that the Norwegian market 
is not a sufficient base for the establishment of such a firm, so he was all the time 
thinking export. He was awarded a Reodor Prize in 1994 because of an invention he 
made. At the time of start-up, Mr Gjelsnes came from a job where he had travelled 
for about two years selling a product that counted bacteria and cells and that is how 
he came up with the idea of starting on his own, he saw the need for a new type of 
product he believed there was something missing in the offers that were given at the 
time. In addition to him seeing the need for a new product, he explains the start-up 
by his private life being changed. His children had grown up and he was now ready 
to take the risk that was involved in a start-up. It takes time to develop such a 
product, the product was thus not ready for sale until 1995. The price of such a 
system is about 2-400 000 NOK. A prototype was sold to England in 1996/97, this 
was Optoflow’s first foreign sale. Mr Gjelsnes was actually aiming for the German 
market, but the German firm he was negotiating with was cooperating with a Welch 
firm and it was through this Welch firm he got his first sale abroad, to England. 
Today they get orders from several countries’ military research institutes, f.i. from 
CDC (Center of Disease Control) in the US.   
 
Even though it took some years from start-up (1993) to sales abroad (1996/7) we can 
say the internationalization was relatively fast because the product was not ready for 
sale until 1995, “the development of a new product takes time!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). 
Mr. Gjelsnes wished to enter the German market first because of their demanding 
and critical nature especially to technical products, “if it gets acceptance there it is 
easier to get acceptance in other markets”, (Gjelsnes, 2002). The first entry mode 
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used was original equipment manufacturing (OEM), “when you don’t have 
resources you just have to choose the method that cost the least – it’s the economy 
that drives the decision!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). They have used distributors, but are 
currently moving more and more towards manufacturers’ representative or agents. 
He seems to have negative experience with distributors that do not perform as 
expected. The export rate is about 90% and it has been at that level from the start. 
The most important markets today are Germany, Japan and the US. He finds it 
difficult to guess which market will be most important in the next three years, both 
Germany’s and US’ economy is struggling, but he seems very focused on the 
German market, maybe because he knew of that market from earlier work. The entry 
modes used are low-commitment modes such as agents and distributors. 
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Mr Gjelsnes in Optoflow founded the firm on his own in 1993. He has 3 years of 
education in electronics from Oslo Technical School, he states that “it was almost 
impossible to get in those days - the ones who did get in was very dedicated!” 
(Gjelsnes, 2002). He also has some courses from BI that he has taken while 
working. When it comes to Mr Gjelsnes’ international experience he has travelled 
quite a bit, but he has only been employed in Norwegian companies. The positions 
he has held are; head of development, head of laboratory, head of marketing, 
product manager and CEO. He travelled mostly in Europe and the US. When he 
startet up Optoflow he was intending go abroad from the outset. In 1994 he received 
a prize for his invention in a competition staged by SND. Mr Gjelsnes is referred to 
as an inventor, but “that is not what I am!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). He states that he only 
had to invent something to cover a market, get a niche, he therefore started from 
scratch. He describes the risks as quite high and he had to work as a teacher for a 
year to afford paying for the patents, but as he states, “..luckily teachers have a lot of 
holidays so I could work on my invention and travel abroad on the side” (Gjelsnes, 
2002). He masters very well English and German and understands French.   
Personal networks 
Mr Gjelsnes believes he has some sort of network, but he states further that the most 
important he has got from life is the workmethodology, trial and error, finding 
which methods work. There is one Swiss man, Mr Grieder-Leon that was very 
important in the very early days, he contacted Mr Gjelsnes and offered his 
consulting services and distribution in Switzerland when Mr Gjelsens was employed 
in another firm, Skatron AS (Gjelsnes, 2002). Mr Grieder-Leon gathered ten to 
twelve firms in Switzerland for a presentation of Optoflow’s product before start-up. 
Mr Grieder-Leon was the distributor of a firm Mr Gjelsnes worked for previously, 
they often met travelling in Germany and San Fransisco and they then often went 
out for a dinner and a drink. The contact has not remained, “I don’t know whether he 
is dead or alive today” (Gjelsnes, 2002). Mr Gjelsnes does not think he could have 
started the firm if he did not have experience from the industry. He knew the small 
firms and distributors that he got together at start-up from his previous work-life and 
they were therefore positive to attend his presentation of the new concept. Mr 
Gjelsnes believes the network has contributed to simplifying the internationalization 
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process of Optoflow AS. Other personal relations such as colleagues at The 
Norwegian Radium Hospital and at Sintef have been very important to him in that 
he can call and ask them on matters not so familiar to him, such as biology. The 
relation to customers is not very close, maybe because the product in not something 
you buy several times, and there is no cooperation with the customers, f.i. in 
developing the product. Optoflow AS cooperates with Sintef and The Norwegian 
School of Veterinary Science on research and development. The customers get a 
finished product. 
Industry globality 
The demand for Optoflow AS’ products is described as global. There is no need for 
product adaptation regardless where in the world it is sold. The competitive pressure 
is not very strong since it is a completely new product “conservatism is our greatest 
competitor!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). The founder believes total market and purchasing 
power and how well they manage to spread the word is what matters. Within their 
industry there are two large competitors, one in the US and one in Japan. Mr 
Gjelsnes was very well informed of these firms’ activities before start-up, he knew 
their strategies. He was very careful not to step on their toes “I adjust the product to 
make it cover an area they are not covering” (Gjelsnes, 2002). Their customers are 
for instance several of the largest breweries in the US and Germany, “Carlsberg 
withdrew in the last minute and bought cheaper equipment from someone else – it 
does not have the same use at all!  It is as if I needed a car, but bought a bike 
because I cannot afford a car” (Gjelsnes, 2002). The demand is seen as global as 
stated, and the founder claims there is a huge need for the product in the Third 
World such as in Africa, to get clean water, but the problem is who is going to pay 
for it. They sold the product to Jordan to clean the Jordan River. It was Terje Røed-
Larsen and UD that managed to get financing, but to start such a project in Africa 
they need a lobbyist to get money for instance from WHO, but he considers this to 
be difficult to accomplish. As described above the industry structure can be 
described as an oligopoly, the demand pattern as global which indicates strong 
globalization drivers and also there seem to take place an extensive intra-industry 
trade, all factors indicating a high degree of globality. 
Product characteristics 
Optoflow’s product, a compact, portable flow cytometer, is described as an 
industrial product, very specialised and complex. It does not have to be renewed 
very often, it has a very long life cycle like most biotechnology products, “it is not 
like PCs where the new versions are almost too old by the time they reach the 
market!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). Things move very slowly in biotechnology it is a very 
conservative industry, new medicines f.i. may take up to 10 years to develop. The 
demand for Optoflow’s product is not very sensitive to price, but very sensitive to 
quality, “there can be no slack on the quality!” (Gjelsnes, 2002). The product is also 
described as very unique, it is the only portable instrument in its category. The 
alternative to using their product according to Mr Gjelsnes, is to do it manually or 
have large, not portable, expensive and complicated systems that can do similar 
things. 
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5.2.12 Superject AS  
Year  Important events 
1990  Superject AS was founded 
1992  Superject AS had its first sales to Sweden by direct 
export – it is considered the firm’s most important 
market 
1993  Superject AS was nearly bankrupt and Mr Stokkan 
(interviewee) took over 
Established contact with the largest distributor in the 
Nordic countries, 
  Elof Hanson – also got sales to Finland 
1994/95 Superject AS entered Denmark by the use of distributor 
2000  Superject AS entered Germany by the use of distributor 
2001  Superject AS entered France by the use of distributor 
  They used direct export mode to USA, Italy, Poland 
2001 Mr Stokkan is awaiting a take-over bid  
The most important future markets are seen as pulp and paper and 
Sweden 
 
The interviewee, Mr Stokkan, was partly involved in the founding of Superject AS. 
That is, the firm was established in 1990 and Mr Stokkan came in 1993 at that time 
the firm was close to bankruptcy. He claims to be the one who has made the 
company to what it is today. The business idea is based on a patent, seals to rotating 
shafts. Their first foreign sales were to Sweden by direct export in 1992, this market 
is still considered to be the most important country market. The mode has since 
changed to distributor in Sweden in 1993 and they also entered Finland the same 
year. In 1994/95 they entered Denmark, then Germany in 2000 and finally France in 
2001. Pulp and paper is their most important product market. Mr Stokkan considers 
their main competitors to be the distributor’s other products and “old methods”. This 
firm is very special in that the four employees carry out all the tasks themselves, 
nothing is outsourced. One is involved in product development, managing and sales 
(Mr Stokkan), one is in production, one is taking orders, and one keeps the accounts. 
A way of overcoming the disadvantage of being small for Superject, is the close 
contact with the largest trading house in the Nordic countries, Elof Hanson, this 
contact was established in 1993. Hanson has about 25 sellers dedicated to selling 
Superject seals. Mr Stokkan was at the time of the interview (2002) awaiting a bid to 
take over the firm.  
 
The firm has had a high pace of internationalization on most dimensions. Three 
years after start-up the export share was 70%, today it is 80% and they started 
exporting the same year as the firm was established. When it comes to the marked 
dimensions they started by direct export to Sweden and this market is still seen as 
the most important foreign market, i.e. they are not all that global on this dimension. 
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However, within few years they have established contact with distributors in 5 
European countries, so they move relatively fast on this dimension as well.   
Experience/background of founder/key employees 
Mr Stokkan in Superject has partly contributed in starting up the firm that is, the 
firm was founded in 1990 and he came in as CEO in 1993, at that time the firm was 
nearly bankrupt according to Mr Stokkan. Mr Stokkan owns 34% of the shares. He 
is a mechanical engineer, but has also taken some courses in business subjects and 
marketing. The initial founder had business education. Mr Stokkan has worked 
abroad previously on projects in Norwegian companies. He worked as a CEO 
mostly in industries of building and construction, and shipping. He travelled in 
Western countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland and the US. Mr 
Stokkan has never lived nor studied abroad, but has had extensive contact with 
foreign markets as mentioned above. He planned to go abroad from the start when 
starting in Superject. The language he speaks apart from Norwegian is English. 
Personal Network 
Mr Stokkan states they have both close and less close relations in Superject, but 
relations with distributors are close and long-term. He further states that he has a 
personal network and this network is seen as very important for the firm’s 
development. There is one relation in particular who has been of great importance, it 
is both a personal and a business relation.  This person works in the Swedish trading 
house, Elof Hanson. Mr Stokkan has known him since 1993 and is in contact with 
him on a weekly basis, both face-to-face and by e-mail and phone. The Swedish 
trading house acts as distributor and supplier of Superject. Mr Stokkan states that 
they seek quite consciously to build relations, but “the end result we are after is of 
course increased sales” (Stokkan, 2002). Mr Stokkan goes so far as to say that 
finding the right partners are the key to successful business, and he believes that this 
is where the previous owners failed. When it comes to practical use of the relation to 
the Swedish trading house, they are allowed to use the trading house’s facilities 
abroad, f.i. if they wanted to get established in another foreign country such as 
Brazil. Superject has been very conscious about aiming at large, well known 
customers “we compensate for the small size by the association to something larger” 
(Stokkan, 2002). Due to this, he does not see that their size is an issue today, the 
references they get from their large partners is sufficient. Most of their customers 
become long-term relations. 
Industry globality 
The industry Superject is part of is described as very international according to the 
interviewee, “..to a high degree – very international customers and suppliers – only 
international!” (Stokkan, 2002). “We can sell the same product all over the world – 
it is one of the most global products you can find!” (Stokkan, 2002). There are few 
barriers and the ones they compete against are a few, large companies. These factors 
indicate strong globalization drivers and thus we can from this conclude there seem 
to be a high degree of globality in this industry. 
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Product characteristics 
Pulp and paper is Superject’s most important product market, their main competitors 
are the distributor’s other products and “old methods”. It is an industrial product and 
it is highly standardized. The product is not very complex and the product life cycle 
is very long, “it has lasted for 150 years so far..” (Stokkan, 2002). The demand for 
the product is not very sensitive to changes in price, but very sensitive to quality. 
They charge a relatively high price compared to competitors, but their quality is also 
much higher according to Mr Stokkan. The product is claimed to be very unique and 
Mr Stokkan states that Superject is the sole supplier of this product, seals to rotating 
shafts, in the Nordic countries. 
5.3 Summary 
As one can see from the above case-study profiles, the history of a firm sometimes 
begins long before the firm has been established (e.g. ColorMatic, Fras, IRTech, 
Incatel, KLI, NOR-REG and Opera). In many cases, the pre-history of a firm 
provides very useful knowledge, because the development of the founder can be a 
very important key to understanding the establishment and the further development 
of the firm. This is also true for cases where the firm is not independent (e.g. 
ColorMatic, KLI and NOR-REG). The history of the parent company has 
importance for an understanding of the establishment of the firms studied here. 
 
A more compact version of the key data for this research is provided in table 2. The 
reader will note that low commitment modes prevail (i.e. direct export, agents and 
distributors). The exception are firms that have parent companies i.e. ColorMatic 
and NOR-REG Machine both prefer to use wholly owned subsidiaries abroad, and 
KLI is currently considering the establishment of their second production unit 
abroad. This mode too, may be considered to indicate a high commitment (and 
resource demanding) mode.  
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     No of      Sales     Founded   Internat.sales Profit  Type of No. of 
       empl.           (export)   (after3yrs)   NOK  FOM mrkt areas  
ColorMatic  3         5.26        1997(00)   95% (90%) - 2.41 Distrib.      4-5 
 
Dolphin      10        47.44       1991(92)   90% (90%) - 19.52  Agents      3-4 
 
Fras        4          8.65       1996(98)   80% (20%)  -0.01 Follow   worldwide 
        cust. out 
  
ICAS       61        33.79       1989(93)   50% (10%)    2.26   Agents       2-3 
          
  
Incatel       65        76.23      1993/4(97)  80% (50%)   10.16  Direct exp. 2-3 
 
IRTech       2.5         6.01       1995(95)  100% (100%)     0.80   Agents        4-5 
          
  
Kay L       2          4.67        1999(99)    50% (50%)     0.02   Agent   worldwide 
         production 
  
NOR-REG 20      107.18       2000(01)    75% (75%)     3.69  Subsidiaries 2 
          
  
NDisplay      3            2.28      1993/4(94)   60% (65%)     -0.41  Direct exp.  2-3 
          
   
Opera      110        51.10      1995(95)      99% (99%)    -14.85  Direct    worldwide 
           export 
  
Optoflow     10          1.23      1993(97)      90% (85%)      -4.26  Agents        4-5 
          
   
Superject       4          4.96       1990(91)      80% (70%)        0.57  Distributors 2  
 
• All the numbers from the interviewees were verified with transcripts from the 
“Brønnøysund register” except for NOR-REG Machine AS where only the financial 
statements of the parent company was found. All numbers in mill NOK from 2002. 
Table 2 Summary – key figures and internationalization dimensions  
An attempt will be made to classify each case into the different categories identified 
in the framework (e.g. fig. 6), e.g. True Born Global (TBG), Born Global on Export 
dimension (BGE), Born Global on Market dimension (BGM) and Gradual 
International (GI). The cases will be analyzed, propositions developed and the 
findings compared with both conflicting and similar literature. Their similarities and 
differences on the four factors within and between groups will also be looked into 
and this comparison might enable us to see how the different factors influence each 
firm’s pace of internationalization. 
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Chapter 6 Case Analysis and development of 
propositions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis in this section is based on the twelve cases and seeks to generate 
propositions that can be tested with large scale data sets (Eisenhardt, 1989). Analysis 
and proposition development will be segmented into four topics: (1) 
experience/background of founders, (2) personal networks, (3) industry globality 
and (4) product characteristics. In the interviews, the focus was on understanding the 
drivers for the international character of the SMEs in greater detail.   
 
To make sense of data, theory is needed. The purpose of case studies even 
descriptive ones, is never merely to collect and present facts; “What makes fact 
practical and valuable is the glue of explanation and understanding, the framework 
of theory, the tie-rod of conjecture. Only when the facts can be fleshed to a skeletal 
theory do they become meaningful in the solution of problems”, (Ferber et al, 
1964:153). The cases are now compared and a discussion is made of how and why 
they differ according to where they are placed in the framework. Finally, some 
propositions of how the four factors studied here are believed to influence a firm’s 
pace of internationalization is presented. The propositions made are based on the 
findings in the twelve cases studied. 
6.2 Pace of internationalization 
6.2.1 Introduction 
It turned out the majority of the case firms used low-commitment foreign operation 
modes when venturing abroad. This research finding is in line with the resource-
based argument. Pedersen and Petersen (1998) have argued that high-commitment 
modes (e.g. subsidiaries) require set-up costs which may represent a capital 
investment beyond the financial ability of a small, newly established company. 
Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais (2000) also found that born global firms make 
extensive use of low-commitment modes. Since the entry modes of the firms studied 
here are found not to vary much in terms of resources committed to the market, the 
focus will be on the market selection dimension and export rate in the further 
discussion of the firms’ pace of internationalization. 
6.2.2 How the case firms moved on the two dimensions 
The firms studied were chosen with the expectation that differences would be found 
in the pace to internationalize. Finding differences would enable placing these firms 
in different global categories. According to several studies (Knight, 1997; Knight & 
Cavusgil, 1996; Harveston, 2000, Madsen, Rasmussen & Servais, 2000; Junkkari, 
2000), BGs are defined as SMEs with an export rate of more than 25% within three 
years of their founding. The author finds this definition to be too broad for the 12 
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firms in this study. We can imagine, for instance, a Norwegian SME that exports 
30% of its products to Sweden and Denmark within three years of its founding. The 
author would not categorize such a firm as one that was born global. In other words, 
one needs to incorporate the type of market (and how many) an SME must be 
present in before deciding to label it a BG firm. In addition, most of the very 
international SMEs usually have a far higher percentage of foreign sales than 25% 
(e.g. Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2001). In this study, a born global firm is defined 
as an SME that exports a minimum of 50% of its products within 3 years of its 
founding. However, to be defined as a “true born global” (TBG), the SME has to be 
present in more than one continent simultaneously. To exemplify, a Norwegian 
SME that exports 80% of its products to European countries would not be termed a 
TBG. The TBG is found in the upper right corner in figure 7, and the firms that 
gradually become international ones are found in the lower left corner. The upper 
left corner categorizes BG firms when considering the market dimension. The lower 
right corner categorizes BG firms when considering the export dimension. Note that 
all case firms in this study would be termed born globals according to earlier 
definitions used (see above), the strength of this study is thus the nuanced picture 
that is given of the different types of globals that exist. The definition used here is 
more precise when it comes to categorizing a firm as a truly born global firm. 
 
The world was divided into seven parts with increasing psychic distance from the 
home market (in this case Norway); Scandinavia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
North America and Australia, Latin America, Asia and the remaining parts of the 
world (Africa and Arab countries). This division is in accordance with Junkkari 
(2000:160), who classifies areas from hot (business transactions are close-by, in 
terms of distance) to cold (far away). 
   
Just four out of twelve cases started their international activity in a Scandinavian 
country (e.g. ICAS, Incatel, NOR-REG Machine and Superject). The other eight 
cases started their internationalization mostly to central European countries, but one 
(e.g. Dolphin) started also by going to the US and one (e.g. Opera) by going globally 
from the start. Currently the cases are present in from five markets (e.g. ICAS) to 
worldwide (e.g. Fras, KLI and Opera), but most are present in fewer than ten 
countries. It seems they are aiming more for the right market or niche markets than 
as many markets as possible. They are mostly present in European countries or the 
US, but in addition to the three cases present worldwide (e.g. Fras, KLI and Opera) 
two cases are also present in more exotic places e.g. IRTech in South Korea, Japan, 
China and Taiwan and Optoflow in Jordan, Japan and Singapore. 
 
Based on the description of the firms’ degree of internationalization in chapter 5, it 
is found that two firms qualify to be classified as gradual internationals (e.g. ICAS 
and Incatel). Two firms qualify to be classified as born global on the market 
dimension (e.g. KLI and Fras). Four firms qualify to be classified as born global on 
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the export dimension (e.g. Dolphin, NOR-REG Machine, Norsk Display and 
Superject) and finally four firms were found to qualify to be classified as true born 
globals (e.g. ColorMatic, IRTech, Opera and Optoflow). 
Fras
KLI
ColorMatic
IRTech
Opera
Optoflow
ICAS
Incatel
Dolphin
NOR-REG
Norsk Display
Superject
Export within 3 years
50% 100%
No. of
continents
One
Several
 
Figure 7: Different categories of “globals” 
 
The figure above gives a quite static picture of the firms’ internationalization. To 
give a more dynamic illustration of the internationalization process, the firms’ 
development is drawn up in a graph with the two axis representing the two 
dimensions of internationalization, export rate and number of market areas entered. 
Each graph represents each group of “globals” and their trajectory when undergoing 
internationalization. Note that the x-axis is changed and shows the increase in export 
rate at different points in time (not just after 3 years as shown above) 
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Figure 8: Internationalization trajectory of Gradual Internationals 
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Figure 9: Internationalization trajectory of Born Globals on the Export 
dimension 
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Figure 10: Internationalization trajectory of Born Globals on the Market 
dimension 
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Figure 11: Internationalization trajectory of True Born Globals 
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The trajectories of the case firms undergoing internationalization are shown above. 
The first year of each firm identifies the year the firm started exporting. The second 
year indicates how international the case firms are on the two dimensions three years 
after their founding, except for the two firms that have the most gradual pace of 
internationalization, e.g. ICAS and Incatel. These two firms only started to export 
after four and three years, respectively. However, apart from its relatively slow 
entrance into international markets, Incatel moved quite fast on the export rate 
dimension and might thus be characterized more as a BGE than a GI. As a 
consequence, the first year shown in figure 8 shows how international ICAS and 
Incatel are after four and three years respectively. The last year shows how 
international the firms are in 2002. Since each software sold by Incatel amounts to 
the same percentage of its total turnover, it is easy to calculate the increase in export 
share on the basis of each new contract. When Incatel got the TeleDenmark contract, 
in 1997, the export share was thus 50%. In 1999, Incatel contracted with Czech 
Telekom, and the export share rose to 65%. In 2001, Incatel contracted with 
Belgium Telekom, and the export share rose to 75%. The final contract, in 2002, 
with Swedish TeliaSonera, resulted in an export share of 80%.   
 
Regarding the market selection dimension, Andersen & Buvik (2002) propose a 
relationship approach. Their assumption is that the type of customers that a firm 
aims to have, will influence its approach to international market selection (IMS). 
The firm will either rely upon traditional selection procedures or one that is based 
upon relationships. The traditional approach assumes that the firm selects a country 
that consists of “faceless” customers and that the IMS is episodic in nature. The 
relationship approach, however, assumes that certain markets (e.g. industrial and 
institutional markets) have relatively few and large customers. This assumption will 
lead firms that are interested in securing sales to estimate the potential demand more 
directly by contacting the customers.  
 
The relationship approach was supported in the present study. Several of the 
founders (e.g. in Fras, Opera, IRTech, Incatel and Optoflow) stated that they aimed 
at securing particular customers. They were not concerned about the markets in 
particular countries. These firms pursued relationships with suitable customers, 
wherever they were found to be and they did not pay much attention to international 
borders. Firms selling to consumer markets are, by contrast, more likely to focus 
upon market potential at a country level (Andersen & Buvik, 2002).  
 
Another assumption made by Andersen & Buvik (2002) is that the choice of foreign 
market/exchange partner may influence and be influenced by the entry mode. Fras, 
for example, has a very fast pace of internationalization on the market dimension. 
Within four years of their first international steps, Fras defined itselves as being a 
firm with worldwide scope. This may be explained by the fact that the one and only 
foreign operation mode that Fras uses is “follow thy customers” or piggybacking, 
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e.g. Fras goes wherever their customers go. At one time, they went to China in order 
to follow Statoil. At another time, they went to France in order to follow Norske 
Skog. Superject is a firm that is as global as Fras is, on the export share dimension, 
but not as global as Fras is on the market dimension. Superject’s choice of market 
might be explained by the fact that their main customer and partner is located in 
Sweden, and is a large trading house. As a consequence, Sweden becomes an 
important market for Superject, and the Swedish market may also be sufficient for 
Superject’s products.  
 
The type of product a firm sells may influence the choice of foreign 
market/exchange partner. Superject mass produces a standardized product and seems 
not to have any ambitions for entering new markets in the near future. Superject 
reports that Sweden is its most important current and future market. Incatel, on the 
other hand is constantly forced to find new country markets in order to sell their 
product, since there are only a few (and in some cases only one) suitable customers 
(e.g. established tele-communication companies) in each country market. This 
understanding is in line with the strategy labelled “unique products development”, 
which Knight & Cavusgil (2004) found to be a frequently used one by BGs in the 
US. This strategy relies upon the creation of distinctive products and customer 
loyalty by uniquely meeting a particular customer need. 
 
With regard to the influence of the founders’ previous experience and network, all 
but one case (e.g. the gradual international case, ICAS) have extensive experience 
from the industry from earlier and most have quite some international experience as 
well. This make them less sceptical to venture abroad, as one founder put it “it is not 
worse out there than here” (Wahl, 2002). If that is the case or if it is ethnocentricity 
(Albaum, Strandskov & Duerr, 2002) kicking in, is of less importance. The main 
point is that the founders experience less psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977) and are thus not as risk averse when it comes to choosing which and how 
many new markets to enter. When it comes to the founders’ networks it is varying, 
and there are different types of networks that are emphasized as being of importance 
for the firms’ internationalization. While some founders focus on more traditional 
types of relationships (e.g. to customers and suppliers) to increase the firms’ 
competitiveness, others cooperate closely with potential competitors and research 
institutions while at the same time keeping the customers and suppliers at more 
arms’ length. This is in line with Uzzi’s (1997) findings who found that the same 
individuals simultaneously acted “selfishly” and cooperatively with different actors 
in their network.   
6.3 Patternmatching 
6.3.1 Within- and between group comparison 
The cases have been written up using phases and dimensions to structure them, the 
next step is to look for within group similarities and inter-group differences. There 
will be sought for similarities and differences within each group of cases (e.g. GI, 
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BGE, BGM, TBG) and also between each groups of cases. The cases will be 
compared on each of the dimensions; personal experience/background, 
network/personal relationships and level of globalization/ product characteristics to 
try and establish how these factors influence the firms’ pace of internationalization. 
6.3.2 True Born Global 
Founders/key employees’ background/experience dimension 
The firms belonging to this category are ColorMatic, IRTech, Opera and Optoflow. 
All the founders of the TBGs have technical background, two of them were 
electrical engineers. In Opera and ColorMatic the CFO and the Marketing Manager 
were interviewed respectively, when experience is mentioned hereafter it is the 
interviewees that are referred to not the founders, unless explicitly stated. The 
founders of IRTech and Optoflow speak English, French and German, the 
interviewee of ColorMatic speaks English, German and Swedish and the CFO of 
Opera speaks English and French. All of them have either worked abroad for years 
or travelled extensively, e.g. the founder of IRTech worked 8 years in Switzerland 
and 1 year in the US and studied 3 years in Sweden, the marketing manager of 
ColorMatic studied in the US and worked in Sweden, the CFO of Opera has lived 
most of his grown life abroad in the UK or Sweden and the last one, the founder of 
Optoflow have neither lived nor studied abroad, but have travelled extensively 
throughout Europe and the US in his previous jobs.    
Relations dimension 
ColorMatic and Optoflow both describe their sales as “one-shot” and there is thus no 
ground for building relations with the customers. The interviewees in both these 
firms have some relations that come forward as important for the firms’ 
development, but both are hesitant to emphasize it. Mr Gjelsnes in Optoflow states 
that “work methodology” is the most important he has got from life, not 
relationships. Experience from previous work-life and finding which methods that 
work, is seen as most important for the success of the firm.   This is said despite the 
fact that a very important Swiss connection aided him at start-up. He admits that this 
person was very important at the time, but he does not have any contact with him 
presently, “I don’t know if he’s still alive” (Gjelsnes, 2002). In addition he has 
important personal relations at The Foundation for Industrial and Technical 
Research (Sintef), The Norwegian Radium Hospital and The Norwegian School of 
Veterinary Science that are aiding him on subjects were he has insufficient 
knowledge and they cooperate on R & D. Mr Shaefer in ColorMatic also has a 
network that informs him of potential customers and distributors in foreign markets, 
but will not put forward anyone as being more important than the others, 
“they have aided us in identifying who are potential suppliers and 
distributors. For instance they give us 5 names then we can start 
analyzing them a bit. It is always good to have contacts, it enables us 
to cross-check things, confirm or disconfirm information, but there are 
no relation of particular importance” (Schaefer, 2002).   
Mr Hovland in IRTech describes his contact with business relations as close and he 
even states that many of them have become his “personal friends”,  
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“the reason I have done so well is the personal contact!” (Hovland, 
2002).   
He believes the personal contact simplifies negotiations. They also cooperate on 
developing new products with the suppliers. With regard to his personal network 
from previous work, the relations from Mr Hovland’s time in Elkem come forward 
as very important, he states that they are vital for future development of the product 
and they have frequent contact  
“..for instance in a recent development we cooperated very well with 
Scanmatics. That new development would not have been possible 
without the man that now works for Scanmatics, but previously 
worked for Elkem. When he worked for Elkem he worked full time on 
the Therm-o-matic system” (Hovland, 2002).   
The CFO of Opera states that they have very close contact with their customers. Mr 
Jebsen explains that with the fact that they work on large contracts and that it is very 
research based. An example is the deal with IBM, it took them 6 months just to 
negotiate a contract and then another year for developing the product. 
“We are dependent upon new technologies within mobilephone-
technologies. It is a R&D cooperation and it is typical a large 
contract. For instance with IBM the deal took more than six 
months to negotiate and then the development takes about a year. 
In all this period we work very closely together to create a 
product. This procedure goes for Nokia, Ericsson and all the 
others – we work for them and take part in their development of a 
new product” 
Globalization dimension 
We can see from figure 11 and table 2 that the three most global firms, in 
descending order; Opera, IRTech and Optoflow are all independent and they are all 
part of an industry that can be described as very global as Mr Gjelsnes in Optoflow 
expressed it: 
“The demand is global, there is no need for adaptation wherever 
in the world the product is sold and we experience no barriers 
across borders” 
Mr Jebsen in Opera expressed it in even more extreme terms: 
“The industry structure is concentrated around a few large actors 
and there exist no trade barriers whatsoever in this industry. The 
customers and suppliers are extremely international!”   
The fourth TBG’s company, ColorMatic’s can not be described as global as Mr 
Schaefer expressed it: 
“In Europe we operate much within EU-markets. England is more 
a local market – they serve their own marked and in the US it is 
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much the same. There has to be done certain adjustments to the 
product in each different market for instance in the US they have 
their own standard we have CE marking and they have UL. The 
biggest challenge today is that they use different types of 
packaging in different markets, Japan has one type, Europe one 
and in the US yet another type – that is the biggest challenge on 
the packaging side of business today” 
The reason why ColorMatic has become a true born global despite this fact, may at 
least partly be explained by them having a parent company backing it, it is not an 
independent firm, it is a subsidiary. 
Product characteristics dimension 
The products the true born global firms sell are Inkdoser (ColorMatic), system for 
detecting cracks in steel (IRTech), software (Opera) and cytometer, a system for 
detecting microoganisms in for instance water (Optoflow). ColorMatic, IRTech and 
Optoflow all sell industrial goods. Opera defines their product as a consumer good; 
even though they may sell to large industrial companies such as Nokia and Ericsson, 
the end-product is meant for consumers.   
“You can say we have a completely electronic product, which is 
quite distinct from other products. That is, we make software, and 
nothing is being burned on a CD or wrapped. There is no 
distribution network, all distribution is through the internet! There 
are two customer groups; one is individuals who download our 
software from the internet and we have had about 15 million 
downloadings and installations in the last 18 months. Then we 
have the large customers, typically, Nokia, Ericsson, IBM etc and 
even there, the product is an attachment to an e-mail.” (Jebsen, 
2002) 
They all state that their product is unique or very unique. Three of the founders also 
add that their product is very specialized and complex. With Opera it is a bit more 
complex, they aim for two types of markets, browsers for desktops/traditional PCs 
and browsers for internet devices. That is, they sell to customers like you and me 
through the internet and that product is standardized, but the product they sell to the 
large industrial firms is adapted to each customer, but the end-product is still 
standardized to a mass market. The product life cycle (PLC) is long or very long for 
three of the TBGs, only Opera has a very short PLC. Opera’s product is sensitive to 
price, the products of the tree other firms in this category are not sensitive to price.   
Summary within-group comparison 
To sum up, all of the interviewees of the firms belonging to the true born global 
category have extensive international experience from abroad. Three of them have 
lived and worked abroad for several years. The last one, the founder of Optoflow has 
not lived abroad, but has travelled a lot in his previous positions mainly to the US 
and Western Europe. It might thus not be as surprising that these are founders of the 
most global firms. When it comes to the products they sell, they are all described as 
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unique and highly specialized which corresponds with the statement three of the 
interviewees (e.g. in IRTech, Opera and Optoflow) came with when asked about 
competition,  
“the strongest competitor for our product is old methods” (Hovland, 2002; 
Jebsen, 2002 and Gjelsnes, 2002).  
The only one not uttering this was the interviewee of ColorMatic. What is more 
striking is that all four of these most global companies are offspring of other, large 
companies; Opera of Telenor, ColorMatic of Tronrud (e.g. is still a subsidiary), 
Optoflow of Norsk Data and IRTech of Elkem. When it comes to the globalization 
dimension, three of the cases’ industries are defined as having very high degree of 
globality only ColorMatic’s industry is defined as low. It could thus be puzzling that 
a firm is born global in a multilocal industry, however ColorMatic is not only the 
offspring of Tronrud, but also the subsidiary and can thus probably enjoy even more 
support in terms of finances and other resources from the parent company and this 
then might enable ColorMatic to expand fast to foreign markets. With regard to how 
relational the different founders are, the findings are diverse. ColorMatic and 
Optoflow’s founders are not considered relational, both interviewees describe their 
relations to customers as “one-shot” in other words the type of product might have 
an influence on the type of relationship a firm is able to build with its counterparts. 
This is how Mr Schaefer in ColorMatic expresses it:  
“Unfortunately it’s like this – only purchase and sale. It is “one-
shot” and then we’re out again, people buy a machine and that’s 
it. And we have relatively few sales of accessories and other 
things to our machines. Some service, but very little. We do have 
nice relations to our customers. But it is not like continous 
business where people buy more and more from us.”  
Another thing is that during the discussion it turns out both Mr Schaefer and Mr 
Gjelsnes have some relations that have been of great importance especially in the 
very early phase of the firms’ development, but they are both hesitant to put any 
emphasis on them, it just becomes clear as they tell the story of the firm. These 
relationships were perhaps critical in explaining their rapid internationalization. 
 
6.3.3 Born Global on Export dimension (BGE) 
Founders/key employees’ background/experience dimension 
All the founders in this category have technical background as well. The founder of 
Superject has also got some business and marketing background. Three of them 
speak three languages or more. The international experience varies quite a bit. The 
founders of Dolphin and Superject have only worked for Norwegian companies, but 
have travelled extensively in Europe and the US, the founder of Dolphin has in 
addition lived and worked six months in Sweden. The founder of Norsk Display has 
very limited international experience. He explains it in the following way, 
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“I have never worked abroad, nor studied abroad. I have only 
worked in companies with Norwegian owners. I have always 
worked on the technical side of a company so I have not been in 
direct contact with foreign markets or the export side of firms. 
But, the unnecessary respect for foreign products, services and 
demands is worn off – it is not worse out there than here!” (Wahl, 
2002) 
The CEO of NOR-REG Machine on the other hand has studied four years in the US 
(e.g. marketing and finance), in addition he has worked in Sweden for 4 years and in 
Germany for 1 year. The CEO has been in NOR-REG Machine since it departed 
from the parent company NOR-REG AS. The founder with the technical 
background which is referred to at the top is the initial founder of the parent 
company, NOR-REG AS in 1967. The firms have too many connections on a daily 
basis, it is thus difficult to see NOR-REG Machine as a separate unit it was therefore 
referred to the original founder. 
Relations dimension 
Neither of the four cases (e.g. Dolphin, NOR-REG, Norsk Display and Superject) 
belonging to this category are very relational. Mr Løchsen in Dolphin for instance, 
describes the general business climate as “largely of technical nature” (Løchsen, 
2002). On the personal level on the other hand, there is a network of importance for 
Dolphin. Mr Løchsen emphasized the relations he has acquired through a European 
Research Cooperation. Parties from different countries in Europe cooperate on 
projects, usually of a technical nature, and apply for funding in Brussel. NOR-REG 
Machine also describes their relations to customers as “not very close”, and adds 
that this suits them fine. Mr Ingeberg in NOR-REG Machine has a network from 
previously from the packaging industry that has aided them in the 
internationalization process, but he cannot pinpoint anyone of particular importance. 
Mr Wahl in Norsk Display also describes the relations to customers as “not too 
good”, but he states quite clearly that he wishes them to be closer and express 
feelings of failure because they have not managed to build better relations.   
“When we started out, we hoped that we should manage to build 
the kind of trust with our customers so that we could cooperate on 
making as good products as possible. We have not managed that, 
which means we have to use our own knowledge and experience 
to make the products and in addition be attentive to details. There 
exists no R&D cooperation. We find relations very important for 
our current future and success. We feel that the relations we have 
work well, but it is often difficult to relate to the right people in 
the large companies, difficult to find the right person to bond with. 
The aim, as I see it, is first of all to achieve sales. We always 
wanted to create relations that give us tasks, also development. 
That has turned out to be difficult in practice.” (Wahl, 2002) 
Despite what he says it seems that the relations might be somewhat better than he 
thinks referring to the fact that they managed to get the Norwegian subsidiaries to 
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“sell in” their product to the parent companies abroad. This can be seen as an 
indication of Norsk Display having a good reputation in the market. Both Mr 
Ingeberg and Mr Wahl explain the arm’s-length relations to customers with the 
technical nature of their product. They believe they themselves are too technically 
focused and not very good sellers. Mr Wahl has one very important relation, this 
relation is considered to be the direct cause of Norsk Display entering the US 
market. The subsidiary located in Norway “sold in” Norsk Display’s product to the 
US headquarter. The last firm in this category, Superject, has both close and less 
close relations to customers, but they have in general very close relations to their 
distributors. One relation in particular is very important for Superject, it is the 
relation to a Swedish trading house.  
Globalization dimension 
The firms fitting this characteristic, are part of an industry that can be described as 
having medium high (e.g. Nor-Reg Machine and Norsk Display) or very high (e.g. 
Dolphin and Superject) degree of globality. Mr Løchsen in Dolphin describe their 
industry in the following way, 
“I would say the whole business we’re in, electronics, are very 
international. No adaptation is needed in the different markets, 
the marketing might have to be local, but the product is global.” 
One of the firms has a parent company, NOR-REG Machine, and that may also have 
contributed to the relatively fast internationalization for that particular firm. 
Product characteristics dimension 
The products these firms sell are; hardware (Dolphin), packaging machines (NOR-
REG Machine), electronic signs (Norsk Display) and seals to rotating shafts 
(Superject). All the products in this category are defined as industrial products. They 
are also described as unique or very unique. The products of Dolphin and NOR-
REG Machine are seen as both specialized and complex while the products of Norsk 
Display and Superject are seen as simpler products which are highly standardized. 
The product life cycle of these firms are ranging from medium long (Dolphin) to 
very long (Superject), but none of them describe the PLC to be short. Whether the 
product life cycle is considered short or long might obviously be a relative matter 
depending on the industry they are in. In this study it is relied upon the subjective 
judgement of the founder in question, as Mr Ingeberg in NOR-REG Machine put it, 
“The lifetime (of the product) is relatively long and we don’t mind 
to take back machines in return and rebuild them and use them in 
other markets that don’t have as high standards. So you can say 
that with regard to technological cast offs/discarding well…it is 
not computer equipment – our product can last five to eight years 
maybe, quite long durability on the product in other words.” 
The founders of Dolphin and Superject state that their product is not sensitive to 
price while the founder of NOR-REG Machine find that their product is sensitive to 
price. When it comes to Norsk Display it is a bit unclear, they claim to deliver 
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“high quality product at a relatively low price” (Wahl, 2002). 
This may indicate some sensitivity to changes in price. 
Summary within-group comparison 
Before summing up the different case companies according to each dimension, it has 
to be mentioned that overall it varies quite a bit. There is no very distinct pattern to 
be seen as to the case companies in the first group, true born globals. When it comes 
to international experience, it varies from none (e.g. Norsk Display) to one having 
lived and worked a total of eight years abroad (e.g. NOR-REG Machine). The other 
two have worked and travelled abroad in their previous jobs and one (e.g. Dolphin) 
has lived in Sweden for some time, but neither have extensive international 
experience. Two of these founders (e.g. in NOR-REG Machine and Superject) also 
state that “old methods” represent their strongest competition. With regard to the 
characteristics of their products the founders of NOR-REG Machine and Dolphin 
describe their products as both unique and specialized, while Norsk Display describe 
theirs as simple but also with unique features and Superject’s products are described 
as highly standardized but also very unique. Two of the founders describe their 
industry as very global (e.g. in Superject and Dolphin), while for Norsk Display and 
NOR-REG Machine the industries have more medium degree of globality. The fact 
that the industries’ globality is not very strong fits rather well with the fact that the 
two firms are classified as medium globals and not true born globals. Dolphin is 
very close to being a true born global since it has 90% export within 3 years of 
founding, but since it sells to mainly western markets it cannot be classified as a true 
born global. Superject could be expected to be more global since industry globality 
is described as very strong, but other factors might be more influential than the 
industry’s degree of globality for instance the lack of international experience and 
network might play a part and the fact that the product is very standardized might 
make it easier to find sufficient markets nearby than for some of the companies with 
very specialized products for which there exists very limited markets even 
worldwide. This will be discussed in more detail later. The most striking finding in 
this group is that neither of these founders emphasized a network of importance. The 
founder of Norsk Display expresses a wish to develop closer relations with the 
firm’s customers, but cannot be considered to have a strong network at present. Both 
Dolphin and NOR-REG Machine’s founders state that the contact is very much on 
technicalities and that the contract is very important, both factors characterising a 
more arm’s length relationship. For the founder of Superject on the other hand it 
varies. He has a very close relationship to a large distributor which is quite essential 
for the firm’s success, but rather arm’s-length type of relationships to other actors in 
the market. 
6.3.4 Born Global on Market dimension (BGM) 
Founders/key employees’ background/experience dimension 
Both founders of Fras and KLI are engineers, the founder of Fras has some business 
education as well. They both speak English and German and the founder of KLI also 
speaks some French. They have both “always” worked internationally, but have 
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never lived abroad. The founder of KLI has travelled extensively all over the world 
in relation to installing and having service on large incinerator systems. The 
international contact of Fras’ founder are more through his establishment of 
subsidiaries in Norway on behalf of large international companies, he states that he 
sees no barriers with regard to a country’s boundaries, they go where the market is 
whether it is at home or abroad. 
Relations dimension 
One of the companies here, Fras, is very relational both in terms of building a 
personal network and a network towards customers. The founder very consciously 
went out to find Norwegian partners with roots abroad, aiming at the shipping and 
offshore industry. The founder of Fras, Mr Fjerdingstad also has a very important 
personal network which he refers to as “my friends”. The industry they are part of, 
the hydraulics industry, is described as very small “where everybody knows 
everybody” (Fjerdingstad, 2002). The other firm in this category, KLI, is not very 
close to its customers, but it may vary as the CEO Mr Hendriksen put it, 
“The contact varies according to who it is. We have better contact 
with some than others. We have known some of the customers for 
years and years and feel that we know them. The contact is (still) 
mainly on prices and technical details.” 
 
“There was one important relation, an agent 30 years ago, but he 
is dead now. He was located in Bergen and was the one that 
established contacts and made sales for us. He had contacts and 
sold other products to the ship yards already and he helped us 
also to get contracts from foreign ship yards”.   
There is currently a new agent that they got a few years ago that has turned out quite 
valuable for the home sales and Mr Hendriksen believe it is due to him they have 
about 80% market share in Norway.  
“He started out as an agent and worked for commission, but now he 
prefers the role as customer. He loves to sell, is technically competent 
and we work very well together.” 
The CEO of KLI, Mr Hendriksen states that for the firm, the network of agents are 
important. He personally has no network of importance for the development of the 
firm.   
Globalization dimension 
Even though KLI’s industry is described as only medium global, the firm is on the 
border to be characterized as TBG (see graph figure10), this may be due to the 
support it gets from its parent company when needed. The other firm in this 
category, Fras, is part of an industry with very high degree of globality and it is thus 
not so surprising that it is as global. 
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“What is important for us is to go after markets – like for instance the 
offshore market is one market we target – it is international and 
knows no countryborders really. There are four market areas we aim 
for; the offshore industry (oil and gas), ships, the process industry and 
energyproduction that is where we want to be!”  
Product characteristics dimension 
The products they sell are high pressure fluid samplers (Fras) and incinerators for 
ships (KLI). Both firms in this category define their products as industrial products. 
The founders in both firms also state that the product is specialized, Fras’ product 
itself is quite simple but the surroundings are complex. The founder, Mr 
Fjerdingstad described it in the following way, 
“The business idea was to work with preventive maintenance on large 
hydraulic and oil-lubricated systems, but the patent is of use for all 
liquids and gas under pressure. It is a small niche in the 
productspectrum where the product can be used. The fluid sampler is 
patented in 19 countries, not just the product, but the principle for the 
technology – it is I who have invented it. The product is very simple, 
but we have to build up technology around it that makes it…because it 
is a completely new technology – noone understand how to sell or buy 
such a product – why you should need it. So we have to build up a 
whole platform for the product you might say.” 
KLI’s founder states that the product is somewhat complex “it consists of several 
components at least” (Hendriksen, 2002). The product life cycle for both products is 
long. When it comes to price, Fras’ product is not sensitive while KLI’s product is 
very sensitive to price.   
Summary within-group comparison 
To sum up, both founders in this group has “always worked internationally”, but 
neither have lived abroad. Their international experience is more with foreign firms 
in Norway and/or travelling worldwide in their previous work. The establishment 
and success of Fras is very much due to the founder’s network. He very carefully 
built relations and even was employed in a company he deemed suitable for that 
purpose (e.g. Veritas) before starting up on his own. KLI on the other hand, as a 
subsidiary of a larger and older company relies very much on the network of the 
parent company. Both products in this group are described as specialized and Fras’ 
also as unique and not price sensitive. While KLI’s are not seen as unique and is 
also price sensitive and thus not being a “typical” born global product. Finally, with 
regard to the industries’ degree of globality, Fras’ is described as very global and if 
we look at the trajectory of Fras, we can see that it has now become a true born 
global which can be expected of a company in a very global industry. KLI is part of 
an industry that is described as medium global. KLI is also very close to being a true 
born global, but the reason why it is very global even in an environment of only 
moderate globality might be because it has a parent company with everything that 
goes with it (e.g. network of agents, financial resources and so on).   
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6.3.5 Gradual International (GI) 
Founders/key employees’ background/experience dimension 
The founder of ICAS is engineer with some marketing background, the founder of 
Incatel has got most of his “education” through 30 years in IBM.   
“I am primarily a result of having been 30 years in IBM. What I did 
most was operation research. That is, to drive optimalization 
phenomenon in the firm f.i. a production process. I could find the mix 
one should make of two products if there were different selling price 
and different price of raw material – then the optimal mix could be 
calculated. I was 30 years in IBM , 3 of them in the US and 2 of the 
years in Sweden – then you get an extensive network you can use. I 
have several years of experience in dealing with the Nordic (market) 
because (in IBM) we had the Nordic Education System, where we 
trained new sellers.” 
Mr Vedeld (Incatel) lived in the US for three years and in Sweden for two years 
while working at IBM. Mr Olving (ICAS) has never lived abroad, but he has worked 
in international organizations such as ABB and Musta International, both located in 
Switzerland and he has always been responsible for the export part of the business. 
They both speak several foreign languages. 
Relations dimension 
The founder of Incatel is very relational both at the personal level and firm level. Mr 
Olving the founder and CEO of ICAS states on the one hand that they have many 
personal, international business contacts and he considers building relations as a 
continuous process. On the private level however, he is more hesitant. He manages 
to get in contact with the ones he needs to, but considers the experience from 
previous work life as being of more importance than the relations he has made, he 
has learned whom to contact through that experience.  
“You can say it is more that you have previous experience (from a 
country) and know where to start, you don’t waste your time and go to 
the right organizations. We don’t have a particularly important 
relation, we have people for instance our chairman of the board has 
lived abroad for years and we have many contacts in Europe that we 
have known for years through previous work.”  (Olving, 2002) 
Incatel is a firm that is very much built up around different network connections and 
the personal network of the founder very much coincides with the firm’s network 
connections. When Incatel was founded, Telenor Venture owned 40%, IBM Europe 
40%, the founder 10% and the employees 10%. The founder, Mr Vedeld, very much 
depends on his contacts from his time in IBM and Telenor for getting access to new 
potential customers, which are large, established telecompanies. He also refers to his 
network connections in the industry as his “friends”. 
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Globalization dimension 
The industries that Incatel and ICAS are part of, can be described as having a 
medium and low degree of globality respectively, this may account for the fact that 
both these firms have experienced a relatively slow pace of internationalization. As 
Mr Olving in ICAS described it, 
“Yes there are barriers. They were supposed to harmonize the 
legislation in Europe for instance, but it has not been done yet. It is a 
typical trade barrier – England has their standard, Germany has their 
standard and Scandinavia accept most standards, but in addition 
Denmark has one they demand.”  
Product characteristics dimension 
The products these firms sell are fire alarms (e.g. ICAS) and software for established 
telecoms (e.g. Incatel). ICAS’ product is thus a consumer good and Incatel’s is an 
industrial product. The product of Incatel is very unique and very specialized while 
ICAS’ product is mass produced and not very specialized, the product itself is not 
considered unique but the production process is. Incatel is targeting a narrow niche 
and believe themselves that they are successful at it, as Mr Vedeld put it, 
“We target niches. The following statement has come up and it is 
accepted: ”We are the world largest supplier of standard software in 
our niche!” And what is our niche? It is software for established 
telecommunication companies. There is no other supplier that can 
provide the software we provide to be responsible for such large 
telecommunication companies.” 
Both products have long product life cycles. Incatel’s product is not sensitive to 
price, ICAS tries to get away from the traditional price competition that is typical in 
this market with very cheap products coming in from f.i. China. The strategy is to 
differentiate themselves by the use of new technology and design. In Mr Olving’s 
(2002) own words, 
“That is what it all comes down to, price and quality. But, that is what 
we try to get away from (that price is of such significance), by using 
other means than just price as the Chinese use extensively. We then 
choose technology and design as competitive factors.” 
Summary within-group comparison 
ICAS’ founder never lived abroad, but he has worked in international organizations. 
Incatel’s founder has lived and worked in the US and Sweden for several years. It 
might thus be a bit surprising that this case is not experiencing faster 
internationalization, but there might be other factors that are more important such as 
type of product. One of the founders in this group is seen as very relational (e.g. 
Vedeld) and thus emphasize the importance of a network for the development of the 
firm while the other (e.g. Olving) is more hesitant to emphasize the roles of his 
relations. The founder of Incatel even characterize some of his business associates as 
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“friends”. ICAS’ founder on the other hand will not emphasize his personal network 
as being of any particular importance, he states;  
“it is the experience from a life of hard work that is important” (Olving, 2002).  
 
The industries the case firms of this group belong to are both described as having 
relatively low degree of globality. This fits well with the relatively slow pace of 
internationalization both these firms have experienced. Neither product is seen as 
price sensitive, but apart from that they differ quite a lot. While Incatel’s product is 
seen as a unique and very specialized industrial product, is ICAS’ described as a 
rather standardized consumer product. Incatel’s founder also sees “old methods” as 
the strongest competition (e.g. same as ColorMatic, Fras, IRTech, Nor-Reg, Opera, 
Optoflow and Superject) and their product also supports activities described as 
“mission critical” with the customer (e.g. same as for Fras and IRTech).   
6.3.6 Concluding remarks 
One surprising finding is that even though the founders state that they have a 
network of importance and find it rewarding to cultivate these relations, they might 
not have a very relational attitude towards other actors in the market, f.i. customers. 
The founders of Fras, Incatel and IRTech all refer to their business relations as 
“personal friends”, these companies are also the ones that sell products that are 
supporting needs of the customers that are referred to as “mission critical”, is there a 
connection? The customers with processes of the type, mission critical, are 
obviously very dependent on reliable suppliers. 
 
When it comes to the background of the founder, the most striking, but maybe not so 
surprising is the fact that most of the founders have technical background. In 
addition, it seems that one of the founders of the gradual global firms (e.g Incatel) 
have quite extensive international experience and network and it is thus slightly 
puzzling why it has not moved faster on the internationalization process. We might 
find answer to that in type of product they sell and globalization of industry. 
 
Almost all of the cases’ products have a long or very long product life cycle no 
matter which category they belong to, this is quite opposite of what was expected. 
Not so surprising is the fact that all but two cases produce and sell industrial 
products, only Opera (e.g. software) and ICAS (e.g. fire alarms) sell consumer 
goods. 
 
Eighth of the twelve cases’ products are very unique and not price sensitive, the 
products are seen as so special and performing so much better than the alternative (if 
there exists one), that the customers are believed to be willing to pay a little extra for 
it. Opera’s product on the other hand is unique, but also price sensitive. Opera is 
competing against large actors in the market (e.g. Microsoft), that is not as common 
among the born globals in this study, most express that they aim for smaller niches 
in order not to step on the big actors’ toes. It is only KLI that does not claim its 
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product is unique, both NOR-REG Machine and Norsk Display also say it is unique, 
but it is a bit unclear if the product is price sensitive. Two of the true born globals, 
ColorMatic and Optoflow, have had a product development phase of 2-3 years, but 
still they had a very fast pace on their internationalization process, they are very 
innovative and that might be what gives them the competitive edge. 
 
The case firms and how they can be described, on the basis of five different 
dimensions have been discussed. A summary is made below (see table 3).
  ColorMatic Dolphin Fras ICAS Incatel IRTech 
Experience Some Some Experienced Some Very Very 
Relational Not Varying Very Varying Very Very 
Globality Low Very High Very high Low Medium Very high 
Product S,U,longPLC S,U,medPLC S,U,longPLC Long PLC S,U,longPLC S,U,longPLC 
Pace of Int. Very fast Fast Fast Slow Medium Very fast 
       
 KLI NORREG  NorskDisplay Opera Optoflow Superject 
Experience Some Very None Very Experienced Experienced 
Relational Varying Not Varying Very Varying Varying 
Globality Medium Medium Medium Very high High Very high 
Product S,long PLC S,U,longPLC U,longPLC S,U,shortPLC S,U,longPLC U, longPLC 
Pace of Int. Fast Medium Medium Very fast Very fast Medium 
 
Table 3 Key findings 
In order to compactly view the similarities and differences between case firms, the 
data material, consisting of detailed answers from each interviewee, has been 
reduced, and each variable has been given relative values on a continuum, which are 
summarized above. The experience continuum has values that vary from some 
experience at the low end, to experienced, in the middle, to very experienced, at the 
high end. The network variable has been termed “relational”. The term indicates 
whether the founder or another key employee has a network of importance or not, 
and reflects his/her relational approach. This variable is a continuum from not 
relational, at the low end, through varying, when the firm occasionally uses a 
relational approach, suggesting placement in the middle of this continuum, to very 
relational, at the high end. An industry’s global characteristics are found to vary 
between low, medium, high and very high, based on the founder’s perceptions of the 
industry in which he/she does business. When characterizing the product, S means 
that the product is specialized, U means that the product is unique, and the product 
life cycle is either described as being long, medium or short. The dependent 
variable, the pace of internationalization, varies on a continuum between slow, 
medium, fast and very fast. The relative values are assigned based upon the number 
of countries entered and the export rate measured three years after founding. 
6.4 Development of propositions 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The findings from the within- and between-case and within- and between-group 
analysis are compared with theory on the field. Based on the preliminary findings 
some propositions will be presented that might be interesting to test in a follow-up 
study. The purpose of the study was to describe the process of internationalization of 
SMEs and to explore why some become gradual international and some are born 
global.  
6.4.2 Experience/background 
The behavioural approach emphasises the need for a sequential process of learning 
when foreign business activities are undertaken. This study’s findings show that all 
of the founders have some international experience, either from working with 
foreign companies at home or from travelling and visiting partners abroad and/or 
living abroad for some time, either studying or working. For all parties, a gradual 
and sequential process of learning has taken place. For some parties, much of the 
learning has taken place before starting the case firm under study. This finding is 
supported by Bloodgood, Sapienza and Almeida (1996), who stated: “since 
international experience of a firm is confined within individuals, new firms formed 
by these individuals may be able to capitalize on their experience and expand 
internationally” (p.6). Johanson & Vahlne (1977/90) who base their classification of 
market knowledge on Penrose’s (1959) definition of knowledge and experience, 
claim that an increase in market commitment follows as experience increases and it 
is suggested here that this claim is valid at an individual level. The current study, in 
part, focuses upon the knowledge and experience of key individuals in the firm. 
Following Johanson & Vahlne (1977/1990), this study supports the idea that 
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traditional theories are not as outdated as some claim (Melin, 1992). Bloodgood, 
Sapienza and Almeida (1996) argue that a new firm that has specific advantages, 
including special knowledge and experience of key individual employees, will 
probably have an accelerated pace of internationalization and a better chance of 
being successful in its efforts to internationalize. Mr Gjelsnes, the CEO of Optoflow 
stated that “work methodology” is the most important skill he has attained from life, 
not relationships. That is, he knows who to contact in the potential organization and 
how to approach them and the knowledge is gained through years in the industry, 
before starting up the firm in question. In light of this discourse in the literature, and 
the findings in this case study it seems reasonable to expect that a firm’s pace of 
internationalization will be affected by key employees with international experience. 
Proposition 1  
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share are a result of the accumulation of international experience of the founder or 
other key employees. 
6.4.3 Personal Network 
One surprising finding is that even though the founders state that they have a 
network of importance and find it rewarding to cultivate the relationships in their 
network, they might not have a very relational attitude towards other actors in the 
market, e.g. customers. Mr Løchsen in Dolphin, for example, describes the general 
business climate as being “largely of a technical nature”. At the personal level, on 
the other hand, he has a network of importance, and relationships within a network 
created to foster European research and cooperation is emphasized. The founder of 
Optoflow, Mr Gjelsnes, describes the firm’s sales as “one-shot” and he believes that 
there is no reason to build relationships with customers, but he too nurtures 
important relations to different research institutions.  
 
As can be seen from the case firms in this study, even though there are only three 
subsidiaries out of the twelve cases, eight of the cases have large, well-known 
companies backing them and of the last four cases, three have strong relationships to 
at least one important actor. As the founder of Superject put it, “(it is very important 
for a newly started firm) to get associated with something bigger” (Stokkan, 2002). 
ColorMatic is the subsidiary of Tronrud Engineering, KLI is the subsidiary of Kay 
Lindegaard, and NOR-REG Machine is the subsidiary of NOR-REG. The large 
company behind Dolphin was Norsk Data; Veritas supported Fras; Incatel was 
supported by IBM and Telenor; Elkem supported IRTech; Telenor was behind 
Opera; ICAS closely cooperates with insurance companies; Optoflow has very close 
relations to different research institutions; and Superject has a very strong and long-
lasting relationship with a large distributor, Elof Hanson in Sweden. The remaining 
firm, Norsk Display, does not have a large firm backing it, but the founder expresses 
a wish to have closer relationships with customers. The founder of Norsk Display 
does have an important relationship to someone he met before starting his firm, who 
has since helped him to locate customers. This supports the findings of Crick and 
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Jones (2000), who found that several firms were set up by managers with experience 
from international markets, and most importantly, that these managers had already 
developed networks and made contacts which could be built upon after setting up 
their own firms. From this we can pose our second proposition: 
Proposition 2a) 
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share, are a result of the founder’s or key employees’ network. 
 
Based on the results it seems clear that it might be advantageous to dig deeper into 
the term “relations” or “network” to create better understanding of how it might aid 
a firm in its internationalization  process. Although only three firms are defined as 
subsidiaries, most of the case firms turned out to have a firm backing it in one way 
or another and three of the most global firms (e.g. Dolphin, IRTech and Opera) can 
be seen as regular spin-offs to large, established firms such as  Norsk Data, Elkem 
and Telenor respectively. This gives us the next proposition: 
Proposition 2b) 
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share, are expected to be fast for SMEs starting out as spin-offs from larger, 
international firms.  
 
The experience that Mr Gjelsnes attained from previous work and the discovery of 
the particular methods that work in the business world are, in his opinion, most 
important for the success of the firm. This is his view in spite of the fact that a very 
important Swiss connection aided him at start-up. Mr Gjelsnes admits that this man 
was very important at the time, but he has no contact with him at present. In 
addition, he has important relationships with various research organizations, such as 
Sintef, The Norwegian Radium Hospital, and The Norwegian School of Veterinary 
Science, which aid him on matters where he considers himself to have insufficient 
knowledge and these institutions cooperate with him on R&D. This downplayed 
understanding of the role of relationships in business is a finding that is in keeping 
with Uzzi’s (1997) perspective. Uzzi pointed out that any assumptions about 
individuals being either innately self-interested or cooperative are too simplistic. He 
found that individuals simultaneously act “selfishly” and cooperatively with 
different actors in their network.  In other words, self-interest is also involved when 
social relations play a role in the business world. The conclusions made from Uzzi’s 
findings are that the motivation for establishing close ties is neither purely rational 
nor selfish, but expert. This fits well the findings in this study where several 
founders appear to be very solicitous about with whom they wish to establish a 
closer relation to. Mr Løchsen in Dolphin also emphasized the great importance of 
his relations to research institutions, but his general business relations are described 
more as being largely of “technical nature”. A pattern thus appear of it not being 
traditional relationships to parties like customers or suppliers, but different 
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strategically chosen actors that these fast internationalizing firms need (e.g. 
researchers) in order to further develop a solution or a product. We thus get the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2c) 
The kinds of relations most prevalent in fast internationalizing SMEs are “expert” 
relations. 
 
The embeddedness of such close social relations in the market has a very important 
side-effect apart from the actual research or funding or other it contributes, it creates 
economic opportunities that are difficult to replicate via market contracts or vertical 
integration and thus is a good basis for sustainable competitive advantage for the 
firms involved. The advantages of such relationships is also emphasized by Turnbull 
(1990) who states that the breath of what is achieved via interactions increases as 
business relationships also become social relationships. As seen with Incatel for 
instance, the founder used his connections both to get important contracts but also to 
find good leaders, e.g. one of his co-workers was recruited from his time in IBM and 
one from his time in Telenor.  
6.4.4 Industry Globality 
Internationalization processes of firms, according to the network theory (Johanson & 
Mattson, 1988), are assumed to be much faster in internationalized conditions (e.g. 
high degree of industry globality). There are a number of indirect relations with 
foreign networks even for a purely domestic firm. Even market investments in the 
domestic market are assets, which can be utilized when going abroad. Bell (1995) 
also found that international market selection was strongly influenced by domestic 
and foreign client followership, the targeting of niche markets and industry specific 
considerations, rather than psychic distance. 
 
An underlying assumption (of the traditional models that explain the transition from 
a national to a global firm) asserts that firms are well established in the domestic 
market before venturing abroad (Bell, McNaughton and Young, 2001). This 
assumption is rejected by most of the interviewees in our study, although many of 
the firms had some sales in the home market before selling abroad. Ten out of 
twelve interviewees stated that they intended to go abroad from the start. All ten 
pointed out that the home market is not large enough for the firm to be established. 
One explanation of this deviation from traditional development might be the recent 
changes in the degree of globality of many industries. For many, especially high-
technology, products there is a global market potential. In addition, it is often not 
seen as feasible to establish a new firm if based on sales mainly to the home market, 
since the product in many cases is so advanced and specialized that there exist only 
very few potential customers in the home market. This is confirmed by Madsen, 
Rasmussen & Servais, (2000) who found that the product is often developed for a 
global-/international market.   
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Market selection for rapidly globalizing firms is characterised by starting activities 
in many markets quickly and not always in markets that are geographically close. 
Bell (1995) explains this phenomenon in the following way: “psychic distance has 
become much less relevant as global communication and transportation 
infrastructures improve and as markets become increasingly homogeneous” (p.62). 
In other words, founders of rapidly globalizing firms may be assumed to perceive 
the world as a world that is getting smaller and it thus seems more accessible even 
for smaller firms to globalize. From this we get the next proposition:  
Proposition 3 a) 
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share, are a result of the industry’s globality in that it makes foreign markets more 
accessible for internationalizing firms. 
 
In addition, it is believed that global firms from small and open economies, such as 
Norway, are believed to globalize because they are pushed (Luostarinen and 
Gabrielsson, 2001). In such economies the domestic market is often too small to 
justify start-up and the founders might also fear future competition from global firms 
in larger countries and these factors push these firms to find new markets. If we look 
at tables 2 and 3 above, we see examples of this way of thinking in our study. Fras 
and Opera, which are very global on the market coverage dimension and, in fact, 
present on all continents, have interviewees that describe their respective industries 
as being very global. As Mr Jebsen (2002) in Opera expressed it, “The industry 
structure is concentrated around a few large actors and there exist no trade barriers 
whatsoever in this industry. The customers and suppliers are extremely 
international!”. Both interviewees stated very clearly that they are not concerned 
with country borders, and that they aim at finding customers wherever they can be 
located in the world. We can from this assume that globalization at industry level 
and the increased competition that results from it, is one of the reasons for the 
change found in export behaviour: 
Proposition 3 b)   
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share, are a result of the industry’s globality in that it increases competition and by 
that many firms are forced out not to lag behind. 
6.4.5 Product characteristics 
Differentiation strategy, that is, offering products perceived by customers as unique 
by offering superior quality products in niche markets is much used by these case 
firms. All of the TBGs (e.g. Opera, Optoflow, IRTech and ColorMatic) have very 
unique, high quality products. As the founder of Optoflow put it:  
“There are two giants, one in the US and one in Japan – I knew these well 
and I knew their strategies and I made sure not to step on their toes, not to 
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touch their turf – we adapt our product to an area they are not covering” 
(Gjelsnes, 2002). 
 
Several of the founders also expressed the need to “create or establish” a market for 
their product (e.g. Mr Fjerdingstad in Fras). This is in accordance with Andersson, 
Håkanson and Johanson (1994) who claim that the environment is not completely 
given by external forces, but can be manipulated by the firm. Mr Jebsen in Opera 
also states that  
“it is very researchbased what we do and we work towards markets we think 
will come in the next few years” (Jebsen, 2002).  
This is also typical of entrepreneurial minds that they see the opportunities before 
others (Stevenson, 1984). On the other hand, new and improved technology may aid 
firms with small home markets in that economies of scale are no longer a key factor 
to succeed globally. The improved production technology makes it possible to 
produce and sell smaller quantities at a profit. In addition, for the unique and 
differentiated products that most of the case firms sell, the price and thus cost is not 
vital. It is the unique features that is important and for which the niche buyers are 
willing to pay well. Many of the founders came with more or less the same 
statement, “..once they have tried our product, they will not return to the older, 
outdated product used earlier”. 
 
Almost all of the products sold by the case firms have long or very long product life 
cycles, and this is true for all categories of globals. This is quite the opposite of what 
was expected. Only Opera has a short PLC and they describe it as being very short. 
This particular product characteristic may not be as important in determining the 
pace of internationalization as was expected. Perhaps other characteristics of the 
product have more influence on the pace of internationalization? All of the very 
rapidly internationalizing cases (e.g. Fras, Opera, Optoflow, IRtech and ColorMatic) 
describe their product as being very unique, “one of a kind” and highly specialized. 
This finding accords well with Knight & Cavusgil’s (2004) findings, that the most 
important strategies employed by born global firms, in their investigation, 
underscore global technological competence, unique product development, quality 
focus and leveraging foreign distributor competence. In addition, Bloodgood, 
Sapienza & Almeida (1996) found that ventures were significantly more 
internationalized if they were seeking competitive advantage through product 
differentiation. This finding is consistent with their reasoning that ventures 
internationalize earlier on in order to exploit a distinctive competence or feature. 
 
Optoflow’s founder stated very clearly that they were careful not to step on the toes 
of the big actors in the industry. This concern is in line with Porter and Caves (1977) 
who stated that focus allows the small player to avoid head-to-head competition with 
larger, broadly-based firms that tend to target mass markets. The finding that small 
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firms often follow a niche focus strategy (Moen, 2000) is consistent with Solberg’s 
(1997) framework, which aims at analyzing the strategic options for small and 
medium sized firms competing in international markets. His view implies that small 
firms operating in markets that are exposed to international competition do not have 
any other choice than to focus their resources on an international niche strategy 
targeting small customer groups. Christensen (1991) provides a similar description, 
linked to what he calls “the small and medium-sized exporter’s squeeze” (p.49), 
where mainly external factors make it necessary for small and medium-sized firms 
to start exporting, when they lack internal resources and export competence (Moen, 
2000). We thus get the final proposition: 
Proposition 4 
The pace by which a firm enters new markets and the increase in the firm’s export 
share, is positively related to the product offering’s degree of specialization and 
uniqueness. 
6.4.6 Performance 
It is quite striking when looking at table 2, that two of the largest firms (apart from 
Opera), ICAS and Incatel both with 65 employees, have the slowest pace of 
internationalization of all the case firms. This is in accordance with Solberg (1997) 
who states that small firms are better suited for acting fast in an international 
environment. All the firms, except from Dolphin, have grown both in terms of 
employees and turnover, Dolphin has reduced the number of employees from 20 at 
start-up to 10 today. Opera has increased the most, from 2 employees at start-up, to 
the current (2002) number of 110. Opera had a large negative result in 2001 of - 21 
mill, but the financial director explains this with them working long term “we still 
follow the plan from 1999” (Jebsen, 2002) and they expect to be profitable by 2003 
“we have to have a long-term perspective – it has to do with the market being 
established” (Jebsen, 2002). Five out of the twelve cases had negative results in 
2001, but two of the firms with the largest negative results, Incatel aand Opera with 
– 43 mill  and -21 mill respectively in 2001, were positive of the future. Opera 
expected to have a positive result of about 10-20 mill this year (2002) and Incatel 
forecasted to have a positive result of about 10 mill by 2002 following from the 
contract with TeliaSonera. Looking at the numbers from 2002 (source: 
Brønnøysundregister) Incatel had a positive result of 10.16 mill NOK and Opera, a 
negative result of -14.85 mill NOK. Incatel in the “Information Memorandum” 
describes themselves as having “stable growth and healthy economics” (p.20). They 
achieved revenue growth of 35% from 1994 (9 mill) to 2000 (54 mill) and they have 
been around break even or profitable every year except for year 2001. The 
explanation given for the fall in revenue growth in year 2000, and the weak revenue 
and profit figures in year 2001 was that they had made a significant investment in 
product development, that they increased sales and marketing efforts to strengthen 
their Nordic position and also the fact that the times were difficult in the telecom 
markets in 2001. The efforts in product development and sales and marketing seems 
to have paid off for 2002 and the years to follow, they forecasted revenues of 80 mill 
for year 2002. These two firms, Incatel and Opera, was in addition rated as 2 out of 
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26 hottest firms in Norway and were chosen to take part in the  “Norwegian Tech 
Tour” where they are to make themselves attractive for representatives  of the 
world’s largest “venture-moneybags”. The criteria to be selected were that the firms 
had to be in ICT (e.g. Information Communication Technology), energy or biomarin 
business. They should be in a phase of expansion, have unique technology and be 
international on a large scale.  
 
Dolphin, with the largest negative result (-19 mill), explains this by the fact of the 
USD falling in March 2001, the result in 2000 was 79 mill and turnover was 63 mill 
in year 2000, the sales and the profits accordingly thus seems to fluctuate quite a bit. 
ICAS is the case with the best financial result out of these twelve cases in 2001 and 
in third place in 2002 (e.g. behind Incatel and Nor-Reg) this may be explained partly 
with the firm being cautious in their expansion strategy, referring to their slow 
internationalization, they still only have an export rate of about 45% 13 years after 
start-up and they are present in about 6 countries mainly in Europe, with Sweden 
being their most important market accounting for 40% of their total sales. Another 
explanation for the good results may be that the product ICAS sells is a rather 
simple product made for a mass market and thus not demanding large investments in 
product development. Last, but not least, ICAS is the “oldest” firm of the sample 
(established in 1989) and it follows then that it has had the time to get established in 
the market and to pay off debt. We saw above that both Opera (established in 1995) 
and Incatel (established in 1993/94) with relatively large negative results in 2001 
expected this to change in the very near future and already the year after it had 
greatly improved. 
6.4.7 Summary 
The propositions presented give a good starting point for a further study, but first the 
assumptions behind the propositions will be elaborated. ICAS is the least global case 
and Opera the most global case on both dimensions (e.g. export share and number of 
markets). Why is that so? What are the differences between these two firms that 
might explain their different paces of internationalization? Both ICAS and Opera 
produce consumer goods, but Opera also has large industrial firms as customers. In 
addition, Opera also has a large and powerful supporter in Telenor, where the 
founders previously worked. Telenor supplied Opera with locations and consultants 
when Opera started up. ICAS had no large company to support its establishment. 
The products of these two firms are also very different. Opera’s software has unique 
features and is very specialized, differentiating it from other similar products. 
Opera’s software has a very short product life cycle, demanding constant updates. 
ICAS’ smoke detectors are neither unique nor specialized and they have a long 
product life cycle. Opera’s product is also special because it can be distributed over 
the internet. It makes no difference where the customers are located, as long as they 
have access to the internet. This obviously simplifies the process of 
internationalization. Finally, the founder of ICAS describes the industry’s level of 
globality as being low, because products must meet different standards from country 
to country, while in Opera’s case, the industry’s level of globalization is described 
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as being very high, with no barriers whatsoever and a demand pattern that is 
described as being a global one. Both founders describe their competition as being 
very strong, but while Opera has its competitors from a few and very large 
American companies, such as Microsoft, ICAS’ founder state that its competition is 
from many small and large companies, especially from China. Another factor that 
might have influenced the extremely different pace of internationalization may be 
the characteristics of the founders. Opera’s founder is 35 years old and he has 
extensive experience living and working abroad, and the relations to actors in the 
market are described as close, while ICAS’ founder is 57 years old and he has 
neither lived nor worked abroad, although he has some experience working for 
international firms and he will not point at any relation of particular importance to 
the firm’s development. 
 
From the discussion above we get that the strategy to become a successful fast 
internationalizing SME (e.g. born global) when originating from a small economy, is 
to offer unique and specialized products or services to well-defined niches and 
making use of low-commitment foreign operation modes which enable the firms to 
be present in many international markets even when having limited resources. The 
main challenges for such firms are to convince customers of the superiority of the 
products or services (e.g. “would never change back to the old methods”) and also to 
protect themselves from larger actors in the market copying their products. Being a 
very small actor which most Norwegian firms are on a world scale, also means they 
sometimes have to work hard to prove they are here to stay (especially a problem 
when supplying a customer’s mission critical process, e.g. Fras, Incatel and IRTech).  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Implications 
 
7.1 Main Findings 
The most important finding is that firms fitting the traditional definition of born 
globals might be seen as a much more heterogenous group of firms than previously 
assumed. Based on the findings in this study, we find that it might be useful to 
divide the born globals into more specific categories (e.g. born globals on export 
dimension, born globals on market dimension and true born globals). There is found 
to be certain similarities on firms within each category on the four variables studied 
(e.g. experience, network, industry globality and product characteristic) and 
differences on these variables between the firms in the different categories. This will 
be elaborated on below. 
 
Most of the founders who were interviewed in this study have some international 
experience, either from working and/or studying abroad or from working in an 
international firm in Norway. The founders of the firms with the slowest pace of 
internationalization, ICAS and Incatel, have some and very much experience, 
respectively. This finding may be somewhat surprising. One of the founders is also 
described as being very relational, meaning that he recognizes the importance of 
networks for the development of the firm. The explanation for the slow pace might 
be found in the two other factors. The global characteristics of the industry are 
described as being relatively low, for both industries, and the product characteristics 
are both described as having long PLCs, and in ICAS’ case, the product is a standard 
one, and easy to sell, even in the home market. In contrast, the product of the true 
born global firm IRTech, is so specialized and designed for such a narrow niche that 
potential customers in the home market do not even exist. The products of all the 
most global cases (e.g. Dolphin, IRTech, Opera and Optoflow) are described as 
being very specialized and very unique. We must from this assume that 
technological excellence helps rapidly globalizing firms to develop products that 
appeal to niche markets around the world.  
 
With regard to the relational variable, it seems that all firms have networks or at 
least a few relations of importance, but there is some variation regarding the degree 
to which founders are willing to acknowledge their importance. Our findings support 
the idea that founders should not be described as being either relational or not. The 
founders of Dolphin, KLI, Norsk Display, Optoflow and Superject all vary with 
regard to whether or not they should be classified as being relational. While some, 
like the founder of Norsk Display, sees the lack of close relations to key actors in the 
industry as a weakness and wish to improve this area of their performance, others, 
like the founders of Dolphin and Optoflow, are not very relational toward typical 
actors in the industry, i.e. customers and suppliers, but they both have very 
important relations to different research institutions which they consider vital for the 
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success of their firms. In other words, they are very selective regarding the parties 
with whom they build relationships. The kind of relations they build may also 
depend upon the kind of product the firm is offering. Both ColorMatic’s and 
Optoflow’s sale is described as “one-shot”. That is, they do not consider there being 
a basis for building relationships since there is very little or no repurchase of their 
products. This study thus, gives a more nuanced insight to the different types of 
relations that exist among the different parties in the market arena and how these 
different types of relations may influence a firm’s process of internationalization. 
 
When it comes to the globalization variable, almost all firms with a very rapid pace 
of internationalization, on both dimensions, (e.g. ColorMatic, IRTech, Opera and 
Optoflow) described the industry as having very high or high global characteristics. 
The exception is ColorMatic. ColorMatic has a parent company and this relationship 
may make it easier for the firm to access resources, i.e. capital and human resources. 
This configuration might explain the firm’s rapid pace of internationalization despite 
the low global characteristics of the industry. It can be concluded that firms 
originating from peripheral and small countries may not be at such a disadvantage in 
the current globalizing environment. Globalization drivers such as improved 
communication and transportation technology vastly increase these firms’ ability to 
sell and market their products in foreign markets. Previously there has been a 
positive correlation between trade and proximity, but today distance is in many 
cases not seen as an obstacle to internationalization. 
 
With regard to the dependent variable studied here, the pace of internationalization, 
it was found that one dimension, the entry mode dimension, was not as valuable for 
distinguishing among the different case companies and for classifying them into 
different categories of ”globals”. The reason for this was the little variance found in 
the types of entry modes used by the case companies in particular with regard to the 
resources committed to the foreign market. Most of the case companies made 
extensive use of relatively low-commitment and thus low resource demanding 
modes such as OEM-agreements, agents, distributors and direct export, not only at 
the very early stage of internationalization, but it was often the preferred mode even 
at later stages. As a consequence this dimension of a firm’s degree of 
internationalization was not considered important for classification and the two 
dimensions; market selection or market spreading and export share was used for this 
purpose. As most studies on internationalization and the increased involvement of 
firms in international markets has focused on the choice of entry modes or foreign 
operation modes used by the internationalising firm, this study thus departs from this 
tradition. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
As all studies, this study has been undertaken with certain resource constraints. The 
most important one is that the study has been undertaken by only one researcher. It 
is likely that a team of researchers would have been able to go deeper into the 
material and provide a more nuanced view. Secondly, several authors (e.g. Saunders 
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et al, 2003; Yin, 1994; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) have pointed out that different 
biases must be kept in mind as a limitation. Any researcher will have biases about 
the companies studied. An important limitation of any study is thus the personal 
biases of the researcher. The danger is to find only what you are looking for, but due 
to the open-ended structure of the questions allowing for each interviewee telling 
their story in their own words it is believed that this was not the case here. In 
addition, contrary to previous researchers who studied the pace in particular 
industries such as high-technology manufacturing industry (e.g. Lindqvist, 1991; 
Bell, 1995; Burgel & Murray, 2000; Junkkari, 2000), the case firms in this study 
represented several very different types of industries. Also the twelve case firms 
were completely unknown to the researcher before the research started. However, 
there is still a danger of unconscious bias, this is attempted amended for by writing 
out the cases in detail for colleagues to read to test the interpretation, in addition 
quotes are used extensively to allow the reader to make up his or her opinion of 
whether the conclusions drawn are plausible. 
7.3 Practical Implications 
The findings reveal that a change in policy is warranted by an arm of the Norwegian 
government. It was claimed by several of the interviewees that the Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) or Innovation Norway as it is 
called since 1 January, 2004, requires all new firms to have a foothold in the home 
market before granting them financial support for export. This view is in line with 
traditional theories on internationalization. Such a requirement unnecessarily 
complicates matters for most of the firms affected by this ruling. The home market 
in Norway is too small or non-existent for many industries and there is no economic 
basis for establishing a large number of firms if they are primarily required to base 
their incomes on home sales. The markets for many newly established firms are seen 
as being international and, in many cases, the market is a global one. This reality 
should be made known to those in the Norwegian government who are responsible 
for creating the guidelines for fund allocation to SMEs in Norway. 
 
In a study of the factors influencing entrepreneurship in Norway (Røste & Schanke, 
2006) it was found that personal characteristics and competences are of utmost 
importance to succeed, but experience and access to resources were also found to be 
of importance. The same also found that the founders were not dependent upon 
public incentives to succeed, although to what degree a potential founder has access 
to resources may indirectly be influenced by public policies and initiatives made to 
encourage increased entrepreneurship activity. According to Mr Bakke and Mr 
Snedal in Innovation Norway there is no established policy stating that a firm should 
be well established in the home market to get financial support and mr Bakke even 
stated that “we are familiar with several firms being born global” (April, 2006). 
However, as our discussion proceeds it turns out they are a bit sceptical to 
globalisation at the point of start-up, as they believe internationalization will be very 
resource demanding and Mr Bakke also explicitly states that the firms applying for 
funding will be evaluated on what they have achieved at home first and foremost 
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and thus, it seems the comments from the founders may reflect the reality. Mr 
Snedal also states that as it is more difficult to document market potential for a 
product in a potential international market, than in the home market this may in 
reality mean that the potential born globals will not be first in line to get funding 
from Innovation Norway. As Mr Bakke put it; “no firm is entitled to support, and an 
evaluation of the risk involved in the venture may be decisive!” An international 
venture is likely to be considered more risky and thus is less likely to get funding. 
 
Access to capital is seen as a major barrier for new ventures in Norway. It is 
according to Spilling & Steinsli (2003) widely recognised that unavailability of risk 
capital, particularly in the early stages of development, may represent a barrier to 
development. The same argue further that there are weak traditions in this field in 
Norway, and that the Norwegian venture capital market is immature. This is in 
keeping with Mr Vedeld (telephone interview, April 2006) who stated that 
“Norwegian investors jumps in at the first stage, but then they are happy to sell…”. 
He further elaborated that “it is as expensive to sell a product as to develop it”, and 
he believes the Norwegian business community do not understand this. That is the 
reason for good Norwegian high-tech products are developed and reach venture 
stage, but then it is often sold to foreign owners so they can take it further and 
commercialize it. The exceptions are Opera and Opticom which so far have 
remained in Norwegian ownership. Mr Vedeld claims there is too little know-how of 
international marketing (except in the shipping industry) in Norway. There are many 
good brains who invent new software for instance, but it all too often disappears 
abroad in short time. This founder’s view is in keeping with Spilling & Steinsli 
(2003) who state that there has not been a clear focus on commercialization and how 
research institutions and intermediate institutions may be designed in order to 
improve these processes. It seems the former government (Bondevik) were aware of 
these deficiencies and has now established an Entrepreneurship Forum (NHD, 
2005). This is a forum designed to create dialogue between entrepreneurs and public 
authorities. The purpose is to get useful suggestions on the economic policy and the 
apparatus of means through a direct dialogue with entrepreneurs. The forum is 
organized as a seminar and they meet once or twice a year, with different topics of 
focus each time. The two seminars they have had so far covered topics of 
counselling, network and tax and the last one was on commercialization of research. 
The former government aimed to continue these seminars due to positive 
experiences from them, but it remains to be seen whether or not the current, more 
left-turned government will do so. Another initiative from the Bondevik-government 
came as a follow-up to the government report “from idea to value” (NHD, 2003). 
Contact has been made between the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the 
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, the main organization for Norwegian 
employers, in order to establish opportunities for establishing ways of improving he 
conditions for co-workers in large companies with a wish to start on their own. The 
attitude that is found in large corporations to spin-offs is seen as maybe even more 
important with regard to the rate of entrepreneurship in the country, than single 
initiatives form the policy makers (NHD, 2005). Several of the cases in this study 
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may be seen as regular spin-offs of larger corporations (e.g. Incatel of Telenor, 
Opera of Telenor, IRTech of Elkem, Fras of Veritas, Dolphin of Norsk Data). Some 
of the other case companies have a similar background, but have stayed within the 
safe folds of a parent company and are thus subsidiaries and not independent new 
firms (e.g. ColorMatic, NOR-REG Machine, Kay Lindegaard Incinerators). Still, 
Spillling & Steinsli (2003) found that there are only a few larger manufacturing 
companies in Oslo and this may be related to less capacity for developing 
indigenous firms, i.e. as a result of spin-offs from universities or existing firms.  
 
When it comes to the implications for the management of SME’s considering 
expanding internationally, the results of the study suggest that the SMEs which may 
be recommended to venture abroad at an early stage are the ones with; 
- a unique product/or production process 
- founders or other key employees with extensive experience and network from 
previous employment in similar industries, in particular will the ones with strong 
relations to key persons in large, successful organizations have a large advantage, or 
the ones with good and well-established relations to certain actors in the industry 
supporting them with knowledge and insight to areas they themselves are lacking 
(f.i. research institutions) will be at an advantage compared to those not having such 
relationships (e.g. they have to start at start-up with establishing such relationships). 
- products adapted for a global market – may need to venture abroad and an earlier 
stage in the firm’s development, compared to firms with products for which there 
exists a sufficient home market. 
7.4 Implications for Future Research 
This study departs from other studies of firm internationalization where the focus is 
mainly on the increased resource commitments to foreign markets. The case firms in 
this study mostly use low-commitment modes for their foreign operations. They 
either export directly to customers or they engage agents and distributors to manage 
their foreign operations. This might be explained by the fact that many SMEs simply 
do not have the resources in place to make the investment necessary for more high-
commitment modes. There may also be little or no motivation to engage in high-
commitment modes, since the niches they aim for are too small to justify the kind of 
resources needed for internalizing their activities abroad. The entry mode dimension 
and the possible gradual increase of resource commitment to each market may thus 
not provide us with very interesting information. The market selection dimension, 
on the other hand, seems to vary substantially for the different case companies in our 
study. All but two of the case firms can be categorized as being rapidly globalizing. 
The market selection dimension and not the entry mode provide us with more 
interesting information for SMEs that are undergoing internationalization. Further 
studies should be made to investigate a larger sample of the rapidly globalizing 
firms, with focus on their market selection strategies. We need to know what factors 
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influence their choice of markets. This knowledge will deepen our understanding of 
those firms that rapidly undergo internationalization.   
 
Performance was not emphasized in this study. It was assumed that firms 
internationalize in order to benefit from potential profit opportunities outside of the 
home market or to resist competitive pressure. The assumption is that factors that 
influence the firm to internationalize also contribute to its increased profitability. It 
was assumed that the more international/global a firm is, the better it performs. This 
assumption may be a bit off the mark, but export sales ratio was the most used 
indicator of export performance according to Katsiekas, Leonidou and Morgan’s 
(2000) analysis of 100 articles that studied export performance. The non-economic 
measure most commonly used in the studies is number of export countries. In other 
words, to measure a firm’s export success by measuring its degree of 
internationalization is quite common. Still, this is not to say this is the correct and 
only way of doing it, but due to the age of the firms studied here it will have to do 
for now. The firms in this study are very young and a follow-up study should be 
made to study survival rates and how widespread de-internationalization is among 
the firms in the sample. It has been too short a time since establishment for some of 
the firms for the positive effects of sustained investments in research to be reflected 
in operational results. It might also be of interest to compare firms that gradually 
internationalize to firms that rapidly internationalize, in order to find out which ones 
perform better. A study of that kind would introduce a normative aspect to the pace 
of internationalization.  
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Appendix 1: Interviews in chronological order 
 
Date   Interviewee  Position Company 
10.10.02  Claus Wahl  CEO  Norsk Display 
11.10.02  Harald Hendriksen CEO  Kay Lindeg. Inc 
15.10.02  Kåre Løchsen  CEO  Dolphin 
21.10.02  Odd R.Vedeld  CEO  Incatel 
22.10.02  Christian Jebsen CFO  Opera Software 
22.10.02  Heljar Hovland  CEO  IRTech 
29.10.02  Oddbjørn Gjelsnes CEO (ex-) Optoflow 
01.11.02  Jørgen Ingeberg CEO  NOR-REG M 
06.11.02  Frederick Schaefer Mrktn Mngr ColorMatic 
07.11.02  Ketil Olving  CEO  ICAS 
08.11.02  Sølve Fjerdingstad CEO  Fras Techn. 
11.11.02  Per Stokkan  CEO  Superject 
 
E-mail/Phone contact for follow-up questions: 
Claus Wahl in Norsk Display e-mail on 24 of April 2003 
Christian Jebsen in Opera Software telephone interview on 23 of April 2003 
Jørgen Ingeberg in NOR-REG Machine now technical Director for the German 
subsidiary e-mail on 23 of April 2003 
Asle Fjelldal Support Manager in ColorMatic e-mail on 24 of April 2003 
Sølve Fjerdingstad in Fras Technology  e-mail on 23 April 2003 
Odd Vedeld in Incatel (now Comptel) telephone interview 5 of April 2006 and e-
mail reply 
Claus Wahl in Norsk Display e-mail on 19 of April 2006 
Sølve Fjerdingstad in Fras Technology e-mail on  23 of March 2006 
Oddbjørn Gjelsnes in Optoflow (now BioDetect) e-mail on 1 of April 2006  
 
It was not possible to locate and get additional information from all interviewees, 
but where this was the case, more updated information was sought on the different 
firms’ homepages and from newspaper articles. In addition, the information from 
the Brønnøysund Register was quite extensive, where it was often elaborated on 
both change of leadership and ownership and in some cases the reasons for these 
changes and also if there was a large negative result one year this was also 
explained. In the case of NOR-REG AS there was also information on the share of 
export to the different areas of the world. 
 
Bjørnar Snedal in Innovation Norway telephone interview 21 of April 2006 
Petter Bakke Innovation Norway e-mail on 24 of April 2006   
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Appendix 2:  Postscript 
 
ColorMatic has continued as before, the employees were reduced to two in 2003 
after a large negative result in 2003, the result was modestly positive in 2004. 
 
Dolphin had a large negative result in 2002, but it was greatly reduced in 2003, 
there were no accounts for 2004, due to the company becoming a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Dolphinics in December 2002. The large negative result in 2002 is 
explained by fluctuating currency rates in particular sinking USD. The negative 
result in 2003 is explained by costs incurred from tidying up after former managers 
in the US. The employees increased to seventeen in 2002 and eighteen in 2003. 
 
Fras Technology had a small negative result in 2002 (-10 000 NOK), and it 
decreased to further to -2.6 mill NOK in 2003, the numbers for 2004 were not 
available. The number of employees have increased to six in 2003 (from four in 
2001). 
 
ICAS has healthy positive results all years even though it became a bit low  (0.79 
mill vs 2 mill the 3 years before), the employees in Norway are five all years (the 
number reported in the table for 2002 is including the employees in Prague (100% 
subsidiary since 1991). A subsidiary in Hannover, Germany was established in 
2002 and one in UK in 2003.  
 
Incatel has also got healthy results of 10 mill NOK in 2002, 57 mill NOK in 2003, 
and 3,4 mill in 2004. In 2003 Incatel was bought up by EDB Business Partner with 
all its employees (seventy) intact. Six months later EDB put Incatel out for sale 
since they decided that development and maintenance of networks for 
telecompanies was not their cup of tea. The autumn of 2005 Incatel was bought by 
the Finnish company Comptel. The current export share for Incatel is 
approximately 60%, it has decreased because of large contracts to Telenor. Incatel 
now has the advantage of 60 sellers from Comptel that are active worldwide and 
since Incatel’s product is complementary to Comptel’s product they can sell it to 
existing customers of Comptel. 
 
IRTech has also got healthy, positive results in all the previous years, the best was 
in 2003 with 3.7 mill NOK. One more person was employed in 2002. 
 
KLI’s result was positive in 2002, the rest of the years it has been slightly negative 
(-0.5 mill in 2004). KLI employed in 2004 two point five persons. 
 
NOR-REG Machine AS was merged with its parent company NOR-REG AS in 
January 2002. Sales to different geographical areas (for the parent company NOR-
REG AS) are distributed as follows: 37 mill to Norway, 26 mill to the rest of 
Europe, 19 mill to the rest of the world, 14 mill to Sweden and 9 mill to Denmark. 
Export share is thus approximately 65%. Due to reduced interest rates in 2003 and 
reduced value of the Norwegian currency, they expected to experience improved 
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competitiveness. The Iraqi war also influenced in making investors sceptical to 
make long-term investments. 
 
Norsk Display has in the last couple of years had a modestly, positive result of with 
0.26mill NOK in 2004. The workforce was reduced to two in 2003. 
 
Opera Software went from quite large negative result in 2002 (- 14 mill) to 62 mill 
on the positive side in 2004. They have currently (2004) one hundred and twenty-
six employees in the concern. 
 
Optoflow was bought by Biodetect in the first quarter of 2002, from the third 
quarter and onwards Biodetect has taken care of the marketing and sale part, while 
Optoflow is now purely a development company. Optoflow received a loan from 
Biodetect in 2002 to the development for a new product to the defense industry, but 
it failed in the commercialization phase. They have lost 50% of the stockcapital in 
2004 and 2005 there has been a further worsening of the situation, continuing 
business is dependent upon great improvements or adding of new net capital.  
 
Superject has had a modestly positive result all years except in 2003 (- 0.3 mill). 
There has been some conflict among the Board of the company and the CEO. In 
2003 Superject became the subsidiary of the main shareholder Marcussen Holding 
AS and in 2004 the CEO was let go and he is now running a lawsuit against the 
company for unreasonable dismissal. There were five employees in 2003 and four 
in 2004.  
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Appendix 3: Interviewguide 
 
Globalisering og Internasjonalisering av Norsk Næringsliv  
 
Faktaopplysninger 
 
Hva er din posisjon i bedriften (tittel)? 
 
Var du med å starte opp bedriften? 
 
Har du høyre utdanning isåfall hvilke (teknisk,pedagogisk, økonomi, juridisk, 
ledelse, administrasjon)? 
 
Hvor gammel er du (evt. gi kategorier)? 
 
Hvilken bakgrunn har grunnleggeren av bedriften (teknisk, økonomisk, 
administrativ)? 
 
Hva var omsetningen deres i år 2001?  
 
Er det børsnotert selskap, familieselskap eller annet (har det endret seg – milepæler 
for bedr)? 
 
Er bedriften en del av et konsern (moderselskap (norsk/utenl), datterselskap)? 
 
Hvor mye eier grunder (i %)? 
 
Del 1  
Hvordan startet bedriften opp – hva var ideen bak? 
 
Startet dere eksport før dere hadde salg hjemme? 
 
Fulgte dere kunder ut? 
 
Hvilke land er dere inne i idag ? 
 
  
Hvilke marked gikk dere inn i først? 
 
Hvilke inngangsstrategi ble brukt i første utenlandske marked (agent, joint venture, 
distributør, salgskontor)? 
 
Hva påvirket valg av inngangstrategi? 
 
Hvordan ble potensielle partnere identifisert/evaluert? 
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Hvilke kriterier ble brukt? 
 
Hvilken distribusjonskanal er den mest brukte på de viktigste eksportmarkedene 
idag? 
 
Hvor stor del (omtrent) eier dere av denne distribusjonskanalen i deres viktigste 
eksportmarked 
(skriv  prosent eller 0 hvis de ikke har noe eierskap)? _______% 
 
I hvor mange (evt. hvilke) markeder har dere endret ”strategi” til en annen?  
______ 
 
Hva har vært hovedårsaken til skiftet? 
 
Hva er eksportandelen ifht total omsetning idag og tre år etter oppstart (i %)? 
   
Hva anser dere som deres viktigste internasjonale marked/område idag ? 
  
Hvor stor % av bedriftens totale salg ”originate”  utgår fra det viktigste markedet? 
 
Kjente dere til det viktigste markedet før oppstart? 
 
Hva er ser du som deres viktigste (nye) eksportmarked om tre år fra nå ? 
 
Hvor mange land eksporterer dere til idag? ______ 
 
Hvordan går dere fram for å finne nye kunder? 
 
Er internett viktig for dere? På hvilken måte? 
 
Hvordan vil du beskrive den generelle kontakten mellom kunder/leverandører (flest 
arms’length  
eller nære – viktigste nære? er det mange isåfall)? 
 
Hvordan håndterer dere uenigheter? 
 
Er opportunisme et problem? 
 
Del 2   
Hvordan oppfatter du konkurransepresset i din industri (sterkt, medium, svakt)? 
 
Hvordan oppfatter du industristrukturen (oligopolistisk vs fragmentert)? 
 
Hvordan oppfatter du handelsbarrierene til ulike marked innen din industri (store 
hindringer vs. ikke-eksisterende hindringer? 
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I hvilken grad oppfatter du deres kunder/leverandører som internasjonale (stor grad 
vs. liten grad)? 
 
Hvordan oppfatter du det internasjonale etterspørselsmønsteret (globalt vs. lokalt)? 
 
Hvorfor gikk dere internasjonalt (på grunn av lite hjemmemarked, hard 
konkurranse på hjemmemarked, så muligheter i utlandet, lett access, etc)? 
 
Del 3  
 
Har du arbeidet i utlandet tidligere? Hvis ja, hvor og hvor lenge? 
 
Har du studert i utlandet? Hvis ja, hvor og hvor lenge? 
 
Har du vokst opp/bodd i utlandet? Hvis ja, hvor og hvor lenge? 
 
Har du arbeidet i en utenlandsk bedrift? 
 
Har du hatt kontakt med utenlandske markeder før oppstart av denne bedriften, 
hvis så på hvilken måte?  
 
Hva var tankene ved oppstart - ble det planlagt ved oppstart å ”gå internasjonalt” 
med en gang? 
 
Hvilke språk behersker du? 
 
Del 4   
Har du noe nettverk fra å ha studert i utlandet/ bodd i utlandet/ tidligere arbeid i 
utlandet? 
 
Har dette nettverket på noen måte bidratt til å forenkle 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen til denne bedriften (mht til hvilket marked dere 
valgte å gå inn i og hvilken inngangsstrategi dere brukte)? 
 
Introduserte eller opplyste noen av de relasjonene dine deg til/om 
kunder/partnere/distributører i det utenlandske markedet? 
 
Hvordan vil du beskrive relasjonen din til den personen i dette nettverket (velg en 
vikrig relasjon i forkant av dette spørsmålet)? 
 
Hvor lenge har du kjent denne personen? 
 
Hvor ofte, i snitt,  har dere kontakt (daglig, ukentlig, månedlig)? 
 
Hvilken type kontakt har dere som oftest (per mail, telefon, ansikt til ansikt)? 
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Tilhører den viktige relasjonen til en bedrift dere er tilknyttet (leverandør, kunde, 
distributør o.l.) eller er det en rent personlig relasjon? 
- Hvis bedrift, hvilke beskrivelse passer best for den bedriften din relasjon 
er en del av (produsent/fabrikant, distributør/agent/grossist/forhandler, 
detaljist)?   
- Hvilken type interaksjon er der mellom din bedrift og bedrift X – hva blir 
kjøpt og solgt? 
 
Hva er din personlige rolle i disse handlene? 
 
Hvordan og hvorfor startet denne relasjonen mellom deg og denne personen? 
 
Del 5   
Hvor mange ansatte har dere i Norge ______  i utlandet _______? 
 
Hva er utdanningsnivået til de ansatte? 
 
Er det mange ansatte som har internasjonal erfaring? 
 
Gjennomsnittlig alder på de ansatte? 
 
Føler dere at, pga mer begrensede finanser, at dere har færre valgmuligheter når det 
gjelder å gå inn i nye markeder enn større bedrifter? 
 
Retter dere dere mot små spesialiserte nisjer i markedet? 
 
Del 6   
Beskriv produktet deres. 
  
- Er det industrirettet produkt eller konsument rettet? 
 
- Er det et ordinært eller mer spesialisert produkt? 
          
I hvilken grad er det standardisert? 
 
Er det et komplekst produkt? 
 
Må det fornyes ofte (blir det raskt foreldet)? 
 
Hvor sensitiv er etterspørselen etter produktet deres til pris, kvalitet og mote 
trender? 
 
Hva er prisnivået deres ifht konkurrentene? 
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Hvordan tror du kundene i deres viktigste eksport markeder vurderer kvaliteten av 
de produkter dere tilbyr ifht det deres konkurrenter tilbyr? 
 
Sammenlignet med det konkurrenten tilbyr er eksportproduktene deres unike på 
noe vis når det gjelder design, teknologi, markedsføring eller egenskaper?   
 
Del 7   
Hva er deres omtrentlige markedsandel i hovedeksportmarkedet?  
 
I forhold til tidligere forventninger, er du fornøyd med resultatet de siste tre årene 
når det gjelder: 
- markedsandel i dette markedet 
- salgsvekst i dette markedet 
- lønnsomhet i dette markedet 
 
Hvordan tror du salgsutviklingen for dere har vært på det viktigste eksportmarkedet 
ifht de største konkurrentene (lavere, høyere, likt)? 
 
Føler dere at dere har fullt ut utnyttet markedspotensialet i det viktigste 
eksportmarkedet? 
 
Føler dere at eksportarbeidet har vært en suksess? 
 
Hvor mange ansatte var dere  
da dere etablerte bedriften: 
  første året dere eksporterte: 
 
Hva var omsetningen  
første driftsåret: 
  første året dere eksporterte: 
 
Hvor stor var eksportandelen første året dere begynte med eksport:  % 
 
Del 8  
 
Hvor viktig er hver relasjon til den nåværende suksessen til bedriften?  Til den 
fremtidige suksessen? 
 
Er dere fornøyd med relasjonene? 
 
Hva vil du si karakteriserer en bra relasjon? (e.g. ofte ansikt til ansikt 
kommunikasjon, økt salg, konkurransefordel) 
 
Hvor viktig anser du bedriftens lokalisering for beslutningen om å 
internasjonalisere?  I valg av relasjonspartner? 
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Hvor viktig anser du konkurranse for beslutningen om å internasjonalisere? I valg 
av relasjonspartner?  
 
Hva anser du som bedriftens styrke/svakhet? 
 
Nøkkelsuksessfaktorer for å lykkes internasjonalt som en SME basert i Norge? 
 
Hva er fellene en bør unngå? 
 
Har dere en plan videre (formell/uformell)?  
 - vekst (antall ansatte, omsetning, eksportandel)? 
 
